Butler v. LOCAL NO. 4 AND LOCAL NO. 269, LABORERS'INT. U.
| Decision Date | 09 October 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 69 C 432.,69 C 432. |
| Citation | 308 F. Supp. 528 |
| Parties | Charlie BUTLER a/k/a Charles Butler and Curtis Bush, Individually and as Representatives of a Class, Plaintiffs, v. LOCAL NO. 4 AND LOCAL NO. 269, LABORERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA (AFL-CIO) and District Council of Chicago and Vicinity of the Laborers' International Union of North America, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Joseph Minsky, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs.
Daniel Steiner, Gen. Counsel, Russell Specter, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Philip B. Sklover, Atty., Washington, D. C., Thomas A. Foran, U. S. Atty., amicus curiae for Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
Marvin Gittler, Asher, Greenfield, Gubbins & Segall, Chicago, Ill., for defendants.
This action was brought by the plaintiffs under section 706(e), Title VII, of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). The complaint alleges that defendant locals, of which the plaintiffs are members respectively, and their District Council are guilty of unlawful employment practices against the plaintiffs and other Negro members of the union. They seek to maintain this suit as a class action on behalf of themselves and all other Negro members of the defendant locals and all other locals which are members of the defendant District Council. The District Council has moved for summary judgment for lack of jurisdiction. The defendant Locals have moved to dismiss because of the absence of indispensible parties. In the alternative the locals have moved for an order prohibiting the maintenance of a class action and have moved to strike portions of the plaintiffs' complaint. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has filed a brief as amicus curiae in opposition to defendants' motions. All defendants have moved to strike certain portions of the Commission's brief and affidavits filed by the plaintiffs. The District Council's motion for summary judgment will be treated as a motion to dismiss.
Butler, a member of Local 4 of the Laborers' International Union of North America, and Bush, a member of Local 269 of the same union, each filed verified charges of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against their respective locals. After deferment to the State of Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b-d), the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission began an investigation of the charges and subsequently notified the plaintiffs, in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), that a civil action could be brought within thirty days against the respondents named in the charge. The plaintiffs then filed this action against their locals and the District Council.
In support of its motion to dismiss, the council contends that the statute authorizing an action in the District Court makes it a jurisdictional prerequisite that any party sought to be sued must have been a respondent in the charge brought before the Commission. It is argued that since the District Council was not charged before the Commission it can not be sued here. The section in question, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), provides in part:
If within thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission or within thirty days after expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c) of this section * * *, the Commission has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance with this subchapter, the Commission shall so notify the person aggrieved and a civil action may, within thirty days thereafter, be brought against the respondent named in the charge * * *.
This language has consistently been held to make the naming of a respondent in a charge before the Commission a jurisdictional prerequisite to a civil action against that party under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Mickel v. South Carolina State Employment Service, 377 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1967); Sokolowski v. Swift & Co., 286 F.Supp. 775, 782 (D.C.Minn. 1968); Cox v. United States Gypsum Co., 284 F.Supp. 74, 76 (N.D.Ind.1968), aff'd 409 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1969); Mondy v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 271 F.Supp. 258, 266 (E.D.La.1967). There is, however, language in some of these cases indicating that the rule need not be strictly applied where there exists between the defendants, one of whom was not charged before the Commission, an agency relationship by which a common enterprise of discrimination is being carried out. Taylor v. Armco Steel Corp., C.A. 68-H-129 (S.D.Tex. June 9, 1969), so held. This construction of the statute was expressed in Sokolowski v. Swift & Co., supra 286 F.Supp. at 782.
The rationale of the above-cited cases seems to be that in the absence of allegations in the complaint, and later supported by evidence, that something in the nature of an agency relationship exists whereby one party is carrying out the plan of another to effect a discriminatory employment practice, each defendant must be named in the charge before the Commission in order that suit later may be brought against such person. The allegation in the complaint in Sokolowski, et al consisting only of the simple statement that the Local and the International are "affiliated" falls far short of such requirement.
The plaintiffs urge that Armco Steel and the dicta in Sokolowski should be followed and that the relationship between the defendants here is sufficiently close and their activities sufficiently dependent that technical compliance with the statute should not be required. The District Council is composed of delegates from each of the union's locals in the Chicago area. These delegates in turn elect the officers of the Council which bargains for and binds the locals to agreements with the employers in the industry. The plaintiffs rely on the functional connection between the locals and the District Council and affidavits of the plaintiffs and other members of the locals, indicating that members of the District Council have in the past exercised influence and control over the locals.
It is the opinion of this Court that the District Council's motion to dismiss must be granted. The language of the statute is clear and unequivocal that a party must be a respondent before the EEOC before he may be sued under Title VII. In Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969), the Court stated:
It is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the filing of a suit under Title VII that a charge be filed with the EEOC against the party sought to be sued. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). This provision serves two important purposes. First, it notifies the charged party of the asserted violation. Secondly, it brings the charged party before the EEOC and permits effectuation of the Act's primary goal, the securing of voluntary compliance with the law. While we believe that the Union was not entirely blameless in permitting discrimination to exist and could have worked harder to eliminate the residual and continuing effects of the blatant prior discrimination, it is undisputed that at no time was the Union ever charged before the EEOC as a party in violation of Title VII. Accordingly, the Union cannot be held liable for any damages resulting from discrimination and the trial court's determination in favor of the Union is affirmed.
It is the position of the plaintiffs and the holding of Taylor v. Armco Steel Corp., supra, that the statute's definition of labor organization to include any agent of such organization, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(d), extends jurisdiction in this Court to any agent of a party charged before the Commission. This Court does not agree. Defining a labor organization to include its agents delineates the scope of application of the sections of Title VII prohibiting unlawful employment practices. It does not suggest that the term "respondent" as used in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) has the same meaning. According to the definition, the activities of agents of labor organizations are subject to the provisions of Title VII. However, the charging of one before EEOC does not make a respondent of the other.
The situation may be different where there is substantial identity between the parties but that is not the case here. The plaintiffs have submitted affidavits which relate incidents suggesting that members of the District Council have exercised influence over the locals. These affidavits, however, do not establish an identity of parties or a coextensive plan of discrimination that would warrant disregard for the literal meaning of the statute.
The defendant locals have moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs have failed to join indispensible parties under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It is argued that this action can not proceed without the District Council, the other affiliated locals and representatives of the employers' associations, all of whom are parties to or affected by collective bargaining agreements entered into by the District Council on behalf of the union. This argument is without merit because it misconceives the nature of the remedy sought by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs seek an injunction against unlawful employment practices by the defendants and damages for themselves and the class they seek to represent resulting from past discrimination. In addition, they ask this Court, either directly or through a special master, to oversee the establishment of a non-discriminatory hiring and referral procedure.
Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the joinder of persons needed for a just adjudication. The rule states in part:
(a) Person to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an...
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