Butchino v. City of Plattsburgh
| Docket Number | 8:20-cv-796 (MAD/CFH) |
| Decision Date | 14 January 2022 |
| Parties | ZACHARY BUTCHINO, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF PLATTSBURG, CHAD WELCH, ADAM WOOD, JOSHUA POND, KRISTOPHER MINOGUE, JOEL VASSAR, LEVI RITTER, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
KAUFMAN LIEB LEBOWITZDOUGLAS EDWARD LIEB, ESQ. & FRICK LLP Attorneys for Plaintiff.
FITZGERALD MORRIS BAKERSTEPHANIE McDERMOTT, ESQ. FIRSH P.C.JOHN D. ASPLAND, ESQ. Attorneys for Defendants.
On July 15, 2020, Plaintiff Zachary Butchino initiated this lawsuit against Defendants Chad Welch, Adam Wood, Joshua Pond, Kristopher Minogue, Joel Vassar, Levi Ritter (collectively, "Defendant Officers"), and the City of Plattsburg. See Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff alleges excessive force and failure to intervene claims against the Defendant Officers, and Monell liability as well as violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act against Defendant City. Specifically, Plaintiff's claims arise out of the force used against him by Defendant Officers on August 19, 2017, while in custody, in an effort to remove his shorts as a suicide prevention measure. Presently before the Court is Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Dkt. No. 27.
Plaintiff Zachary Butchino enlisted in the United States Army in 2007 and served in Afghanistan in 2009 and 2010. See Dkt. No. 33-1 at ¶¶ 5-6. In 2013, Plaintiff was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"). Id. at ¶ 124. On August 19, 2017, Plaintiff was arrested for assault by the Plattsburgh Police Department following a night of drinking. Id. at ¶¶ 122, 126. Plaintiff eventually pleaded guilty to a one-year conditional discharge for the assault charge. Id. at ¶ 123.
Following the assault and arrest, Plaintiff arrived at the Plattsburgh police station at approximately 3:21 a.m. Id. at ¶¶ 128, 130. Plaintiff was searched for weapons and contraband, and then placed in Cell 1. Id. at ¶ 11. Due to available surveillance video, most events in the jail are undisputed. From 3:54 a.m. to 4:06 a.m., while in Cell 1, Plaintiff repeatedly requested his medication, requested a phone call, and shook the cell door. Id. at ¶¶ 81-91. Plaintiff then began to sing about the disturbing violence he experienced while serving in Afghanistan, including "I killed a lot of people/they almost killed a lot of my people/my friend in Georgia is dead because [incomprehensible]/you should give me my medication/to prevent me from killing more people." Id. at ¶¶ 92, 95.
At 4:20 a.m., Plaintiff began to cry in his cell. Id. at ¶ 96. At 4:41 a.m., Plaintiff removed his shorts, placed one leg of his shorts over his head and tied the other leg of the shorts to the cell. Id. at ¶¶ 96-99. Following the apparent suicide attempt, Plaintiff refused to hand over his shorts to an officer, and instead put them back on. Id. at ¶ 101.
Defendant Officers subsequently moved Plaintiff to Cell 4 so Defendants could more easily monitor his behavior. Id. at ¶ 135. Throughout the transfer to Cell 4, Plaintiff was combative and struggled with Defendant Officers. Id. at ¶¶ 104-09. Plaintiff, once in Cell 4, still refused to comply with an order to remove his shorts. Id. at ¶ 112. Approximately fourteen seconds after Plaintiff was secured in Cell 4, Defendant Welch re-opened Plaintiff's cell, brandished a taser, and demanded Plaintiff remove his shorts. Id. at ¶¶ 222-23. Plaintiff, however, attempted to hold the door closed. Id. at ¶ 112. Defendants Welch, Wood, Pond and Minogue then opened the door and entered the cell. Id. at ¶¶ 113-14. Defendant Vassar stood at the back of the group outside the door of the cell. Id. at ¶ 115. Defendant Ritter observed the other Defendant Officers from behind a nearby desk in the booking room. Id. at ¶¶ 186-87.
