Butler v. Thompson

Citation97 F. Supp. 17
PartiesBUTLER v. THOMPSON, Central Registrar et al.
Decision Date19 February 1951
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia

John Locke Green, Frank L. Ball, J. Foster Hagan, all of Arlington, Va., for plaintiff.

John W. Jackson, Arlington, Va., J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., Atty. Gen. of Va., Walter E. Rogers, Asst. Atty. Gen. of Va., for defendants.

Before DOBIE, Circuit Judge, and HUTCHESON, Chief Judge and BRYAN, District Judges.

DOBIE, Circuit Judge.

Jessie Butler (hereinafter called Butler) instituted a civil action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia against Mary A. Thompson (hereinafter called Thompson), Central Registrar of the County of Arlington, Virginia, and against various other election officials. Butler asked the court to direct Thompson to register her as a duly qualified voter so that Butler might be permitted to vote in an election then imminent and Butler further asked the court to compel the other defendants, who were election officials, to permit Butler to vote in future elections. Damages in the sum of $5,000 were asked for the refusal of Thompson to register Butler, on the ground that this refusal was wilful and illegal.

The District Judge decided that "the case made by the complaint did not authorize the convening of a three-judge court, because there was no substantial Constitutional or Federal question presented by the complaint" and that "the said complaint does not state a cause of action for the recovery of damages." The complaint was, accordingly, dismissed by the District Court. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court and in a per curiam opinion, 184 F.2d 526, 527 stated:

"There was error in refusing to take appropriate action for convening a statutory court of three judges to hear the case, as substantial constitutional questions were unquestionably involved. We do not here attempt to pass upon these questions, as they are matters for the judgment of the three judge District Court, with review thereof, if any, by the Supreme Court of the United States.

"The judgment dismissing the action will be reversed, and the case will be remanded to the District Court, with direction that a court of three judges be constituted as required by statute to pass upon the questions involved."

The plaintiff here alleged in her complaint that she is a member of the Negro race; that she now is, and for many years has been, a resident of Arlington County, Virginia; that on December 15, 1949, she presented herself duly at the office of Mary Thompson, Central Registrar of the County of Arlington, Virginia, and demanded that she be registered so that she could vote in the general election of 1950 and future elections; and that Thompson refused to register plaintiff on the ground that plaintiff had not, as is required by Virginia law, paid her poll tax for the three preceding years. The complaint alleged that, apart from the payment of her poll taxes, plaintiff was in every way qualified to register under the Virginia law as a voter.

The complaint further alleged that the requirement of the payment of a poll tax as a prerequisite to voting was one of the provisions inserted in the Virginia Constitution of 1902, § 21, for the express purpose of denying to Negro citizens the right of suffrage; that it is now being administered in such way as to discriminate against Negroes; that the election officials of Virginia have conspired to administer the election laws of the State so as to disfranchise Negroes. Accordingly, it is alleged, the franchise provisions of the Virginia Constitution of 1902 and the Tax Code of Virginia violate the Virginia Constitution of 1867, the Act of Congress of 1870, 16 Stat. 62, admitting Virginia to representation in Congress, and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

At the hearing before the three-judge court, plaintiff, in addition to filing numerous exhibits which were chiefly statistical and are later discussed, introduced three witnesses, all officials of the State of Virginia: Messrs. Shepherd (Deputy Treasurer of Arlington County), Clements (Sheriff of Arlington County), and Trice (Deputy Sheriff of Arlington County). Not one shred or scintilla of evidence was evoked from these three witnesses that even had a tendency to support the plaintiff's contentions. Indeed, the only testimony given by these witnesses of any consequence whatever was that of Trice, who, on cross-examination, testified that to the best of his knowledge, the practices and procedure in administering the poll tax laws as prerequisites to voting were precisely the same as to Negroes and white persons and that he knew of no instance of administering these laws so as to discriminate against Negroes. Plaintiff Butler did not testify.

Defendants introduced only one witness, the defendant Thompson, Central Registrar of Arlington County. Her appearance, her manner of testifying, her frankness and candor made an unusually favorable impression on this court. She testified that, as alleged, the plaintiff Butler did appear before her and that she refused to register plaintiff solely because the plaintiff had not paid her poll taxes as is required by Virginia law. She further testified that she offered to register plaintiff if plaintiff would pay the required poll taxes. Thompson's testimony also supported that of Deputy Sheriff Trice that practices and procedures of her office were precisely the same as to both Negroes and white persons and that, both as to plaintiff and others offering to register, there was no discrimination whatever against members of the Negro race.

Plaintiff here bases her case on three contentions: (1) the poll tax requirements for voting in Virginia are invalid because Virginia is prohibited by the Act of Congress of January 26, 1870, from imposing such requirements; (2) these requirements are invalid because of the evil motives of the draftsmen of the Virginia Constitution of 1902 and subsequent poll tax statutes of Virginia; and (3) the Virginia Constitution and subsequent poll tax statutes are invalid because, even if these be fair on their face and seemingly non-discriminatory against Negroes, these are administered by the taxing and voting officers of the State of Virginia in such manner as to discriminate against Negroes.

