Butler v. Alabama Dept. of Transp., 2:06-CV-278-MEF.
| Decision Date | 21 May 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:06-CV-278-MEF.,2:06-CV-278-MEF. |
| Citation | 512 F.Supp.2d 1209 |
| Parties | Alverene D. BUTLER, Plaintiff, v. ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
Jay Lewis, Law Offices of Jay Lewis, LLC, Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff.
Jim R. Ippolito, Jr., Robert Mitchell Alton, III, George Robert Prescott, Jr., Harry A. Lyles, Jim R. Ippolito, Jr., Alabama Department of Transportation, Montgomery, AL, for Defendants.
Plaintiff Alverene Butler (hereinafter "Plaintiff") brings suit against Defendants Alabama Department of Transportation (hereinafter "ALDOT"), Mark T. Waits (hereinafter "Waits") and Patrick T. Jackson (hereinafter "Jackson") (hereinafter collectively "Defendants").1 Plaintiff alleges that Waits and Jackson retaliated and discriminated against her in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (" § 1981"), via 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (" § 1983"), and that ALDOT discriminated against her in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"). Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, declaratory judgment, equitable relief, and attorney's fees and costs. This cause is presently before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 25) and Motion to Strike (Doc. # 35). The Court has carefully considered the pleadings, briefs, and evidentiary submissions. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' motions are due to be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
The Court exercises subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question) and 1343(a) (civil rights). The parties contest neither personal jurisdiction nor venue, and the Court finds a sufficient factual basis for each.
Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 (11th Cir.1996) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). "A genuine issue of material fact does not exist unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in its favor." Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc) (quoting Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir.1995) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
The party seeking summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute of material fact, or by showing the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e) "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). On the other hand, a court ruling on a motion for summary judgment must believe the evidence of the nonmovant and must draw all justifiable inferences from the evidence in the nonmoving party's favor. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir.2003) (). After the nonmoving party has responded to the motion for summary judgment, the court must grant the motion if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
The Court has carefully considered all documents submitted in support of and in opposition to the motion. Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the submissions of the parties establish the following relevant facts:
Plaintiff is a black female who began working at ALDOT in Montgomery, Alabama in 1994. In July of that year, she was provisionally appointed as an Engineering Assistant (hereinafter "EA") I. She was given permanent status in March of 1999.
In November 2001, Plaintiff complained that her supervisor at the time, James Horace (hereinafter "Horace"), was sexually harassing her. Waits was Horace's supervisor. Plaintiff filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter "EEOC") Charge of Discrimination on August 28, 2002 and a departmental grievance in 2003 alleging harassment by Horace. ALDOT investigated Plaintiff's allegations against Horace. As a result of the investigation, ALDOT terminated Horace's employment in April 2003.
In January 2005, Plaintiff was an EA II/III, and Jackson was her immediate supervisor. Jackson also supervised Karen Stacey (hereinafter "Stacey"), a white female EA II/III who worked in the same office as Plaintiff. Jackson's supervisor was Waits, who also indirectly supervised Plaintiff. Joe McInness (hereinafter "McInness") was the director of ALDOT.
On January 31, 2005, Plaintiff and Stacey were involved in an accident while traveling in Stacey's car. Plaintiff believed that Stacey hit the other vehicle, while Stacey believed that the other vehicle had hit her. Stacey said to Plaintiff, "Did you see that stupid motherfucking nigger hit me?" Plaintiff confronted Stacey about the slur at the scene, and Stacey denied using it.
Jackson had Plaintiff's coworker Melvin Wynn (hereinafter "Wynn") take Plaintiff to the hospital. Stacey arrived at the hospital separately. While. Plaintiff was in the examining room, Stacey walked in and began talking about the accident. Plaintiff told Stacey to tell the truth and stated that Stacey had hit the other car. Stacey abruptly left the room. Plaintiff claims that when Jackson arrived at the hospital, she tried to tell him about Stacey's statement, but Jackson did not want to hear about it and would not let Plaintiff continue to tell him. Plaintiff did not file a grievance regarding the incident because she did not think that Waits would do anything about it.
At some point after she returned to work following the accident, Plaintiff went to Jackson's office. After they finished other business, Jackson told Plaintiff that Waits was "gunning for [her]" and that "when he is gunning for someone, he gets his man."
In April 2005, James Feagin (hereinafter "Feagin"), also an EA, told Stacey that Plaintiff had been telling coworkers that Stacey had used a racial epithet following the car accident. On April 6, 2005, Stacey told Jackson what Plaintiff had been saying about her.2
On April 11, 2005, Stacey confronted Plaintiff at a job site.3 Plaintiff's daughter had called her on her cell phone, and she was away from her coworkers. Stacey came up to her while she was talking to her daughter and said, "You need to stop going around here telling these lies on me." (Doc. # 27 Ex. A at 13.) Plaintiff asked Stacey what she said and Stacey repeated the statement. Plaintiff told her daughter that she would call her back. By then, the other coworkers had gathered around Plaintiff and Stacey.4
When Jackson arrived at the work site, he and Stacey had a private conversation about what had just occurred. Plaintiff attempted to tell him her account of the incident, but Jackson would not listen to her. Waits learned about this incident on or about April 8, 2005.
Jackson reprimanded Plaintiff for this incident. The reprimand, dated April 13, 2005, stated that Plaintiff violated work rules prohibiting "[i]nattention to job — doing anything distracting on the job" and "[d]isruptive conduct of any sort." (Doc. # 27 Ex. Q.) The reprimand stated that on April 8, 2005 he told Plaintiff that it would take him time to look into what Stacey had allegedly done and asked Plaintiff to give him a chance to investigate. It also stated, "I told you that I had not discussed this with anyone at the office other than Ms. Stacey." (Id.) The reprimand stated that Plaintiff's actions brought work to a complete halt and that the other employees were unable to complete their work. Further, it stated that Jackson had to go to the work site to deal with the incident. Jackson also wrote that he considered her actions a serious violation of work rules, and that similar actions in the future would cause him to request an immediate suspension pending Plaintiff's dismissal from ALDOT. Plaintiff denies that Jackson ever told her not to discuss Stacey's comment.
On April 14, 2005, Plaintiff received a performance appraisal. Her score was a 17.5...
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