Butte-Silver Bow Local Government v. State, BUTTE-SILVER

• Citation: 235 Mont. 398,46 St.Rep. 87,768 P.2d 327
• Decision Date: 16 February 1989
• Docket Number: BUTTE-SILVER,No. 86-270,86-270
• Parties: BOW LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Petitioner, v. The STATE of Montana; Treasurer of the State of Montana, Department of Revenue of the State of Montana, Respondents.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

Page 327

768 P.2d 327

235 Mont. 398

BUTTE-SILVER BOW LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Petitioner, v. The STATE of Montana; Treasurer of the State of Montana Department of Revenue of the State of Montana, Respondents.

No. 86-270.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted Dec. 2, 1988.

Decided Jan. 19, 1989.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 16, 1989.

James H. Goetz, argued; Goetz, Madden & Dunn, Bozeman, for petitioner.

Mike Greely, Atty. Gen., Helena, Clay R. Smith, argued, Asst. Atty. Gen., Eric J. Fehlig, Dept. of Revenue, Donald MacIntyre, Dept. of Natural Resources, for respondents.

GULBRANDSON, Justice.

This case involves a petition for assumption of original jurisdiction filed pursuant to Rule 17, M.R.App.P. Petitioners seek a declaratory judgment declaring the Montana Resource Indemnity Trust Act (1973), (the Act), unconstitutional, insofar as it authorizes the expenditure of Resource Indemnity Trust (Trust) funds for purposes other than the reclamation of lands disturbed by the taking of natural resources. Petitioners also challenge the constitutionality of respondents' acts in appropriating and expending Trust funds for purposes other than reclamation of lands and contend such acts are a breach of respondents' fiduciary duties as trustees of the Trust under § 15-38-203(2), MCA. We accept the case on original jurisdiction, but find the Act is constitutional and that respondents' expenditures of Trust funds were authorized under the Act.

The Butte-Silver Bow Local Government (Butte-Silver Bow) filed its "Petition for Declaratory Judgment on Original Jurisdiction" with the Montana Supreme Court on June 13, 1986. The petition relies on Art. IX, sec. 2 as the constitutional basis for its claim. On July 30, 1986, petitioners Butte-Silver Bow sought leave to amend its petition to include several individuals who would "suffer serious adverse impacts in their environmental and aesthetic well-being and quality of life if proper reclamation is not undertaken in the City of Butte." Robert J. Pavlovich, Fritz Daily, and Don R. Peoples were added "in their individual capacities as citizens, residents, electors, and taxpayers of Butte-Silver Bow Local Government."

After review of the briefs submitted, this Court remanded the action to Montana's First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, for determination of factual issues. Particularly, this Court requested the District Court to prepare findings of fact "as to the use and expenditures made of monies derived from the Resource Indemnity Trust Fund, through its interest earnings by the various governmental agencies under the appropriations of the Legislature." The case is back before this Court upon the agreed findings of fact of the parties adopted by the District Court.

Petitioners raise the following issues to this Court:

1. Do the petitioners have standing and should this Court assume original jurisdiction?

2. Is the Montana Resource Indemnity Trust Act, § 15-38-101, et seq., MCA, unconstitutional for authorizing the appropriation and expenditure of Trust funds for purposes other than reclamation of lands?

3. Have respondents violated their fiduciary duties as trustees by using Trust funds for purposes other than the reclamation of lands?

4. Have respondents used Trust funds for general agency operating expenses in violation of § 15-38-203(2), MCA?

5. Are petitioners entitled to attorney's fees under the common fund theory?

I.

Should original jurisdiction be granted?

Petitioners' standing to bring this action is essential to the question of our acceptance of original jurisdiction. This Court has previously held a registered voter has standing where a constitutional provision is clearly intended to benefit the public and the electorate, and by contending the provision "has been the victim of legislative strangulation." Committee for an Effective Judiciary v. State (1984), 209 Mont. 105, 108, 679 P.2d 1223, 1225. Further, a taxpayer will have standing to question the validity of a tax, or the expenditure of the tax monies, provided the issue(s) presented directly affect the constitutional validity to collect or use the proceeds of the tax by the state or a local government entity. Grossman v. State, Dept. Natural Resources (1984), 209 Mont. 427, 438-439, 682 P.2d 1319, 1325. Individual petitioners meet the criteria necessary to establish standing both as registered voters and as affected taxpayers. Having found the individual petitioners have standing, we decline to address the question of petitioner Butte-Silver Bow's standing.

