Buttolph v. Osborn, 25

• Decision Date: 03 January 1956
• Docket Number: No. 25,25
• Citation: 119 Vt. 116,119 A.2d 686
• Parties: Thomas BUTTOLPH et al. v. Raymond OSBORN, Edgar Turpin and Noble Birchard, School Directors of the Town of Shoreham.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Page 686

119 A.2d 686

119 Vt. 116

Thomas BUTTOLPH et al. v. Raymond OSBORN, Edgar Turpin and Noble Birchard, School Directors of the Town of Shoreham.

No. 25.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

Jan. 3, 1956.

Franklin S. Billings, Jr., Woodstock, for petitioners.

Lawrence & O'Brien, Rutland, for petitionees.

Before JEFFORDS, C. J., and CLEARY, ADAMS, CHASE and HULBURD, JJ.

HULBURD, Justice.

This is a petition brought by fourteen residents and taxpayers of the town of Shoreham, Vermont, for a writ of mandamus to compel the petitionees, the school directors of that town, to open and maintain the high school there as in the past, and to contract with teachers to staff the high school for the ensuing year. The case was heard on the petitionees' demurrer.

The petition alleges that the school directors closed the Shoreham high school at the end of the 1954-1955 school year and are arranging for the advanced education of the resident pupils outside the town. It further alleges that on April 18, 1955 the voters of the town of Shoreham by a vote of 178 to 132 instructed the board of school directors to continue to maintain a high school in Shoreham and to hire teachers for that purpose. It further alleges that a majority of the parents and guardians in Shoreham, having children attending high school, have indicated to the board of school directors that they wish to have their children educated in a high school in Shoreham and not in a high school or academy outside of Shoreham. The petition then alleges that notwithstanding the expressed vote and wishes of the voters and residents of Shoreham, the school directors have refused to comply therewith and are wrongfully taking no steps to continue to maintain a high school in Shoreham and that this refusal is arbitrary, capricious, and based on personal prejudice and selfish motives and that it is not in accordance with their duty under the constitution of the State of Vermont.

To the allegations of this petition, the petitionees have demurred. At the outset the petitionees interpose a technical objection. They say that although the petitioners have alleged that the action of the school directors was arbitrary and capricious, the petitioners have failed to set forth any facts which the court might find constituted this capriciousness and arbitrary selfish conduct,--unless, of course, acting contrary to the vote of the town and the desires of its inhabitants is a sufficient allegation.

The petitioners, while recognizing the requirements of pleading generally, claim that where the official character of the petitionees is set forth and what is sought is the performance of a public duty under the law, that it is a sufficient complaint to allege the failure to so perform and that there is no need to set out the failure with any particularity. The petitioners cite Clement v. Graham, 78 Vt. 290, 306, 63 A. 146. This at once brings us to the question: Is there any statute, or statutes, imposing a duty as claimed by the petitioners? It immediately becomes apparent that the decision of the preliminary question involves a determination of the central point of the controversy. The technical question and the main question on the merits merge if the petitioners' contention is adopted.

In such a situation the method of procedure in City of Montpelier v. Gates, 106 Vt. 116, 170 A. 473, becomes virtually incapable of being disregarded. It was there said at page 120 of 106 Vt., at page 474 of 170 A.: 'In view of the importance of the case to the state and its officers, and the facts being conceded, the demurrer will be construed as a motion [citing Clement v. Graham, 78 Vt. 290, 306, 63 A. 146, Ann.Cas.1913E, 1208] and the merits of the controversy disposed of without regard to the technical sufficiency of the pleadings.' We adopt that procedure in this case.

As we have pointed out the gist of the petitioners' claim is that the closing of the high school in Shoreham by the school directors in the face of a vote to the contrary by the citizens of Shoreham was in violation of the school directors' legal duty and beyond their statutory and constitutional powers.

In many ways this claim does not present a new problem in the educational history of Vermont. It has been before this Court in various aspects over a long period of time. Thus in 1845 it was held in Mason v. School Dist. No. 14 in Brookfield, 20 Vt. 487 that the dissatisfaction of a majority of the district is of no effect upon the power of the prudential committee in employing and dismissing a teacher. So too, in School District No. 13 in Waterbury v. Harvey, 56 Vt. 556, it was held that the vote of a school district instructing the prudential committee to hire a female teacher was not obligatory on the committee but was advisory merely. In the same year this Court had occasion to consider the case of Chittenden v. School District No. 1 in Waterbury, 56 Vt. 551, in which the district passed a vote as follows: 'Voted that the prudential committee be instructed to employ no teacher for a term to extend beyond this school year.' In spite of this vote, a teacher was employed for a period which extended beyond the school year which constituted the official term of the committee. This is the case which contains a rather memorable sentence. Having first stated, at page 554, that 'The several statutes constituting our common school system are to be read together, and liberally construed to effectuate the general public good proposed in their enactment,' the Court went on to say: 'A review of them will show that the legislature, having full power over the subject, has not entrusted the destiny of the system to the uncertain disposal of the 'fierce democracie' of the districts themselves, but has clothed officials with ample authority to keep the schools in motion in any event.' If there was any doubt up to this point, the opinion made it clear that school directors are public officials who derive their power from the law.

This holding was to be followed by Cobb v. School District No. 1 in Pomfret, 63 Vt. 647, 650, 21 A. 957, 958, wherein it was said: 'He (here a prudential committee of one) does not take his power from the district, but from the statute.' A reading of the statutes from early times, with the added changes as they were made from session to session of the Legislature, shows that school officials' hands were constantly being strengthened. They were clothed with more and more and not less and less power. It was made clear that education is a function of the state as distinguished from local government.

As time went on, the old district as an educational unit began to fade. With its disappearance there were bound to arise certain new problems. One of these was the transportation difficulty. Here again the Legislature enacted law conferring on the school directors additional power. It was they who were to decide in what circumstances transportation should be furnished the pupils of the town. It wasn't long before this new authority was challenged. In Proctor v. Hufnail, 111 Vt. 365, 16 A.2d 518, a petition was brought to this Court seeking to compel the school directors to furnish transportation for a certain child. The petition was dismissed, the Court saying at page 369 of 111 Vt., at page 520 of 16 A.2d, 'An officer who is entrusted with a duty which requires the exercise of his judgment and discretion is entitled to proceed therein without judicial interference, and may render a decision that will be final and conclusive.'

The petitioners admit that school directors have vast powers relative to the internal management of the affairs of a school, but they say that in the matter of...