Buttry v. General Signal Corp.

• Decision Date: 26 October 1995
• Docket Number: No. 78,No. 1891,D,CL,L,AFL-CI,78,1891
• Citation: Buttry v. General Signal Corp., 68 F.3d 1488 (2nd Cir. 1995)
• Parties: 150 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2659, 64 USLW 2320, 131 Lab.Cas. P 11,439 Linda BUTTRY and Richard Lacey, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GENERAL SIGNAL CORPORATION, New York Air Brake Corporation and Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics and Allied Workers International Union,ocalefendants, Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics and Allied Workers,efendant-Appellee. ocket 95-7135.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 1488

68 F.3d 1488

150 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2659, 64 USLW 2320,

131 Lab.Cas. P 11,439

Linda BUTTRY and Richard Lacey, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GENERAL SIGNAL CORPORATION, New York Air Brake Corporation and Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics and Allied Workers International Union, AFL-CIO CLC, Local No. 78B, Defendants Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics and Allied Workers AFL-CIO, CLC, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 1891, Docket 95-7135.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued Sept. 7, 1995.

Decided Oct. 26, 1995.

John F. Corcoran, Hancock & Estabrook, Syracuse, NY (David E. Peebles, Hancock & Estabrook, Syracuse, NY, of counsel), for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Mimi C. Satter, Satter & Conner, Syracuse, NY (Carl S. Yaller, Media, PA, of counsel), for Defendant-Appellee.

Before: WINTER, ALTIMARI and McLAUGHLIN, Circuit Judges.

McLAUGHLIN, Circuit Judge:

Linda Buttry and Richard Lacey (together the "plaintiffs") were clerical workers for New York Air Brake Company. They were also members of the Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics and Allied Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC, Local No. 78B ("Local 78B"), an affiliate of the Glass, Molders Pottery, Plastics and Allied Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC (the "International Union"). When they were laid off, they sued their employer and the International Union in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Frederick J. Scullin, Judge ), alleging that the employer breached their union's collective bargaining agreement, and that the International Union breached its duty of fair representation.

The International Union moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiffs' claim was not timely and, alternatively, that plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing that their claim did not accrue until after completion of certain arbitration proceedings and, alternatively, that the International Union was equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense against them. The district court granted summary judgment to the International Union, ruling that the claim was time-barred, and dismissed the action.

Plaintiffs now appeal, renewing the same two arguments raised below, and adding that summary judgment was improper because they did not have enough time to conduct sufficient discovery. We hold that, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs were barred by the statute of limitations, and that the International Union was not equitably estopped from asserting the limitations period as a defense. Accordingly, we need not reach plaintiffs' argument regarding the sufficiency of discovery.

BACKGROUND

Until January, 1991, General Signal Corporation ("General Signal") owned and operated an air brake division named New York Air Brake Corporation ("Air Brake"). This division had three facilities in Watertown, New York: a railroad and mass transit brake products unit (the "brake unit"); a hydraulic pump unit (the "pump unit"); and a foundry unit. Clerical workers at all three units were represented by Local 78B. Plaintiffs were clerical workers in the pump unit, and were members of Local 78B. Non-clerical workers were represented by the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Lodge No. 761 (the "Machinists Union"). Local 78B and the Machinists Union had separate collective bargaining agreements with Air Brake.

In January, 1991, General Signal sold the brake unit to Knorr Brake Holding Corporation ("Knorr"). Fearing that the pump unit would soon be sold to Knorr as well, Local 78B and the Machinists Union entered into supplemental agreements with General Signal, Air Brake, and Knorr. These agreements gave the members of the Local 78B and the Machinists Union a one-time right to transfer to Knorr on a seniority basis should the pump unit be closed or moved from upstate New York before April 8, 1992.

Time confirmed the Unions' worries--on February 14, 1992, General Signal announced that it would close the pump unit by late 1992. Knorr immediately declared that it would not honor the transfer rights created in the supplemental agreements, because the closing would not take place before April 8, 1992, as required by the agreements.

