Butler v. Becker
| Decision Date | 31 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 19-3261-SAC |
| Parties | RICHARD C. BUTLER, Plaintiff, v. SHERRI BECKER, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
This pro se civil rights complaint was filed by a state pre-trial detainee in the District Court of Atchison County, Kansas. Defendants thereafter removed the action to federal court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1443, and 1446. Plaintiff alleges his constitutional rights were violated when employees of the Atchison County Jail gave a letter he had written to a potential witness to the prosecutor, who then opened and read the letter. He seeks relief in the form of damages totaling $175,000.
This matter is before the Court for screening and upon a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 3) filed by Defendants. Also before the Court are a Motion for Leave to File Under Seal (ECF No. 6) filed by Defendants and ten (10) motions filed by Plaintiff, as well as six (6) responses to the Motion to Dismiss. For reasons that follow, the Court finds that Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed.
Screening of the Complaint
Before addressing any dispositive motions, the Court must screen Plaintiff's Complaint. The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of such entity to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Additionally, with any litigant, such as Plaintiff, who is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court has a duty to screen the complaint to determine its sufficiency. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Upon completion of this screening, the Court must dismiss any claim that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b), 1915(e)(2)(B).
"To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). A court liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th Cir. 2006). On the other hand, "when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief," dismissal is appropriate. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
A pro se litigant's "conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based." Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). "[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief' requires "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The Complaint's "factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level" and "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 555, 570.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained "that, to state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did it; how the defendant's action harmed [the plaintiff]; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated." Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). The court "will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff's behalf." Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
The Tenth Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court's decisions in Twombly and Erickson gave rise to a new standard of review for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). As a result, courts "look to the specific allegations in the complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief." Kay, 500 F.3d at 1218 (citation omitted). Under this new standard, "a plaintiff must 'nudge his claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.'" Smith, 561 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitted). "Plausible" in this context does not mean "likely to be true," but rather refers "to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent," then the plaintiff has not "nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1974).
Nature of the Matter Before the Court
At the time of filing, Plaintiff was being detained in the Atchison County Jail pending trial on rape charges. Plaintiff wrote a letter to the ex-boyfriend of the alleged victim, who Plaintiff wanted to testify at trial. Plaintiff mailed the letter on July 20, 2019, but "jail staff" insteaddelivered the letter to Defendant Becker, the prosecutor in Plaintiff's criminal case. Defendant Becker opened and read the letter. The letter was returned to Plaintiff or his attorney on or about September 10, 2019.
Plaintiff claims the violation of his First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He seeks damages in excess of $175,000 to compensate him for mental anguish and suffering.
Analysis
Plaintiff claims Defendants interfered with his "legal mail" and "grossly hindered his right to a fair trial." ECF No. 1, Attachment #1, at 1. Plaintiff asserts violation of the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments but does not provide further explanation of which rights under those amendments he believes were violated.
Not Legal Mail
The first problem with Plaintiff's allegations is his characterization of the letter as "legal mail." According to the Complaint, the letter was written by Plaintiff to a possible witness, addressed to that person, and intended to go directly to him. "Legal mail" is correspondence with courts or legal counsel. See Wardell v. Duncan, 470 F.3d 954, 959 n.4 (10th Cir. 2006); see also Cotner v. Knight, 61 F.3d 915 (Table), 1995 WL 441408, *5 (10th Cir. 1995); K.A.R. 44-12-601(a)(1)(A) () The letter here, while related to his criminal case, was not a letter to the court or to his appointed defense attorney. As such, it is not entitled to the heightened protection afforded "legal mail."
No Constitutional Violation
Even if the letter were "legal mail," Plaintiff fails to state a constitutional claim. Courts have identified three potential sources of constitutional protection for an inmate's legal mail. First, the mishandling of legal mail may implicate the inmate's right of access to the courts, which derives from the substantive due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the petition clause of the First Amendment. Stanley v. Vining, 602 F.3d 767, 770 (6th Cir. 2010); Villabona-Alvarado v. Rios, No. 07-cv-1937-MSK-MEH, 2009 WL 723308, *3 (D. Colo. Mar. 18, 2009) (citing Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 n.12 (2002)). A pretrial detainee has a "constitutional right to adequate, effective, and meaningful access to the courts." Friedman v. Kennard, 248 F. App'x 918, 921 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Love v. Summit County, 776 F.2d 908, 912 (10th Cir. 1985)). Furthermore, "unimpeded transmission of inmate legal mail is the 'most obvious and formal manifestation' of the right of access to the courts." Simkins v. Bruce, 406 F.3d 1239, 1243 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Crowder v. Sinyard, 884 F.2d 804, 811 (5th Cir.1989)).
However, in order "[t]o present a viable claim for denial of access to the courts, . . . an inmate must allege and prove prejudice arising from the defendants' actions." Peterson v. Shanks, 149 F.3d 1140, 1145 (10th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996) (). An inmate may satisfy the actual injury requirement by demonstrating that the alleged acts or shortcomings of defendants "hindered his efforts to pursue" a non-frivolous legal claim. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-53. "Conclusory allegations of injury in this respect will not suffice." Wardell, 470 F.3d at 959.
In Plaintiff's case, to meet the actual injury requirement, he must demonstrate that the delay in delivery of his letter to the potential witness prejudiced his defense. Plaintiff does not explainhow the delay from July 20 to September 10, 2019, prejudiced his defense when the trial was not set to start until March of 2020. The allegations in the Complaint do not show that Defendants' alleged actions caused Plaintiff to miss any court deadline, have any legal claim dismissed, or lose the ability to pursue any particular defense.
In response to the motion to dismiss filed by Defendants, Plaintiff does claim he suffered an actual injury. See ECF No. 5, at 1. He alleges because the letter was given to Defendant Becker, the judge in his criminal case refused to let Plaintiff subpoena the addressee of the letter. He seems to claim the addressee could have provided "exculpatory evidence." Id.
Based on Plaintiff's submissions, these claims make no...
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