Butler v. Directsat USA, LLC

• Decision Date: 16 October 2014
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. DKC 10–2747.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
• Parties: Jeffry BUTLER, et al. v. DIRECTSAT USA, LLC, et al.

55 F.Supp.3d 793

Jeffry BUTLER, et al.

v.DIRECTSAT USA, LLC, et al.

Civil Action No. DKC 10–2747.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

Filed Oct. 16, 2014.

Daniel Adlai Katz, Law Office of Gary M. Gilbert and Associates PC, Silver Spring, MD, Jac A. Cotiguala, Jac A. Cotiguala and Associates, James B. Zouras, Ryan F. Stephan, Stephan Zouras LLP, Chicago, IL, for Jeffry Butler, et al.

Colin D. Dougherty, Jonathan David Christman, Fox Rothschild LLP, Blue Bell, PA, Dirk Densford Haire, Nicholas T. Solosky, Fox Rothschild LLP, Washington, DC, John Augustine Bourgeois, Kramon and Graham PA, Baltimore, MD, for DirectSat USA, LLC, et al.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DEBORAH K. CHASANOW, District Judge.

Presently pending and ready for resolution in this Fair Labor Standards Act collective action case is a motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 257), filed by Defendants DirectSAT USA, LLC (“DirectSAT”), UniTek USA, LLC (“UniTek”), and UniTek Global Services, Inc (“UGS”). Also pending are motions to seal filed by Defendants and Plaintiff Jeffry Butler. (ECF Nos. 265 and 270). The issues have been fully briefed and the court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the following reasons, Defendants' motion for summary judgment, and motion to seal will be granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiff Butler's motion to seal will be denied.

I. Background

Defendant DirectSAT, a subsidiary of UniTek and UGS, provides satellite installation services to DirecTV customers throughout the country. Plaintiff Jeffry Butler (“Plaintiff Butler” or “Butler”) is a technician who previously installed, upgraded, and serviced DirecTV equipment at customer locations in Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia.¹ Defendants classified Butler's position as non-exempt under federal and state wage and hour laws. Butler began working for Defendants as a technician in October 2007 and held this position until July 20, 2008, when he was promoted to warehouse manager. He typically worked six or seven days per week.

Technicians were paid pursuant to a “job rate” or “piece rate” system. Technicians would be given assignments at the beginning of the day, go out into the field and complete those assignments, report back as to the work performed, and be paid based on credits accounting for quantity and type of work, as opposed to an hourly wage.² Technicians were instructed to clock-in when they arrived at their first job-site and clock-out when they left their last job-site of the day. Plaintiff Butler alleges that he regularly worked more than forty hours per week without proper overtime compensation and, furthermore, was encouraged by Defendants to begin work before the start of his route and continue working after completing his last work order, thereby performing work without being paid. This alleged off-the-clock work included receiving work orders at home, mapping out his route, preparing satellite dishes, and loading and unloading equipment from his company vehicle. Butler also alleges that Defendants had a uniform policy and practice to encourage unpaid work and deny earned overtime.

On October 4, 2010, Plaintiff Butler brought suit against Defendants alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) (Count I), the Maryland Wage and Hour Law (“MWHL”) (Count II), the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law (“MWPCL”) (Count III), and the District of Columbia Minimum Wage Law (“DCMWL”) (Count IV). (ECF No. 1). As to the FLSA claim, Butler sought to represent a collective of all technicians employed by Defendants in Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia during the applicable statute of limitations period for unpaid overtime. Butler alleges that the collective is similarly situated in that they all had similar duties, performed similar tasks, were subjected to the same requirements under the FLSA to be paid overtime wages unless specifically exempted thereunder, were subjected to similar pay plans, were required to work and did work more than forty hours per week, and were not paid one and one-half times their regular rate for overtime worked. As to the Maryland and D.C. law claims, Butler sought to represent a class comprised of all technicians employed by Defendants during the applicable statute of limitations period in Maryland and D.C., respectively. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and the court, through Memorandum Opinion and Order dated July 6, 2011, granted in part Defendants' motion, dismissing Butler's MWPCL claim (Count III).³ (ECF Nos. 28 and 29). Plaintiff Butler has seemingly abandoned representing a class on his state law claims as he failed to move for conditional certification by the October 1, 2012 deadline. (ECF No. 79). On November 1, 2011, Butler moved for conditional certification of an FLSA collective action and to facilitate notice pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). (ECF No. 41). On April 10, 2012, Plaintiff Butler's motion was granted and a collective consisting of all technicians based out of Defendants' Waldorf and Beltsville warehouses during the past three years was conditionally certified and notices were disseminated. (ECF No. 65 and 66). At one point, fifty-two (52) technicians initially declared their desire to be opt-in Plaintiffs, but many opt-in Plaintiffs have been dismissed for a variety of reasons, leaving Mr. Butler as the named Plaintiff and twenty-five (25) others as opt-in Plaintiffs (collectively “Plaintiffs”).

On May 12, 2014, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment as to the only named Plaintiff Jeffry Butler's claims. (ECF No. 257). Butler filed an opposition on July 16, 2014 (ECF No. 268), to which Defendants replied on August 15, 2014 (ECF No. 273). The parties each filed unopposed motions to seal certain exhibits attached to their filings. (ECF Nos. 265 and 270).

II. Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Standard of Review

A motion for summary judgment will be granted only if there exists no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) ; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. No genuine dispute of material fact exists, however, if the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of his or her case as to which he or she would have the burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Therefore, on those issues on which the nonmoving party has the burden of proof, it is his or her responsibility to confront the summary judgment motion with an affidavit or other similar evidence showing that there is a genuine dispute for trial.

In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., the Supreme Court of the United States explained that, in considering a motion for summary judgment, the “judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Thus, “the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the [nonmoving party] on the evidence presented.” Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

In undertaking this inquiry, a court must view the facts and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom “in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962) ); see also EEOC v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424 F.3d 397, 405 (4th Cir.2005). The mere existence of a “scintilla” of evidence in support of the non-moving party's case is not sufficient to preclude an order granting summary judgment. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

A “party cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact through mere speculation or compilation of inferences.” Shin v. Shalala, 166 F.Supp.2d 373, 375 (D.Md.2001) (citation omitted). Indeed, this court has an affirmative obligation to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from going to trial. See Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778–79 (4th Cir.1993) (quoting Felty v. Graves–Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir.1987) ).

B. Analysis

1. Statute of Limitations

Defendants first argue that Butler's claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The FLSA provides for a two-tiered statute of limitations, depending on the standard of culpability a plaintiff can prove. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). By default, a plaintiff must commence an FLSA action within two years of the date the cause of action accrued. If Butler can prove a “willful violation” of the FLSA, however, the period to commence an FLSA cause of action is extended to three years. Id.

In his answers to Defendants' interrogatories, Butler states that Defendants employed him as a technician from August 2007 to July 20, 2008.⁴ (ECF No. 264). Thus, the outer limits of his FLSA claim extend to July 20, 2010, or to July 20, 2011, if he can prove willfulness. Butler filed his complaint in October 2010. Defendants contend, however, that because Butler is bringing a collective action, the statute of limitations did not toll until he filed a consent form opting-in to the collective action, despite the fact that he is a named Plaintiff.

At first glance, Defendants' argument seems needlessly formalistic, but it cannot be denied that “[c]ourts have repeatedly interpreted [29 U.S.C. § ]256 as requiring all plaintiffs in an FLSA collective action,...