On February 19, 1992, International Union officials met with its union members to discuss transfer rights under their supplemental agreement. Both plaintiffs were at this meeting, where Frank Brandao, the International Union Representative, stated categorically that Knorr was within its rights, that the supplemental agreement did not apply, and that the International Union (and Local 78B) would not press transfer rights for its members. Plaintiffs had seniority rights which, if exercised in the course of a transfer pursuant to the supplemental agreement, might "bump" other members of Local 78B, i.e. cause them to be laid off. As a result, the meeting became unruly because some members regarded plaintiffs as a threat.

Plaintiff Lacey was laid off on September 4, 1992; plaintiff Buttry's termination followed on October 30, 1992. Consistent with Knorr's public position that the supplemental agreement did not apply, neither Lacey nor Buttry was offered employment with Knorr.

Meanwhile, the Machinists Union, unlike the International Union, chose to fight for the transfer rights of its members by filing a grievance with General Signal and Knorr. In response, Knorr filed a declaratory judgment action against General Signal, the Machinists Union, and Local 78B (but not the International Union, presumably because the supplemental agreement was in the name of Local 78B only) in state court, seeking a declaration of its rights and responsibilities under the supplemental agreements. The defendants in the state court removed the action to federal court. On June 5, 1992, all parties to the removed action agreed to submit the issue of Knorr's obligations under the supplemental agreements to final and binding arbitration. The stipulation to arbitrate was signed, among others, by Brandao on behalf of Local 78B.

Arbitration hearings were held over four days on August 6 and 7, September 15, and October 6, 1992. Appearances at those hearings were made by counsel for Knorr, General Signal, and the Machinists Union. Although Local 78B was a named party to the arbitration proceedings, no one appeared for Local 78B (or the International Union). Knorr called International Union Representative Brandao as a witness. The Machinists Union called Charles DeMiceli, former President of Local 78B, and Beverly Suschinski, Recording Secretary of Local 78B, as witnesses.

On March 30, 1993, the arbitrator ruled that Knorr had violated the supplemental agreement with the Machinists Union, and ordered reinstatement and back pay. The arbitrator did not address whether Local 78B's agreement had been breached, apparently because Local 78B had chosen not to participate in the arbitration hearings. In August, 1993, with motions pending before the district court to confirm the arbitration, the plaintiffs belatedly moved to be substituted as parties for Local 78B in the declaratory judgment suit, or, alternatively, to intervene as additional defendants. Their motion was denied in its entirety.

The plaintiffs brought this action against General Signal, Air Brake (now completely owned and operated by Knorr), Local 78B, and the International Union on September 30, 1993, alleging a "hybrid" claim under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 159, and the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185. The plaintiffs asserted that General Signal and Air Brake had breached the collective bargaining agreement with Local 78B, and that Local 78B and the International Union had breached their duty of fair representation. Local 78B failed to answer the complaint or otherwise appear in the hybrid suit. (Apparently, the local chapter was decertified and is now defunct.) General Signal moved to dismiss the claim as against it; plaintiffs did not oppose that motion, and it was granted. The two remaining defendants, Air Brake and the International Union, filed timely answers to the complaint.

The International Union then moved for summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiffs' hybrid claim was not timely and, alternatively, that plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing that their claim was timely because it did not accrue until the arbitrator issued his decision. Alternatively, the plaintiffs argued that the International Union should be equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense. The district court granted summary judgment to the International Union, ruling that the hybrid claim was time-barred, and that the International Union was not estopped from asserting this defense. Buttry v. General Signal Corp., 871 F.Supp. 136 (N.D.N.Y.1994). The court therefore did not reach the failure to exhaust issue. Because the hybrid claim accrued against Air Brake and the International Union at the same time, the district court dismissed the suit in its entirety.

Plaintiffs now appeal, raising substantially the same arguments asserted below, namely that: (1) their claim did not accrue until the arbitrator issued his award, and therefore that claim is not barred by the statute of limitations; (2) even if the claim is time-barred, the International Union is equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense; and (3) summary judgment was premature, because plaintiffs did not have enough time to conduct sufficient discovery in support of their claim.

DISCUSSION

This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo. Litton Indus., Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb Inc., 967 F.2d 742, 746 (2d Cir.1992). Summary judgment is proper only if, viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id.; see...