Once standing to bring the action is established, the question shifts to whether the action meets the necessary factors for this Court to accept original jurisdiction. This Court has found that an assumption of original jurisdiction is proper when: (1) constitutional issues of major state wide importance are involved; (2) the case involves pure legal questions of statutory and constitutional construction; and (3) urgency and emergency factors exist making the normal appeal process inadequate. State ex rel. Greely v. Water Court, State of Montana (1984), 214 Mont. 143, 691 P.2d 833; Rule 12, M.R.App.P. Moreover, this Court clearly stated the Court has original jurisdiction to accept declaratory judgment proceedings "where the issues have impact of major importance on a statewide basis, or upon a major segment of the state, and where the purpose of the declaratory judgment proceedings will serve the office of a writ provided by law ..." Grossman v. State, Dept. of Natural Resources (1984), 209 Mont. 427, 436, 682 P.2d 1319, 1324.

This petition involves a constitutional issue of major statewide importance. Petitioners are seeking an interpretation by this Court of a section of the Constitution, of a major act passed by the Legislature and a determination of the existence or absence of conflicts between the two. A decision in the petitioners' favor clearly would have a major impact on the Legislature's funding of a variety of state programs.

Additionally, this petition involves only legal questions. All factual questions involving the disposition of Trust monies, have been adequately addressed in the District Court's findings of fact. The Court must determine the legal question of the purposes for which trust funds may or may not be utilized, and then may examine whether the appropriations made by the Legislature were authorized.

Regarding the question of whether or not this case presents sufficient urgency and emergency factors to require the Court to exercise original jurisdiction, this Court has stated:

Resolution of the issues presented herein is necessary to eliminate or reduce a multiplicity of future litigation; ... and to eliminate needless expenditure of public funds on procedures that otherwise might subsequently be declared illegal. One of the basic purposes of the Montana Declaratory Judgment Act is to provide for advance determination of such issues, thereby eliminating these otherwise detrimental results.

Grossman, 682 P.2d at 1322, citing Forty-Second Legislative Assembly v. Lennon (1971), 156 Mont. 416, 420-422, 481 P.2d 330, 332-333. In light of the fact that the Legislature convened on January 2, 1989, and it will undoubtedly fund programs from the trust income which may or may not be determined constitutional by this opinion, sufficient urgency and emergency exists for exercising original jurisdiction.

Having found that petitioners have standing and that the petition satisfies the three required factors, we assume original jurisdiction.

II.

Petitioners' advance three arguments on the issue of whether or not the Montana Resource Indemnity Trust Act of 1973 violates Art. IX, sec. 2 of the 1972 Montana Constitution. First, petitioners allege that the plain language of Art. IX, sec. 2, provides the Trust fund shall only be used for the reclamation of lands disturbed by the taking of natural resources. Second, by placing the amendments authorizing the Trust in Art. IX, sec. 2, the people of the state of Montana have shown their intent that use of the Trust funds be limited to reclamation of such disturbed lands. Third, the Legislative history shows an intent to limit Art. IX, sec. 2, to reclamation of lands disturbed by the removal of natural resources.

When interpreting a constitutional provision, certain tenets must be observed. The same rules of construction which apply to determining the meaning of statutory provisions apply to constitutional provisions. Keller v. Smith (1976), 170 Mont. 399, 404, 553 P.2d 1002, 1006. The intent of the framers of the provision is controlling. Keller, 553 P.2d at 1006. However,

[S]uch intent shall first be determined from the plain meaning of the words used, if possible, and if the intent can be so determined, the courts may go no further and apply any other means of interpretation. (Citations omitted.)

Keller, 553 P.2d at 1006. We therefore must decide whether the plain language of Art. IX, sec. 2 clearly provides the trust fund shall only be used for the reclamation of lands disturbed by the taking of natural resources, or whether the provision is ambiguous and in need of additional interpretation. If the State Constitution does not provide an express limitation on the legislative appropriation power of the State, that power shall reside in the Legislature. Board of Regents of Higher Education v. Judge (1975), 168 Mont. 433, 446, 543 P.2d 1323, 1331.

The plain language of Art. IX, sec. 2(1), which is the reclamation section within the larger Environment and Natural Resources Article, states:

All lands disturbed by the taking of natural resources shall be reclaimed. The legislature shall provide effective requirements and standards for the reclamation of lands disturbed.

Subsection (1) is a statement by the framers of the Constitution that "[a]ll lands disturbed by the taking of natural resources shall be reclaimed" and that the Legislature is directed to provide regulations...