Butler v. Corp. of President of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter–Day Saints

• Decision Date: 03 October 2014
• Docket Number: 20130709.,Nos. 20130612,s. 20130612
• Parties: Christy BUTLER, Appellant, v. CORPORATION OF the PRESIDENT OF the CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER–DAY SAINTS, Appellee. Christy Butler, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Thomas L. Kay, Respondent.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

337 P.3d 280

2014 UT 41

Christy BUTLER, Appellant

v.CORPORATION OF the PRESIDENT OF the CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER–DAY SAINTS, Appellee.

Christy Butler, Petitioner

v.The Honorable Thomas L. Kay, Respondent.

Nos. 20130612

20130709.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Oct. 3, 2014.

Linda M. Jones, Lindy W. Hamilton, Troy L. Booher, Erin Bergeson Hull, Robert W. Gibbons, Salt Lake City, for appellant and petitioner.

Stephen J. Trayner, Peter H. Christensen, Alexander Dushku, Swen R. Swenson, Kathryn Tunacik Smith, Salt Lake City, for appellee.

Brent M. Johnson, Salt Lake City, for respondent.

Justice PARRISH authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice NEHRING and Justice DURHAM joined.

Justice PARRISH, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1 This case comes before us on cross-motions for summary disposition and on a petition for an extraordinary writ. The issues presented in the motions and the petition are (1) whether an interlocutory decision is subject to the implementing order requirements of rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and, if so, (2) whether a rule 54(b) certification can satisfy the rule 7(f)(2) requirements for an interlocutory decision. We answer both questions in the affirmative but explain that for a single order to satisfy both rule 54(b) and rule 7(f)(2), it must meet the requirements of both rules.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 2 This appeal stems from Christy Butler's personal injury suit against Lauren K. Ford and the Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (COP). Butler filed a complaint alleging that she was injured in an automobile accident caused by Ford's negligent driving. The complaint also alleges that Ford was an agent of COP acting within the scope of the agency relationship at the time of the accident. Thus, Butler seeks to hold COP vicariously liable for Butler's injuries under a theory of respondeat superior.

¶ 3 COP moved for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of all of Butler's claims against it. The district court granted COP's motion in a memorandum decision titled “Ruling and Order on Motion for Summary Judgment” (Summary Judgment Ruling). COP did not submit a proposed implementing order with its motion for summary judgment, nor did it serve Butler with a proposed order within fifteen days of the district court's Summary Judgment Ruling, as required by rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. And the Summary Judgment Ruling itself did not state that no further order was required. As a result, the district court did not enter an order implementing the Summary Judgment Ruling.

¶ 4 Approximately a month after the district court issued its Summary Judgment Ruling, COP filed a motion for rule 54(b) certification of final judgment, in which it requested that the court certify the Summary Judgment Ruling as final for purposes of appeal. COP included with its motion a proposed “Order Directing Entry and Certification of Final Judgment under Rule 54(b),” but did not serve the proposed order on Butler prior to filing it with the court. Butler did not oppose the motion, and the district court subsequently signed and entered the proposed order (Certification Order). The order stated:

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs' [sic ] claims against COP be and are dismissed with prejudice and that ... [t]he Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendant COP ... is a final judgment of the court under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Court expressly directs entry and certification of final judgment to that effect.

(Emphasis added). The clerk of the court thereafter made a docket entry stating, “Case Disposition is Dismd w [sic ] prejudice.”

¶ 5 COP did not serve the signed Certification Order on Butler as required by rules 5(b)(2)(A) and 58A(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. And Butler alleges that although her counsel “regularly monitored” the online docket through “one of the court's approved e-filing providers,” the Certification Order did not appear on the e-filing provider's system until over a month after it had been entered. Thus, according to Butler, she was unaware that the Certification Order had been signed and entered until more than thirty days had passed from its entry.

¶ 6 Operating under the assumption that two orders were still forthcoming—a rule 7(f)(2) order implementing the court's Summary Judgment Ruling and a rule 54(b) certifying order (as opposed to an order “direct[ing] entry and certification”)—Butler did not file a notice of appeal upon learning of the Certification Order. Instead, Butler filed what she titled a “Motion to Proceed with Her Appeal.” In the motion, Butler explained that she believed her time to appeal the Summary Judgment Ruling had not begun to run because neither party had filed an implementing order for the Summary Judgment Ruling and the Certification Order alone did not constitute a final order.

