Buttram v. Harris

• Decision Date: 26 November 1934
• Docket Number: No. 7349.,7349.
• Citation: 73 F.2d 679
• Parties: BUTTRAM v. HARRIS.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

73 F.2d 679 (1934)

BUTTRAM v. HARRIS.

No. 7349.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

November 26, 1934.

O. B. Pirkey, of New Boston, Tex., for appellant.

Rollin W. Rodgers, of Texarkana, Tex., for appellee.

Before FOSTER, SIBLEY, and HUTCHESON, Circuit Judges.

HUTCHESON, Circuit Judge.

Buttram, a bankrupt, living and having a place of business in a small settlement called Oak Grove, made claim to have exempted to him, not only the lands he was living on and using in the settlement, but two other tracts of farming land of 61 and 100 acres, respectively, lying some distance from it.

The referee thought the settlement Buttram lived in was a village within the meaning of the constitutional provision defining a homestead in a "city, town or village" (Const. of Texas, art. 16, § 51), and that his homestead right was confined to the property he lived on and used there. Supporting his finding and recommendation that the exemption claim be so confined by a careful and thoughtful statement of fact and law, the referee certified the matter to the District Judge, who agreed with and confirmed them. The bankrupt is here contesting the finding that Oak Grove is such a village, and insisting upon exemption for all the property he claims. He argues that, though it may not be denied that Oak Grove is a settlement, it is not a village. He points to the fact that those who live there live on scattered acreage tracts, and are almost exclusively engaged in farming. He insists that there is no urban semblance in the conditions obtaining there.

Both appellant and appellee rely upon Texas cases in which, under varying states of fact, the constitutional provision in question has been construed. We have examined all of these cases. They make it clear that the word "village" was not used in the Constitution as a term of art, having a restricted and confined meaning, but as one of general signification, embracing within its scope all of those communities where, not as matter of law, but as matter of fact, village life is carried on. They make it clear that, by making the same provision for a homestead in a village as for one in a city or town, it was not intended to draw a contrast between them, but to attribute to them all, for homestead purposes, the same characteristics, and to extend to the dwellers in them all, without difference or discrimination, the same homestead privileges. The decisions make it clear, too, that in each case, whether the claimant is entitled to a rural or an urban homestead, is to be determined upon the facts of that case, bearing in mind the declared constitutional purpose and intent. In line with this view the Supreme Court has held in more than one case that a rural homestead taken into a city or town by the extension of its limits does not cease to be rural and become urban merely because of that extension. There must be a real incorporation of the place into the communal life by subdividing it, or by otherwise adapting it to community uses. Posey v. Bass, 77 Tex. 512, 14 S. W. 156; Wilder v. McConnell, 91 Tex. 600, 45 S. W. 145. On the other hand, property really used as a part of and in connection with the community life of a village has been held to be an urban homestead, though not subdivided into lots and blocks, and though the community was but a small one composed mainly of farmers. Mikael v. Equitable Securities Co., 32 Tex. Civ. App. 182, 74 S. W. 67.

Appraising and giving effect to the whole facts of this case in the light of these principles, we think it cannot...