Butler v. Cnty. of San Diego

• Decision Date: 20 October 2022
• Docket Number: 22-cv-690-MMA (DEB)
• Parties: STEPHON BUTLER Inmate #22709674, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; ANTHONY REY, Sheriff, San Diego County; MONTGOMERY, San Diego County Sheriff's Dept. Chief Medical Officer; SONIA L. MANNING, Commander of VDF, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of California

STEPHON BUTLER Inmate #22709674, Plaintiff,
v.
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; ANTHONY REY, Sheriff, San Diego County; MONTGOMERY, San Diego County Sheriff's Dept. Chief Medical Officer; SONIA L. MANNING, Commander of VDF, Defendants.

No. 22-cv-690-MMA (DEB)

United States District Court, S.D. California

October 20, 2022

ORDER DISMISSING CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) AND 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) AND DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL TO EFFECT SERVICE OF AMENDED COMPLAINT [ECF No. 10] AND SUMMONS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) & Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(c)(3)

HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

On May 13, 2022, Plaintiff Stephon Butler (“Plaintiff” or “Butler”), currently housed at the Vista Detention Facility (“VDF”), located in Vista, California, and proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Doc. No. 1 (“Compl.”). Plaintiff did not pay the filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) to commence a civil action; instead, he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Doc. No. 2.

On July 19, 2022, the Court granted Butler's IFP motion and dismissed his Complaint for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1). Doc. No. 6. Butler was given forty-five (45) days to file an Amended

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Complaint that cured the deficiencies of pleading outlined in the Court's dismissal Order. Id. Butler was also cautioned that “Defendants not named and any claims not re-alleged in the First Amended Complaint will be considered waived.” Id. at 15 (first citing S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; then citing Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”); and then citing Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (nothing that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”)).

On August 8, 2022, Butler filed an Amended Complaint. Doc. No. 10 (“FAC”). In his FAC, Butler no longer names Defendants Classification Deputy, San Diego Sheriff's Department; Medical Staff, San Diego Sheriff's Department, and the San Diego Sheriff's Department in this matter. Thus, the claims against these Defendants are deemed waived and the Clerk of Court is directed to terminate these Defendants from the docket. See Lacey, 693 F.3d at 928.

I. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) and § 1915(e)(2)

A. Standard of Review

As with Butler's original Complaint, because Butler is a prisoner, his FAC requires a pre-answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner's IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.'” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of

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Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121.

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).

C. Discussion

Butler's FAC names San Diego County, San Diego Sheriff Anthony Rey, Chief Medical Officer Montgomery, and Sonia Manning, Commander of VDF (“Defendants”).

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See FAC. He alleges in his FAC that his federal Due Process, Equal Protection, First Amendment, and Eighth Amendment rights have been violated by Defendants. See Id. In Count One, he claims Defendants have violated his Due Process and Equal Protection rights by improperly using his involuntary manslaughter conviction to increase his classification, which resulted in his housing assignment being more restrictive. See id. at 6-7. In Counts Two and Three, Butler claims the Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to treat his knee pain, delaying recommended knee surgery, denying him dentures, and delaying treatment for kidney pain which resulted in Butler developing a kidney infection. Id. at 3-8. He claims his complaints have been ignored by the VDF's Medical Department and that the Department has a policy of denying an delaying medical care. Id. at 5. Butler also alleges in Count Four that he has been subjected to lengthy periods of time being locked in his cell because the Sheriff's Department is understaffed. Id. at 6. Finally, he alleges in Count Five that his mail has been repeatedly delayed. Id. at 7.

1. Classification Claim (Count One)

Butler alleges Defendants' improper classification and housing assignment violate his federal Due Process and Equal Protection rights. See id. at 3. As the Court explained to Butler in its July 19, 2022 Order, “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural protection must establish that one of these interests is at stake.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). “To state a procedural due process claim, [a plaintiff] must allege ‘(1) a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the interest by the government; (and) (3) lack of process.'” Wright v. Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Portman v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 1993)). Liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause “will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on

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the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).

Prisoners have “no constitutional right to a particular classification or to earn credits.” Hernandez v. Adams, No. 1:08-cv-00254 LJO MJS HC, 2010 WL 5071131, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2010); Hernandez v. Johnston, 833 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n. 9 (1976) (Due Process Clause not implicated by federal prisoner classification and eligibility for rehabilitative programs, even where inmate suffers “grievous loss”). Because Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged he was deprived of “a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution,” Wright, 219 F.3d at 913, he has not stated a claim for which § 1983 relief can be granted. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1).

With regard to Butler's equal protection claims, the Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985); Hartmann v. California Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2013); Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013); Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 891 (9th Cir. 2008).^[1] To state a claim, Butler must show that Defendants intentionally discriminated against him based on his membership in a protected class. Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1123; Furnace, 705 F.3d at 1030; Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003). Butler fails to make any such allegation, and “neither prisoners nor ‘persons convicted of crimes'

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constitute a suspect class for equal protection purposes.” United States v. Whitlock, 639 F.3d 935, 941 (9th Cir. 2011); Glauner v. Miller, 184 F.3d 1053, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[P]risoners are not a suspect class ....”); United States v. Smith, 818 F.2d 687, 691 (9th...