Butterworth v. Dempsey

Decision Date26 March 1964
Docket NumberCiv. No. 9571.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
PartiesOliver BUTTERWORTH et al., Plaintiffs, v. John DEMPSEY, Governor of the State of Connecticut, Ella T. Grasso, Secretary of the State of Connecticut, Donald J. Irwin, Treasurer of the State of Connecticut, and Raymond S. Thatcher, Comptroller of the State of Connecticut, Defendants.

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Donald F. Keefe, of Gumbart, Corbin, Tyler & Cooper, New Haven, Conn. (William L. F. Felstiner and Milton P. DeVane, of Gumbart, Corbin, Tyler & Cooper, New Haven, Conn., on the brief), for plaintiffs.

Harold M. Mulvey, Atty. Gen. of Conn., Hartford, Conn., for defendants.

H. Meade Alcorn, Jr., of Alcorn, Bakewell & Smith, Hartford, Conn., and Prof. James Wm. Moore, New Haven, Conn. (Norman K. Parsells, Bridgeport, Conn., Ralph M. Shulansky, of Shulansky & Cohn, Hartford, Conn., and Ralph G. Elliot, of Alcorn, Bakewell & Smith, Hartford, Conn., on the brief), for intervenors A. Searle Pinney, J. Tyler Patterson, Jr., Frederick Pope, Jr., and Peter P. Mariani.

Leo Parskey, Hartford, Conn., for intervenor John M. Bailey.

Before J. JOSEPH SMITH, Circuit Judge, and ANDERSON and TIMBERS, District Judges.*

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; Judgment; Memorandum on Form of Judgment; and Memorandum on Motion to Intervene by Towns of Franklin and Salem Filed March 26, 1964.

Judgments Affirmed June 22, 1964. See 84 S.Ct. 1913, 1918.

TIMBERS, District Judge:

QUESTION PRESENTED

The question here presented is whether the Connecticut General Assembly as now constituted denies plaintiffs the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. We hold that the districting of the Senate and the apportionment of the House so debase the voting rights of plaintiffs in the choice of the members of both houses as to result in an invidious discrimination against plaintiffs who thereby are denied the equal protection of the laws.

PARTIES TO THE ACTION

Plaintiffs are ten resident citizens and voters of Connecticut from six urban and suburban towns,1 suing for themselves and other Connecticut voters similarly situated.

Defendants are the Governor, Secretary of the State, Treasurer and Comptroller of Connecticut, sued in their official capacities and particularly with respect to their duties in the holding of general elections to the legislature and in certifying the results of such elections. The Secretary of the State, in addition, is sued in her capacity as Commissioner of Elections representing all state and municipal election officials charged with duties in the holding of general elections to the legislature.

Other resident citizens and voters were permitted to intervene, including the chairmen of the Republican and Democratic State Central Committees who were permitted to intervene as individuals, not as political leaders.

CLAIMS OF THE PARTIES

Plaintiffs in their complaint seek (i) a declaratory judgment that their constitutional rights are impaired by the malapportionment2 of both houses of the General Assembly; (ii) injunctive relief against the holding of general elections, other than elections at large, to the General Assembly in 1964 until the House has been reapportioned and the Senate redistricted so as not to impair plaintiffs' constitutional rights; and (iii) such further relief as may be just and equitable. Plaintiffs also filed, and pressed at the hearing, a motion for partial summary judgment claiming at this time only the declaratory judgment prayed for in the complaint.

Defendants in their answer and at the hearing took no position with respect to the critical issues in the case but did request an opportunity to comply with any decree entered by the Court.

Intervenor Bailey supports generally the position of plaintiffs, claiming malapportionment of both Senate and House.

The Pinney intervenors admit malapportionment of the Senate; but they vigorously assert that apportionment of the House based upon the principle of unit representation, using the towns as local units, complies with the Constitution of Connecticut and does not violate the Constitution of the United States, so long as the Senate is based on the principle of equality of population. The Pinney intervenors also filed, but did not press at the hearing, a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, questioning the power of this Court to declare invalid a legislative apportionment system embodied in a state constitution.

JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and (4).

