Butler v. State

Decision Date26 June 1996
Docket NumberNo. 46A05-9409-CR-353,46A05-9409-CR-353
Citation668 N.E.2d 266
CourtIndiana Appellate Court
PartiesWilliam BUTLER, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
OPINION

NAJAM, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

William Butler appeals from his convictions for two counts of Dealing in Cocaine, as Class A felonies. Following a jury trial, the trial court sentenced Butler to 30 years imprisonment.

We reverse and remand for a new trial.

ISSUE

Butler presents several issues for our review; however, because we reverse and remand, we need only address whether Butler received the effective assistance of trial counsel.

FACTS

On December 5, 1991, the State charged Butler by information with two counts of dealing in cocaine as Class A felonies. During trial on those charges, Butler was represented by an Illinois attorney, George C. Howard. That trial resulted in a hung jury and the court declared a mistrial on August 17, 1992. A second trial was held and Butler was again represented by Howard. The jury found Butler guilty on both counts. Although Howard was licensed to practice law in Illinois, at no time during the proceedings was Howard licensed to practice law in Indiana nor was he admitted to practice pro hac vice or otherwise in accordance with the rules promulgated by our supreme court. At the time of trial, Butler was unaware that his counsel was not licensed in Indiana. 1 Butler claims ineffective assistance of counsel on those grounds.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Butler contends that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution. In analyzing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we use the two-pronged test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must show both that his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficient performance so prejudiced the defendant as to deprive him of a fair trial. Bellmore v. State, 602 N.E.2d 111, 123 (Ind.1992). Generally, to demonstrate that he was deprived of a fair trial, a defendant must affirmatively prove that he was prejudiced by his counsel's conduct by showing there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. Wooden v. State, 657 N.E.2d 109, 111-12 (Ind.1995). However, in certain situations prejudice will be presumed. Id. On the facts of this case we conclude that Butler's counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. We will presume that Butler suffered prejudice and hold as a matter of law that the conduct of counsel in question was ineffective assistance of counsel per se.

Our supreme court has provided that a member of the Bar of another state may be admitted to practice in an Indiana trial court pro hac vice. 2 Indiana Admission and Discipline Rule 3 provides that in the trial court's sole discretion, an attorney not licensed in Indiana may appear in a particular proceeding for a temporary period only if "said attorney appears with local Indiana counsel after petitioning the trial court for the courtesy and disclosing in said petition all pending causes in Indiana in which said attorney has been permitted to appear." 3 Further, local Indiana counsel "shall sign all briefs, papers and pleadings in such cause and shall be jointly responsible therefor." Admis.Disc.R. 3. Absent leave of the court, an attorney not licensed to practice law in Indiana may neither enter an appearance on behalf of a client nor file any briefs, papers or pleadings without the aid of local counsel. Pro-Lam, Inc. v. B & R. Enterprises, 651 N.E.2d 1153, 1156 (Ind.Ct.App.1995).

This court has held that only persons duly admitted to practice law in this state may appear on behalf of other persons. Simmons v. Carter, 576 N.E.2d 1278, 1279 (Ind.Ct.App.1991). Where a legal proceeding has been instituted on behalf of another in a court of record by one not licensed to practice law, the action should be dismissed, and if the suit has proceeded to judgment, the judgment is void. Id. at 1280. Although Simmons involved a non-lawyer representing a civil client, we see no reason to apply a different standard where, as here, an attorney not licensed to practice law in Indiana, although licensed elsewhere, appears and purports to represent a criminal defendant at trial. Our supreme court could not have been more clear when it drafted Admission and Discipline Rule 3 to provide that an out-of-state attorney may practice in Indiana for a temporary period, but only after petitioning the court for the courtesy, and that the out-of-state attorney must at all times work jointly with local counsel.

Here, Howard was not licensed to practice law in Indiana. He neither petitioned the LaPorte Superior Court for leave to practice before the court nor procured the assistance of local Indiana counsel. In addition, Howard never disclosed to the court all pending causes in Indiana in which he had been permitted to appear. Howard's failure to comply with Admission and Discipline Rule 3 rendered him without authority to appear and represent Butler in this case.

We are not persuaded by the State's contention that the trial court somehow "recognized" Howard's authority to practice law in Indiana because it failed to challenge...

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  • Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Wills
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • October 6, 1999
    ...App.1998) ("only persons duly admitted to practice law in this state may appear on behalf of other persons") (citing Butler v. State, 668 N.E.2d 266, 268 (Ind.Ct.App. 1996)). See also Simmons v. Carter, 576 N.E.2d 1278, 1279 (Ind.Ct.App. 1991) ("[W]hile any natural person may appear in cour......
  • Anderson v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • August 20, 1998
    ...but no prejudice resulted to defendant). In a final effort to plug the gap in his argument, Anderson points to Butler v. State, 668 N.E.2d 266 (Ind.Ct.App.1996) which held that where an Illinois attorney represented a criminal defendant in an Indiana court without permission of the court, t......
  • Cole v. U.S.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • December 10, 1998
    ...United States v. Bradford, 238 F.2d 395 (2d Cir.1956). The sole case Cole points to as supporting a per se rule is Butler v. State of Indiana, 668 N.E.2d 266 (Ind.App.1996), in which an Indiana appellate court held that defense counsel's lack of admission to the Indiana bar was a per se vio......
  • Mallory v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • July 13, 2011
    ...counsel was per se ineffective because he was not licensed to practice law in Indiana. In support, Mallory cites to Butler v. State, 668 N.E.2d 266, 269 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), in which a panel of this court concluded that an attorney who is not licensed in Indiana was “per se incapable of provi......
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