Butler v. Carney
Decision Date | 02 December 1936 |
Docket Number | 6661.,6644,No. 6375,6646,6645,6375 |
Citation | 17 F. Supp. 133 |
Parties | BUTLER et al. v. CARNEY, and four other cases. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Edward R. Hale, of Boston, Mass., for plaintiffs in Nos. 6375, 6644, and 6645.
Edward R. Hale and Bennett Sanderson, both of Boston, Mass., for plaintiff in No. 6646.
Fox & Orlov, of Boston, Mass., for plaintiff in No. 6661.
Francis J. W. Ford, U. S. Atty., and Arthur L. Murray, Sp. Asst. to Atty., both of Boston, Mass., Robert H. Jackson, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Andrew D. Sharpe and Arthur P. Curran, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., for defendants.
These five suits were brought to recover taxes illegally collected under the provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, and the Act as amended, 7 U.S.C.A. § 601 et seq.
The case of William M. Butler et al. v. Carney, No. 6375, was begun by a writ dated April 22, 1935. Both processing taxes and floor stocks taxes are involved. The plaintiffs allege that they have filed claims for the refund of these taxes on the ground that the act imposing them was beyond the powers of Congress under the Constitution of the United States, and that their claims have been rejected by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The defendant in this case at first filed an answer, but has been allowed to withdraw his answer and substitute a demurrer.
The three cases brought by the Quissett Mill contain substantially similar allegations. The writs in these suits were dated January 13, 1936. As in the Butler case, both processing taxes and floor stocks taxes are involved.
The case of Hodgman Rubber Co. v. Carney involves floor stocks taxes only. The writ is dated January 10, 1936. The plaintiff's allegations do not differ materialy from those in the other cases.
To each of these declarations the defendant has filed a demurrer on the grounds that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine the controversy and that the facts, as stated therein, fail to set forth a cause of action.
It is the contention of the defendants that the provisions of title 7 of the Revenue Act of 1936 (sections 901-917 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 623 note, 644-659) are applicable to all of these suits and operate both to take away the jurisdiction of this court to hear these cases and to take away the right of the various plaintiffs to any recovery under the facts as set forth in their various declarations. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend that if these provisions of the Revenue Act of 1936 are applicable, they are unconstitutional, and of no effect.
In title 7 of the Revenue Act of 1936, provision is made for refunds of amounts collected under the Agricultural Adjustment Act. Section 902 (7 U.S.C.A. § 644) provides:
Section 903 (7 U.S.C.A. § 645), dealing with the filing of claims, provides:
Section 904 (7 U.S.C.A. § 646) provides limitations upon the time of bringing suit:
Section 906 (7 U.S.C.A. § 648) provides a special administrative remedy for the recovery of amounts paid as processing taxes. This section has no application to the recovery of amounts paid as floor stocks taxes.
The Commissioner is given three years in which to act upon such claims after they have been filed. A Board of Review is created, to consist of nine persons, to be officers or employees of the Treasury Department, designated to act by the Secretary of the Treasury. The Commissioner's allowance or disallowance of any claim is to be final, unless within three months the claimant files a petition with this Board of Review requesting a hearing on the merits of his claim, in whole or in part. The claimant is then allowed to appeal to the appropriate Circuit Court of Appeals, which is given exclusive jurisdiction to modify the decision of the Board of Review, if it is found to be not in accordance with law. Provision is made for taking any extra evidence before the Board of Review, if this becomes necessary.
Section 910 (7 U.S.C.A. § 652) abolishes the liability of Collectors under all circumstances:
So far as refunds of processing taxes are concerned, there is no doubt that the words of section 906 (7 U.S.C.A. § 648) apply to all applications for refunds, whether pending before the courts at the time of the passage of the act or not. The statute expressly so states. In addition there is a prohibition against "maintaining" any suit or proceeding. It has been held that such language includes suits already begun at the time of the passage of the act. Smallwood v. Gallardo, 275 U.S. 56, 48 S. Ct. 23, 72 L.Ed. 152. As to the recovery of amounts paid as floor stocks taxes, there is more difficulty. The language of section 902 (7 U.S.C.A. § 644) does not differ, in this particular, materially from that used in section 21 (d) (1) of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended (7 U.S.C.A. § 623 (d) (1). It has been held that the latter statute has no application to suits begun before its passage. Wilkes Barre Lace Mfg. Co. v. Mundy (D.C.) 13 F.Supp. 870. Section 21 (d) of the Agricultural Adjustment Act (7 U.S.C.A. § 623 (d), moreover, is now expressly repealed by section 901 of the Revenue Act of 1936 (7 U.S.C.A. § 623 note). The same considerations are perhaps applicable to section 903 (7 U.S.C.A. § 645) relative to the filing of claims. Section 904 (7 U.S.C.A. § 646), however, provides that no suit or proceeding, whether begun before or after the passage of the act, may be begun or maintained "before the expiration of eighteen months from the date of filing a claim therefor under section 645 of this title." The effect of this language would appear to be to cut off any proceedings pending at the time of the passage of the act.
It is necessary to decide, therefore, whether any violation of the Constitution of the United States is involved in the statutes quoted above. In the first place, the plaintiffs contend that the effect of section 910 (7 U.S.C.A. § 652), quoted above, is to deprive them of a common-law right against the collector of internal revenue, and that consequently they...
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Seligman's, Inc. v. United States
...provisions of Title IV. Analogous criticism may be made of the use of the phrase "floor stock taxes" found in the case of Butler et al. v. Carney, D.C. 17 F.Supp. 133. Plaintiff by the nature of its claim, being a gratuity, may only use for recovery the provisions of Title IV, wherein no co......
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Royal Worcester Corset Co. v. White
...remedy. Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, Coll., 5 Cir., 87 F.2d 773; Wilkes Barre Lace Mfg. Co. v. Mundy, D.C., 18 F.Supp. 65; Butler v. Carney, D.C., 17 F.Supp. 133. This remedy may be subject to conditions imposed by Congress, Tucker v. Alexander, Coll., 275 U.S. 228, 231, 48 S.Ct. 45, 72 L.Ed......
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Edwin Cigar Co. v. Higgins
...par. 35824), affirmed (C.C.A. 5) 87 F.(2d) 773, and by the District Court of Massachusetts in Butler v. Carney, and four other cases, 17 F.Supp. 133, decided December 2, The court has not overlooked a ruling of the District Court of Virginia (see Charles W. Priddy & Co., Inc., v. Early no o......
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Wilkes Barre Lace Mfg. Co. v. Mundy, 3780.
...conditions prescribed by the statute, and the suit must be dismissed. The same result has been reached in a similar case, Butler v. Carney (D.C.Mass.) 17 F.Supp. 133, opinion filed December 2, Now, January 28, 1937, the suit is dismissed. ...