Butler v. Albany Intern.

• Citation: 273 F.Supp.2d 1278
• Decision Date: 29 July 2003
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 01-F-1318-N.
• Parties: Jacquelyn T. BUTLER, Plaintiff, v. ALBANY INTERNATIONAL, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

273 F.Supp.2d 1278

Jacquelyn T. BUTLER, Plaintiff, v. ALBANY INTERNATIONAL, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 01-F-1318-N.

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.

July 29, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Alvin T. Prestwood, Linda Sue Wellman, Prestwood & Associates PC Montgomery, AL, for plaintiff.

Charles A. Powell, IV, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Thomas A. Davis, Jonathan Toby Dykes, Constangy, Brooks & Smith, Birmingham, AL, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

FULLER, District Judge.

Plaintiff, Jacquelyn T. Butler, filed a Complaint (Doc. # 1) on November 9, 2001, bringing claims of gender-based pay discrimination pursuant to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (hereinafter "Title VII") and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). On February 14, 2002, Defendant, Albany International (hereinafter "Albany") filed an Answer (Doc. # 4).

This action is presently before the court on the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant on April 23, 2003 (Doc. # 14). After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the relevant law, and the record as a whole, the court concludes that the motion for summary judgment is due to be GRANTED.

I. FACTS¹ AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Employment Background

Plaintiff, a female, has been employed with Albany² for almost twenty-five years. She was hired in September of 1978 as an Incentive Clerk with a pay grade level 6 ($7,072 annual base salary).³ A few months later, in January of 1979, Plaintiff became an Incentive and Purchasing Clerk.⁴ However, it was not until a year later, January of 1980, that Plaintiff's pay grade level was increased to level 8 ($9,300 annual base salary). In April of 1985, Plaintiff was promoted to Production Control Clerk and her pay grade level was increased to level 10 ($14,800 annual base salary).⁵

On June 1, 1988, the Production Control Coordinator, and Plaintiff's supervisor, Robert Hooper (hereinafter "Hooper"), received a promotion to Weaving Shift Supervisor. Due to Hooper's promotion, Plaintiff was promoted to the position of Production Control Coordinator⁶ and was directed to report to Larry Paschall (hereinafter "Paschall"), Albany's Plant Manager (Butler Dep., Ex. 1). Notwithstanding the new position, Plaintiff's pay grade level remained at level 10 ($16,700 annual base salary⁷).

In this new position, Plaintiff's duties included: performing warp planning in conjunction with Division Production Control, scheduling looms, printing tickets, issuing warp tickets, issuing cut forms, planning and organizing shipping as needed with independent trucking contractors, supervising regular and emergency truck drivers, working with Production Schedulers in Portland and Menasha, working with customer service, sales and technical persons, interacting with Group Leaders and Team Leaders, planning and organizing the Plant Physical Inventory on an annual basis, attending scheduling meetings, attending and recording minutes for morning meetings, checking for stock, issuing manufacturing tickets, entering daily production reports from Manufacturing into the computer, ordering raw materials through Division Production Control, issuing alteration orders to Manufacturing on a daily basis, compiling and distributing the weekly plant production report, scheduling fabrics, distributing date changes to finishing, changing dates on tickets in Weaving and Seaming, and working the expedite list. On April 1, 1995, Plaintiff's pay grade level was increased to level 12 ($25,800 annual base salary).

B. Gender-Based Discrimination Claims

Plaintiff bases her claims of discrimination on a comparison of her wages with those of a male co-worker, Bill Smith (hereinafter "Smith"). Smith began his employment with Albany in August of 1968 as a pern winder. After about six months, Smith moved to the position of weaver. Two to three years later, Smith transferred to the Appleton, Wisconsin plant⁸ to fulfill a supervisory position. Smith remained at the Appleton plant for three years, and returned to the Montgomery plant as a Seaming Supervisor. In this position, Smith has a pay grade level of level 17 ($20,600 annual base salary). In April of 1983, Smith was moved to the position of Finishing Supervisor and maintained a pay grade level of level 17 ($28,000 annual base salary).⁹