¶ 7 Butler alternatively argued that if the time for appeal had begun to run on the day the Certification Order was entered, the court should grant Butler an extension of time to appeal pursuant to rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Butler argued that “the unusual actions” that had taken place following the Summary Judgment Ruling “violated the Rules of Civil Procedure” and had been “beyond Plaintiff's control.” Butler filed a proposed order with her motion, which she alleged was both rule 7(f)(2) and rule 54(b) compliant.

¶ 8 COP opposed Butler's motion, arguing that “[a] final Rule 56 Order has been entered and a Rule 54(b) motion has been granted certifying that Order as final. Nothing more was necessary to start the running of time for Plaintiff to file a notice of appeal.” COP further argued that Butler should not be granted additional time to file a notice of appeal because Butler had not demonstrated excusable neglect or good cause as required by rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Specifically, COP alleged that, contrary to Butler's assertion that there had been a glitch in the e-filing service provider's system, Butler had simply failed to diligently check with the clerk of the court to determine whether the rule 54(b) order had been entered.¹ COP also opposed Butler's proposed order, arguing that “[t]he court has already issued a final [rule 7 compliant] order on Defendant COP's Motion for Summary Judgment” through its Summary Judgment Ruling.

¶ 9 The court held a hearing on Butler's motion to proceed with her appeal. After the parties presented their arguments, the district court ruled from the bench. Without addressing Butler's argument that the time for appeal had not yet begun to run, the court ruled that Butler had shown neither good cause nor excusable neglect for an extension of time to appeal under rule 4(e). Although the district court declined to address the interplay between rules 7(f)(2) and 54(b), it acknowledged that the issue “really ... hasn't been clearly decided.” The court also stated that this case would provide an opportunity for “the appellate courts [to] clarify who's right.” Despite its acknowledgment that the rules were unclear, the district court denied Butler's motion to either proceed with her appeal or to extend the time to appeal and entered an order consistent with its ruling. Within one month of the district court's ruling, Butler filed a notice of appeal in which she stated her intent to appeal both the ruling on her motion to proceed with her appeal and the underlying Summary Judgment Ruling.

¶ 10 One day after Butler filed her appellate docketing statement, COP filed a motion for summary disposition. See Utah R.App. P. 10(a)(2) (explaining that a party may move for summary disposition within ten days after the docketing statement is filed). COP argues that Butler's appeal should be summarily dismissed because Butler failed to timely file a notice of appeal of the district court's Summary Judgment Ruling. Although COP no longer contends that the Summary Judgment Ruling alone meets the requirements of rule 7(f)(2), it argues that the subsequent Certification Order rendered the Summary Judgment Ruling a “final, appealable order and judgment ... even if the original summary judgment decision was not in the form prescribed by rule 7(f).” COP further argues that the district court acted within its discretion in denying Butler's motion for an extension of the time to appeal. In short, COP argues that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear Butler's appeal and that her appeal must therefore be dismissed with prejudice.

¶ 11 Butler also filed a motion for summary disposition. She argues that the Summary Judgment Ruling lacked a necessary rule 7(f)(2) implementing order and that, although the district court subsequently directed entry of final judgment under rule 54(b) in its Certification Order, final judgment was never actually entered. Butler urges this court to dismiss her appeal without prejudice and asks us to direct the district court to enter a rule 7(f)(2) order and a final rule 54(b) judgment.

¶ 12 Butler simultaneously filed a petition for an extraordinary writ. Relying on the same arguments presented in her motion for summary disposition, Butler's petition asks this court to issue an order “compelling the [district court] to enter a rule 7(f)(2) order and a final rule 54(b) judgment.”

¶ 13 We consolidate the motions for summary disposition and the extraordinary writ and hold that neither the Summary Judgment Ruling nor the Certification Order satisfied rule 7(f)(2) for purposes of triggering the time to appeal the Summary Judgment Ruling. We therefore dismiss this appeal without prejudice. We decline to grant Butler's petition for extraordinary writ because this is not a case where “no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available.” Utah R. Civ . P. 65B(a). Instead, having clarified the law, we conclude that the district court is now equipped to...