Butler v. Thompson

• Decision Date: 20 December 1902
• Parties: BUTLER. v. THOMPSON et al.
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

43 S.E. 174

52 W. Va. 311

BUTLER.

v.THOMPSON et al.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Dec. 20, 1902.

APPEAL—REVERSAL—PROCEDURE BELOW— SECOND APPEAL.

1. Where the court reverses a decree upon the merits, and remands the cause to the circuit court "for further proceedings therein to be had according to the rules and principles stated in the written opinion" filed in the cause, the findings of fact set forth in the opinion are binding upon the court below, and that court cannot permit new pleadings and further evidence to be filed touching any matter involved in the decision of the appellate court, but must enter a decree in accordance with the opinion.

2. If, in such case, the court below allows the cause to be re-opened by new pleadings and evidence, and pronounces a decree contrary to the decision of the appellate court, the party aggrieved thereby may appeal from the decree and have the same set aside, and, on the second appeal, a mandate will go to the court below to enter a decree in conformity with the decision on the first appeal.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Appeal from circuit court, Tucker county; John Homer Holt, Judge.

Bill by I. P. Butler against J. F. Thompson and others. Decree for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

Cunningham & Stallings, for appellant.

W. B. Maxwell and C. O. Strieby, for appellees.

POFFENBARGER, J. This Is a second appeal in the chancery cause of Butler v. Thompson, commenced In 1892, and, as decided by this court, reported in 45 W. Va. 660, 31 S. E. 960, 72 Am. St Rep. 838, where a full statement of the matters involved and proceedings had may be seen. The suit was brought for the purpose of setting aside conveyances of real and personal property, as having been made by Thompson with intent to hinder, delay, and defraud his creditors, and especially the plaintiff, I. P. Butler, who, at the time of the institution of said chancery cause, had a judgment against Thompson for $410.60. J. F. Thompson, the debtor, and F. E. Thompson, the alleged purchaser of the property in controversy, filed their answers to the bill, and depositions were taken and filed on their behalf. On the hearing upon the merits, the circuit court dismissed the bill. On appeal, this court reversed the decree of the circuit court dismissing the bill, and remanded the cause "for further proceedings therein to be had, according to the rules and principles stated in the written opinion aforesaid, and, further, according to the rules and principles governing courts of equity." After the cause went back to the circuit court, the defendant, J. F. Thompson, was permitted to file an amended answer and depositions in his behalf, after which another decree was entered by the circuit court again dismissing the bill.

The former decision of this court was clearly an adjudication upon the merits Infavor of the plaintiff, and it could not be reheard or In any way altered by the circuit court It was an adjudication upon the facts as well as upon the pleadings, and therefore covered the entire controversy. Instead of accepting it as final and unalterable, as it was bound in law to do, the circuit court permitted the whole matter to be reopened, and additional pleadings and evidence to be filed, and entered a decree in exact conformity with its former decree, which this court had reversed and set aside. The very core of the controversy in this court on the former appeal was the question whether the deed made by Thompson was invalid as having been made to defraud his creditors. It was really the only question decided by this court although the decree entered here did not say so in express terms. It set aside, reversed, and annulled the decree of the circuit court, and remanded the cause, without, in express terms, setting the deed aside. Evidently, the court below has proceeded upon the erroneous view that, as this court did not expressly decree the deed to be fraudulent, set it aside, and charge the plaintiff's debt upon the property, there was no adjudication as to those matters by this court, and they were left open for adjudication by the circuit court As the validity of the deed was the only real question presented, and the decree of the circuit court was reversed, this court must necessarily have reversed the finding of the court below on that question and decided against the validity of the deed. If this court had held the deed good, there could have been no reversal.

The principle governing the case is announced in Koonce v. Doolittle, 48 W. Va. 592, 37 S. E. 644, decided long after the decree here complained of was entered, and holding that questions of fact determined in the opinions filed by the judges of this court, when necessary to the decision of cases, are res adjudicata, and not open for review and readjudication by the circuit court in the further progress of litigation. The correctness of this decision is beyond question. The principle is as old as the law, and rests not only upon reasons of sound public policy, demanding a cessation of a controversy at the end of one full and fair trial, but upon principles of logic as well. Whether the final decision of the court of last resort is right or wrong, it is unalterable, and must stand. "If an appellate court has ever so erroneously decided that it has jurisdiction of a cause, and then proceeds to determine it on its merits, the parties to the cause are bound as res adjudicata by the decision of the court that it has jurisdiction, as well as by the decision of the court on its merits." Herm. Estop. 119, 120. "A case finally decided in the supreme court of appeals has become res adjudicata, and is no longer a subject of review in that court" Camden v. Werninger, V W. Va. 528. "The decree of the supreme court of appeals upon a question, decided by the court below, is final and irreversible; and, upon a second appeal in the cause, the question decided upon the first appeal cannot be reviewed." Henry v. Davis, 13 W. Va. 230. "A fact which has been directly tried and decided in a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be controverted again between the same parties in the same or any other court." Id. Campbell's Ex'rs v. Campbell's Ex'r, 22 Grat. 649; Bank v. Craig, 6 Leigh, 399; Hun-gerfoot v. Cushing, 8 Wis. 324; Matthews v.-Sands, 29 Ala. 136; Miller v. Jones' Adm'r, Id. 174; Bradford v. Patterson, 1 A. K. Marsh. 464.

It is obvious that there is a distinction between decisions that are interlocutory and decisions upon the merits. Only that which has been adjudicated is concluded. Hence, if the only question presented is that of the sufficiency of a declaration, plea, bill, or answer, the court below holding it insufficient and this court reversing and holding it good, there is no adjudication of questions of fact ordinarily, because they are not raised nor in condition for determination. But it is well settled that where the facts and their legal effect are determined by the appellate court by a mere reversal of the decree of the court below, nothing can be done in that court other than the entering up of a decree in accordance with the opinion of the appellate court filed in the cause. 3 Cycl. Law & Proc. 486, note 5; City of Chicago v. Gregsten, 157 111. 160, 45 N. E. 505; Lynn v. Lynn, 160 111. 307, 43 N. E. 482; Smith v. Coleman, 59 Ala. 260; Soule v. Dawes, 14 Cal. 248; Whitney v. Tray-nor, 76 Wis. 628, 45 N. W. 530; National Inv. Co. v. National Savings, Loan & Bldg. Ass'n, ...