Since the action draws into question provisions of the statutes and Constitution of Connecticut, a special statutory district court of three judges was convened to hear and determine the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281-2284.

HEARING AND RECORD

The Court held a hearing on October 22, 1963, at which counsel were heard on the motion for partial summary judgment as well as on the merits of the case. No oral evidence was presented.

The record before the Court consists of the pleadings; facts established by stipulation and by requests for admissions pursuant to Rule 36, Fed.R.Civ.P.; and affidavits.

After the death of Judge CLARK and the designation of Judge SMITH in his place, counsel agreed that the Court should hear and determine the case on this record including a transcription of the oral arguments, which course has been followed.

THE SENATE

Under the Connecticut Constitution adopted in 1818 and amendments thereto, the legislature consists of a bicameral General Assembly. The upper house, the Senate, is comprised presently of 36 members.

Article Third, Section 5, adopted in 1901, raised the minimum number of Senate districts to 24, the maximum to 36. The last general redistricting was in 1903 when the General Assembly divided the State into 35 districts. A thirty-sixth district (Greenwich) was added in 1941. Aside from the addition of the thirty-sixth district in 1941 and some shifting of boundaries in New Haven, there has been no valid redistricting of the Senate since 1903, more than 60 years, despite numerous legislative proposals.

Article Third, Section 5, also provides that in districting the Senate, "regard shall be had to population in the several districts, that the same may be as nearly equal as possible under the limitations of this section." The limitations referred to are that Senate districts shall always be composed of contiguous territory; that neither the whole nor a part of one county shall be joined to the whole or a part of another county to form a district; that no town shall be divided unless for the purpose of forming more than one district wholly within the town; and that each county shall have at least one senator.

In 1953 the General Assembly enacted legislation to redistrict the Senate. The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors struck down this legislation, holding mandatory that provision of Article Third, Section 5, which allows only that session of the General Assembly next after completion of the United States census to redistrict the Senate. Cahill v. Leopold, 141 Conn. 1, 103 A.2d 818 (1954).

Measured by any of the recognized standards, the malapportionment of the Senate is clearly demonstrated.3 The disparity between the most populous district (the Twenty-fifth with 175,940 inhabitants) and the least populous district (the Tenth with 21,627 inhabitants) is in a ratio of eight to one.4 Based upon a 1960 state population of 2,535,234, the norm for each Senate district is 70,423, from which the deviations in the present districting of the Senate are striking: the average population of the five most populous districts is 159,721 (compared with the norm of 70,423), indicating a deviation of 226.8% from the norm; the average population of the five least populous districts is 28,722, or 40.8% of the norm; of the 36 districts, 25 deviate more than 25% from the norm, 17 below and 8 above.5 A majority of the Senate is elected by 31.9% of the total population; the 17 districts 25% or more below the norm contain 27.6% of the population and elect 47.2% of the Senate membership; the 8 districts 25% or more above the norm contain 43.9% of the population and elect 22.2% of the Senate membership.6

Obviously the present districting of the Senate deviates sharply from the requirement of districts of approximately equal population contemplated by the Connecticut Constitution. All parties agree that the Senate must be redistricted.

With respect to the Senate, we hold:

(1) That the present districting of the Senate so debases the voting rights of plaintiffs as to result in an invidious discrimination against plaintiffs who thereby are denied the equal protection of the laws;
(2) That the Senate must be redistricted promptly in such a way as to achieve substantially equal weighting of the votes of all voters — in accordance with the guidelines indicated in Judge CLARK'S opinion7 and pursuant to a decree to be formulated by this Court;8
(3) That in so redistricting the Senate, the limitations in Article Third, Section 5, of the Connecticut Constitution, in view of the supremacy clause of the Constitution of the United States,9 cannot bar action to comply with federal constitutional requirements.10
THE HOUSE

The House consists of 294 representatives.11 Each of the 169 towns, the basic local governmental subdivision in the State, has either one or two representatives in the House.

The town unit basis for representation in the House is found in Article Third, Section 3, of the Connecticut Constitution. Each town with more than 5,000 inhabitants is entitled to two representatives. Each new town must have a population of at least 2,500 before being entitled to one...

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