Butler v. Prudential Insurance Company of America

Decision Date05 March 1935
Docket Number15-1935
Citation117 Pa.Super. 367,177 A. 335
PartiesButler v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, Appellant
CourtPennsylvania Superior Court

Argued November 14, 1934

Appeal by defendant from judgment of C. P., Lackawanna County, March T., 1933, No. 177, in the case of Thomas Butler v. Prudential Insurance Company of America.

Assumpsit on insurance policy. Before Fleming, P. J., specially presiding.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Superior Court.

Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appealed.

Error assigned, among others, was refusal of judgment n. o. v.

Affirmed.

A. A Vosburg, of Vosburg & Vosburg, for appellant.

William G. Walsh, with him Frank T. Butler and William P. Farrell for appellee.

Before Trexler, P. J., Keller, Cunningham, Baldrige, Stadtfeld, Parker and James, JJ.

OPINION

James, J.

Plaintiff brought suit upon a life insurance policy which contained a permanent disability clause and alleged that he was totally and permanently disabled from performing any work for any kind of compensation during the remainder of his life. On March 20, 1932, while employed by the D. L. & W. R. R. Co., plaintiff was seated in a cab located on a turn table into which a locomotive collided, trapping the plaintiff and injuring him both internally and externally and causing him to become unconscious. The injuries the plaintiff received were on or about the face, shoulders, head, hips and pelvis region, and immediately following the accident, he was removed to a hospital where he remained for a period of several weeks and from there was removed to his home and has not been employed in any capacity since. Plaintiff appeared and testified in court while seated in a wheel-chair. The declaration alleged that by reason of injuries sustained and shock to the nervous system, he has suffered and will suffer for the remainder of his life traumatic hysteria and traumatic neurosis and his nervous system has been permanently shocked, as a result of which the plaintiff has been made wholly, continuously and permanently unable to engage in any occupation or perform any work for any kind of compensation. Defendant admitted in its affidavit of defense that plaintiff was suffering from traumatic hysteria but denied that his condition was of a permanent nature. The portion of the disability clause which is involved is as follows:

"Disability Before Age of 60: Waiver of Premiums -- Monthly Income to the Insured -- If the Insured shall become totally and permanently disabled, either physically or mentally, from any cause whatsoever to such an extent that he is rendered wholly, continuously and permanently unable to engage in any occupation or perform any work for any kind of compensation of financial value during the remainder of his lifetime . . . . the company upon receipt of due proof of such disability will grant the following benefits:"

At the close of the case the defendant submitted two requests for special findings as follows: (1) Is Thomas Butler, the plaintiff, suffering from any organic disease? Answer, yes or no. (2) If so, from what organic disease is he suffering? Answer, . . . . In response to which questions the jury answered, no, to question No. (1).

All of the points submitted by defendant were affirmed except the point for binding instructions. After submitting the two questions, the court asked counsel, "If there was anything further you have to say," at which time, defendant's counsel stated that he did not think the court had fully covered the distinction between organic disease and a functional disease and that the court's statement that the distinction between organic and functional disturbance should not be allowed to becloud the issue, was inadequate. In explanation, the court instructed the jury that the submission of the two questions should not interfere with the rendering of the verdict on the issue involved in the case. In response to the court's question, "Is there anything further?" no response was made by either counsel. The jury answered the questions submitted as above noted, and rendered a general verdict for the plaintiff. Defendant's motions for judgment n. o. v. and a new trial were denied.

Plaintiff's family physician testified that he had known the plaintiff for many years and always knew him to be a very powerful man that on an examination made shortly after plaintiff left the hospital, he found him suffering from traumatic neurosis which he designated as a nervous disturbance as the result of an injury to the body; that he attended plaintiff to the date of the trial and that his condition is progressively worse than when he first attended him; that in his opinion he has been totally and permanently disabled since the date of the accident and that such disability will continue for the remainder of his life. Dr. Killeen testified that as long as he lives on this earth, he will be in his present condition unable to engage in any kind of occupation. Dr. Rebhorn, called by defendant, who treated him at the hospital, testified that although he was unable to discover any organic disease or disability in the plaintiff, his present condition might be classified as hysteria neurosis, traumatic neurosis or traumatic hysteria, and that he saw no reason why he shouldn't recover and be able to do something in the future; and could find no pathologic or organic condition, but in his present condition, nobody would ask him to go to work. Dr. M. T. O'Malley, who was called by the defendant, testified that the defendant was suffering from traumatic hysteria and that his condition was curable; that he is simply suffering from a functional...

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