Butts County v. Strahan

• Court: Georgia Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: GEORGE, J.
• Citation: Butts County v. Strahan, 107 S.E. 163, 151 Ga. 417 (Ga. 1921)
• Decision Date: 14 April 1921
• Docket Number: 2340.
• Parties: BUTTS COUNTY ET AL. v. STRAHAN ET AL.

107 S.E. 163

151 Ga. 417

BUTTS COUNTY ET AL. v. STRAHAN ET AL.

No. 2340.

Supreme Court of Georgia

April 14, 1921

Syllabus by the Court.

Where two acts of the General Assembly are "passed" on the same date, and each of the acts in terms provide that the same shall take effect from and after its passage, and said acts are, within the time limit prescribed by paragraph 16, § 1, of article 5, of the Constitution (Civ. Code 1910, § 6485), approved by the Governor, but on different dates, the act last approved is, in legal contemplation, the last expression of the legislative will upon the subject covered by the act; and if the provisions of the act last approved are irreconcilably opposed to those of the act first approved, the last mentioned must be considered as repealed.

Section 20 of the act of the General Assembly approved August 16 1919 (Ga. Laws 1919, p. 256), known as the motor vehicle act which provides for the distribution of the funds arising under and by virtue of that act "among the several counties of this state, according to post road mileage in each county," is necessarily in direct conflict with section 4 of article 5 of the act approved August 18, 1919 (Ga. Laws 1919, pp. 242, 250), which provides for the annual distribution of the state-aid road fund "between the twelve congressional districts as now created, and which shall constitute the road districts, according to the designated mileage of each road district as compared to the total mileage of the designated roads in the whole state," to wit, not exceeding 4,800 miles, as designated by the state highway department.

Accordingly the court did not err in refusing the prayers of the petition for mandamus.

Error from Superior Court, Clarke County; A. J. Cobb, Judge.

Application by the County of Butts and others for a writ of mandamus against C. M. Strahan and others. The writ was refused, and plaintiffs bring error. Affirmed.

E. M Smith, of McDonough, C. L. Redman and W. E. Watkins, both of Jackson, and J. H. Hall, of Macon, for plaintiffs in error.

H. J. Quincey, of Ocilla, for defendants in error.

GEORGE J.

The counties of Butts, Berrien, Henry, and Haralson filed a petition for the writ of mandamus against the state high way board, seeking to compel the board to distribute the state-aid road fund in accordance with the provisions of section 20 of the act approved August 16, 1919 (Ga. Laws 1919, p. 256), entitled "An act to amend an act known as 'the Georgia Motor-Vehicle Law,' etc.," hereinafter referred to as the motor vehicle act. The highway board contended in the court below, and here contends, that the provisions of section 20 of the motor vehicle act, with reference to the distribution of the state-aid road fund, are not binding upon the board, but that the board is controlled, with reference to the distribution of said fund, by section 4 of article 5 of the act approved August 18, 1919 (Ga. Laws 1919, p. 242), entitled "An act to reorganize and reconstitute the State Highway Department of Georgia," etc., hereinafter referred to as the state highway law. The case was submitted upon the petition and answer, and to an order and judgment refusing the writ of mandamus the plaintiffs excepted.

The motor vehicle act and the state highway law were "passed" by the General Assembly on the same date. In terms each act went into effect "from and after" its passage. The motor vehicle act was approved by the Governor on August 16, 1919. The state highway law was approved by the Governor on August 18, 1919. In the case of Floyd County v. Salmon, 151 Ga. 313, 106 S.E. 280, this court said:

"With respect to the time when statutes are to take effect, the old English rule was that if the act was not directed to operate from any particular time, it took effect from the first day of the session at which it was passed. This legal fiction and this extraordinary application of the doctrine of relation was acted upon by the English courts until the statute of 33 Geo. III, c. 13, which statute declared that laws shall operate from the time of receiving the royal assent. Sedgwick on Construction of Statutes (2d Ed.) 65. 'Under Constitutions which, by providing in effect that no bill shall become a law until it shall have received the approval of the chief executive or shall have been passed over his refusal to approve, make the executive a necessary constituent of the lawmaking power, an act becomes a law, not when it is passed by the two houses of the Legislature, but when it is approved by the executive, unless it becomes a law by the lapse of time specified for the return of a bill to the Legislature or by being passed by the Legislature notwithstanding the disapproval of the executive.' 25 R.C.L. 797; cf. article 5, § 1, par. 16, of the Constitution of this state (Civil Code, § 6485); Green v. Hall, 36 Ga. 538; Epstin v. Levenson, 79 Ga. 718 (2), 4 S.E. 328. The general rule followed in the United States is that, in the absence of constitutional or general statutory provision governing the matter, the statute becomes effective on the day of its passage; that is to say, on the day of its approval by the chief executive, or its passage over his veto, or by his nonaction within the time specified in the Constitution for the return of the bill to the Legislature, unless the time for the going into effect of the statute is fixed by the statute itself."

It is elementary that--

"When the provisions of a later statute are opposed to those of an earlier, the last mentioned must be considered as repealed." Harrison v. Walker, 1 Ga. 32; Staten v. State, 141 Ga. 82, 80 S.E. 850.

In Wright v. Overstreet, 122 Ga. 633, 50 S.E. 487, this court held:

"As a general rule, acts of the General Assembly take effect from the date of their approval by the Governor; and where two bills were passed by the Legislature, one dependent for its validity upon the prior enactment of the other, it is immaterial in what order they were introduced or put upon their final passage, so long as executive approval of the two bills was had in such an order of priority as to make them both effective."

It is likewise elementary that the doctrine of implied repeal is not favored, that is to say, repeals by implication are not favored. Article 7 of the state highway law, the act last approved by the Governor, provides that--

"Nothing herein contained shall repeal any criminal law with reference to highways, or the rights or duties of the public with reference thereto, nor shall this Act repeal any other provisions of law whatever except such as are necessarily in direct conflict herewith."

Though intended to emphasize the general principle, article 7 quoted above is simply declaratory of the settled rule of construction. If there is an irreconcilable repugnancy between the motor vehicle act and the state highway law, with reference to the distribution of the state-aid road fund, the provisions of the state highway law, the act last approved by the governor, must control.

Section 20 of the motor vehicle act provided that the fees collected under the act should be turned...