On January 18, 1989, Smith became Production Control Coordinator. An announcement dated for said date indicates that: (1) Smith "[would] move to production control as Montgomery Production Control Coordinator, reporting to [Paschall]," (2) Plaintiff "[would] report to [Smith] in her current job as Production Control Scheduler," and (3) Joe Lunsford "[would] move to Finishing as Finishing Supervisor, filling the opening created by [Smith's] moving to Production Control." (Butler Dep., Ex. 2). According to Smith, Plaintiff trained him¹⁰ and they constantly¹¹ performed the same tasks.¹² Notwithstanding these similarities, at that time, Smith's pay grade level remained at level 17 ($37,600 annual base salary) and Plaintiff's pay grade level remained at level 12 ($18,900 annual base salary).¹³

Over eleven years later, in May of 2000, Smith returned to the Manufacturing Department. An announcement dated May 2, 2000 indicates that Smith, "currently Production Control Coordinator, [would] move to the Finishing Department as a Finishing Team Leader, effective May 29, 2002" and that Plaintiff, "currently Production Scheduling Coordinator, [would] assume the responsibilities of Production Control Coordinator, effective June 1, 2000." (Butler Dep., Ex. 3). The announcement further indicated that Plaintiff would report to Ted Bryant (hereinafter "Bryant"), Human Resources and Office Services Manager, and that Corlis Miles (hereinafter "Miles"), Plant Secretary, "[would] maintain her current duties while assuming the additional responsibility of assisting [Plaintiff] in Production Control, effective May 8, 2000." (Id.). At that time, Plaintiff's grade level was at level 12 ($30,700 annual base salary)¹⁴ and Smith's grade level was at level 17 ($56,100 annual base salary).

On June 1, 2000, Plaintiff assumed the responsibilities of Production Control Coordinator and reported to Bryant.¹⁵ Plaintiff's duties in this position includes the following: issuing cut stock tickets to manufacturing; supervising one full-time truck driver; planning and organizing shipping as needed with independent trucking contractors; attending and recording the minutes of the morning meetings on Monday, Wednesday and Friday; attending warp planning meetings every six weeks; attending scheduled meetings; working with group leaders and team leaders; working with customer services, sales and technicals as needed; planning and organizing the plant physical inventory on an annual basis; checking for stock; issuing warp tickets; reviewing "hot fabrics" list at the morning meetings; conducting monthly cycle counts on inventory; and working with production schedulers in Portland and Menasha.¹⁶

C. Procedural History

After complaining of unequal treatment and receiving an unsatisfactory response,¹⁷ Cazalet gave Plaintiff no reason for the pay disparity (Butler Dep., at p. 134-135). Plaintiff filed a written charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter "EEOC") on May 17, 2001, alleging sex discrimination under Title VII and "adverse treatment" in violation of the Equal Pay Act (Compl., Ex. A). The EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue Letter on September 14, 2001 (Compl., Ex. B), and Plaintiff filed a timely suit in this court seeking back pay, front pay, interest, liquidated damages, and attorney fees (Doc. #1, Compl).

On April 23, 2003, Albany filed a motion for summary judgment (Doc. #14). Plaintiff filed her response to the motion on May 16, 2003 (Doc. #20), and on May 23, 2003, Defendant filed a reply (Doc. #21).

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The court exercises subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights), and 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended). The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue, and the Court finds adequate allegations supporting both.

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment can be entered on a claim only if it is shown "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). On a motion for summary judgment, the court is to construe the evidence and factual inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.¹⁸

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). This standard can be met by the movant, in a case in which the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial rests on the nonmovant either by submitting affirmative evidence negating an essential element of the nonmovant's claim or by demonstrating that the nonmovant's evidence itself is insufficient to establish an essential element of his or her claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an essential element to its claims, and on which it bears the burden of proof at trial. To satisfy this burden, the nonmovant cannot rest on its pleadings, but must, by affidavit or by other means, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). If the nonmoving party does not respond to a motion for summary judgment, the court may grant a motion for summary judgment in favor of the moving party, if defendant's presentation is sufficient to justify the court's...