We find no merit in this first contention of plaintiff. This Act of Congress, so far as relevant here, provides:

"* * * the State of Virginia is admitted to representation in Congress as one of the States of the Union upon the following fundamental conditions:

"First, That the Constitution of Virginia shall never be so amended or changed as to deprive any citizen or class of citizens of the United States of the right to vote who are entitled to vote by the Constitution herein recognized, except as punishment for such crimes as are now felonies at common law, whereof they shall have been duly convicted under laws equally applicable to all the inhabitants of said State: Provided, That any alteration of said Constitution, prospective in its effects, may be made in regard to the time and place of residence of voters." 62 Stat. 62.

"Provided, that no amendment or revision shall be made which shall deny or in any way impair the right of suffrage, or any civil or political right as conferred by this constitution, except for causes which apply to all persons and classes without distinction." Const.Va.1870, art. 12.

It is extremely doubtful, even if Virginia has violated the conditions of this Act of Congress in Virginia's poll Tax laws, whether this presents a question justiciable in the courts. Such a matter is one peculiarly within the domain of Congress itself, since it only purports to set up a condition governing Virginia's right to admission to representation in Congress. If the establishment of the requirement of the payment of a poll tax as a prerequisite to the right to vote were to be considered as a violation of the condition prescribed in the Act of 1870, it would be a matter peculiarly within the domain of the Congress alone. Such condition, if it be such, might well be considered as waived by Congress in view of the fact that Virginia has continued to be admitted to representation in Congress for a period of nearly half a century after the adoption of the poll tax requirement, and with this increasing representation in accordance with the increase in population. The Act of 1870, too, must be studied against the background of the Tragic Era of which it was a part.

Nor was this Act a compact under which Virginia, after the Civil War, was readmitted to the Union. The Supreme Court has ruled that the Confederate States were never out of the Union and, hence, there was no necessity for readmission. State of Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 74 U.S. 700, 19 L.Ed. 227.

This Act does not attempt to place Virginia in a strait-jacket so far as the election laws of Virgina are concerned. If the Act made that attempt, the Act would be invalid. All states, after their admission into the Federal Union, stand upon equal footing and the constitutional duty of guaranteeing each state a republican form of government gives Congress no power in admitting a state to impose restriction which would operate to deprive that state of equality with other states. See, particularly, Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 570, 573, 31 S.Ct. 688, 55 L.Ed. 853. And see, also, United States v. Chavez, 290 U.S. 357, 365, 54 S.Ct. 217, 78 L.Ed. 360; Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210, 211, 37 S.Ct. 255, 61 L.Ed. 678; Stearns v. State of Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223, 244-245, 21 S.Ct. 73, 45 L.Ed. 162. So that, even if this Act of 1870 be valid and enforceable in the courts, which is open to dispute, still, the Virginia Constitution and the Virginia Election laws have not been amended since 1870 to deprive the Negroes, as a class of...

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7 cases
  • United States v. City of Jackson, Mississippi
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi
    • April 26, 1962
    ...238 F.2d 724; Dawley v. City of Norfolk, 4 Cir., 159 F.Supp. 642; Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 1401, 3 L.Ed. 2d 5; Butler v. Thompson, D.C., 97 F. Supp. 17; and Williams v. State of Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 18 S.Ct. 583, 42 L.Ed. 1012. 12. The placing of appropriate signs by a ci......
  • Clark v. Thompson, Civ. A. No. 3235.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi
    • May 15, 1962
    ...238 F.2d 724; Dawley v. City of Norfolk, D.C., 159 F.Supp. 642; Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 1401, 3 L.Ed.2d 5; Butler v. Thompson, D.C., 97 F.Supp. 17; and Williams v. State of Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 18 S.Ct. 583, 42 L.Ed. The three plaintiffs are entitled to an adjudication o......
  • Williams ex rel. J.E. v. Reeves
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)
    • December 7, 2020
    ...since it only purports to set up a condition governing Virginia's right to admission to representation in Congress." Butler v. Thompson , 97 F. Supp. 17, 20 (E.D. Va. 1951). ...
  • Forssenius v. Harman
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
    • May 29, 1964
    ...Saunders v. Wilkins, 152 F.2d 235, 237 (4 Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 870, 66 S.Ct. 1362, 90 L.Ed. 1640 (1946); Butler v. Thompson, 97 F.Supp. 17 (E.D. Va.1951), aff'd per curiam, 341 U.S. 937, 71 S.Ct. 1002, 95 L.Ed. 1365. Indeed, the very fact that the Congress deemed a constitutio......
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2 books & journal articles
  • Civil death is different: an examination of a post-Graham challenge to felon disenfranchisement under the Eighth Amendment.
    • United States
    • Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Vol. 102 No. 2, March 2012
    • March 22, 2012
    ...Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators."). (161) Butler v. Thompson, 97 F. Supp. 17, 20-21 (E.D. Va. 1951). (162) Id. at 19. (163) Id. at 20 (citing Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 721 (1868)). (164) Id. at 21 (citing Coyle v......
  • The United States Supreme Court and the Segregation Issue
    • United States
    • ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, The No. 304-1, March 1956
    • March 1, 1956
    ...to15 South Covington and Cincinnati StreetRy. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 252 U. S.399 (1920).16 See especially Butler v. Thompson, 97 F.Supp. 17 (E. D., Va., 1951), aff’d, 341 U. S.937 (1951).17 Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219.18 238 U. S. 347.19 307 U. S. 268 (1939).20 Nixon v. Herndon,......

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