The next fifty-six seconds, where the four officers were in his cell, are difficult to discern on the video. Defendants Welch, Wood and Pond were all near Plaintiff's torso and face, while Defendant Minogue successfully removed Plaintiff's shorts. Id. at ¶ 146. At the end, Plaintiff's face was visibly bloody. Id. at ¶ 119. Plaintiff testified that he was punched approximately ten times and was ultimately diagnosed with a deviated septum. Id. at ¶¶ 25, 163. Defendant Welch, however, testified that he punched Plaintiff twice, and no other Defendant stated that they punched Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 167. Additionally, it is undisputed that Defendant Wood "pulled on and squeezed" Plaintiff's genitals after Plaintiff's shorts had been removed. Id. at ¶ 169.
Following the incident, in a recorded conversation, Defendant Vassar told Plaintiff:
Ultimately, we don't want anybody getting hurt. We just want you back in the cell; we want you to be safe. We want you to be able to relax if you can-and I get that being in this room is not relaxing, and I understand that-but there's no way prior to this that we could have known that that would have set off PTSD. You know what I mean? We knew of your PTSD because we were informed of that by you. But we didn't know that being in that cell was going to trigger that. OK? Once we realized that it had triggered that, because of your up-and-down-mood and an attempt to hang yourself, we knew we had to act. And that's what we did. That's what our attempt was, was to act-was actually to protect you, not to hurt you.
A court may grant a motion for summary judgment only if it determines that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried and that the facts as to which there is no such issue warrant judgment for the movant as a matter of law. See Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 36 (2d Cir. 1994). When analyzing a summary judgment motion, the court "cannot try issues of fact; it can only determine whether there are issues to be tried." Id. at 36-37 (). Moreover, it is well-settled that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment may not simply rely on the assertions on its pleadings. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 (c), (e)).
In assessing the record to determine whether any such issues of material fact exist, the Court is required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Chambers, 43 F.3d at 36 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). Where the non-movant either does not respond to the motion or fails to dispute the movant's statement of material facts, the court may not rely solely on the moving party's Rule 56.1 statement; rather the Court must be satisfied that the citations to evidence in the record support the movant's assertions. See Giannullo v. City of New York, 322 F.3d 139, 143 n.5 (2d Cir. 2003) ().
"'Assessments of credibility and choices between conflicting versions of the events are matters for the jury, not for the court on summary judgment.'" Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 553-54 (2d Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). "However, '[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.'" Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252). "To defeat summary judgment, therefore, nonmoving parties 'must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts', ... and they may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation.'" Id. (quotations omitted).
Plaintiff brings a Section 1983 claim for use of excessive force under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. "[T]he Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989). The Supreme Court has held that "pretrial detainees (unlike convicted prisoners) cannot be punished at all." Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 400 (2015). "An officer's actions can amount to punishment if they are taken with 'an expressed intent to punish.'" Frost v. New York City Police Dep't, 980 F.3d 231, 252 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538, (1979)). Alternatively, in the absence of an expressed intent to punish, "a pretrial detainee can nevertheless prevail by showing that the actions are not rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose or that the actions appear excessive in relation to that purpose." Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 398. "[T]he appropriate standard for a pretrial detainee's excessive force claim is solely an objective one." Id. at 397. A pretrial detainee "must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable." Id. at 396-97. The "objective reasonableness" standard "turns on the facts and circumstances of each particular case." Frost, 980 F.3d at 252 (citing Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397).
First Plaintiff asks this Court to infer an express intent to punish because Defendants Welch and Wood lied about their behavior in reports and internal interviews. See Dkt. No. 33 at 12-13. Plaintiff argues that "[i]t is eminently reasonable to infer that Welch and Wood would not have gone to such great lengths to conceal the force they used if they had used it for legitimate reasons." Id. at 13. Such an inference, however, does not relate to whether they acted with an express intent to punish. There is no...
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