Butts v. Armor's Estate

• Decision Date: 01 October 1894
• Docket Number: 453,452
• Citation: 30 A. 357,164 Pa. 73
• Parties: David M. Butts, Exr. of Ruth B. Armor, Appellant, v. Munro Armor et al
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

30 A. 357

164 Pa. 73

David M. Butts, Exr. of Ruth B. Armor, Appellant, v. Munro Armor et al

Nos. 452, 453

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

October 1, 1894

Argued April 20, 1894

Appeals, Nos. 452 and 453, Jan. T., 1894, by plaintiff, from judgment of C.P. Centre Co., Aug. T., 1893, No. 214, on verdict for defendants, and from O.C. Centre Co., No. 5955 Reversed.

Issue devisavit vel non. Before FURST, P.J.

The facts appear by the opinion of the Supreme Court.

Errors assigned were decrees entered by associate judges recited in opinion of Supreme Court, quoting them.

The judgments entered in common pleas October 13th, 1893, October 19th, 1893, October 30th, 1893, and the decree of the orphans' court of October 30th, 1893, annulling and vacating the issue directed to the common pleas; and the judgment entered in common pleas, 22d of February, 1894, are reversed and set aside, at costs of appellees in each judgment appealed from respectively.

James A. Beaver, John M. Dale with him, for appellant. -- The evidence was insufficient to submit to the jury: Van Alst v. Hunter, 5 Johns. Ch. 148; Wilson v Mitchell, 101 Pa. 495; Yardley v. Cuthbertson, 108 Pa. 395; Eddey's Ap., 109 Pa. 407; Pensyl's Est., 157 Pa. 465; Miller v. Oestrich, 157 Pa. 264.

A decision of the associate judges upon a point of law, either in the course of a trial or at the end of a trial, when the court charged the jury, would lead to endless confusion and an absolute miscarriage of justice. How much more is this true in a case of this kind, where legal learning, legal mind and legal conscience are all involved: Kolb's Case, 4 Watts, 154; Glamorgan Iron Co. v. Snyder, 84 Pa. 397.

Samuel Gustine Thompson, C. M. Bower and Ellis L. Orvis with him, for appellees. -- The reserved point states no point of law, and is therefore bad; it reserves the very fact it submits: Wilson v. Steamboat Tuscarora, 25 Pa. 317; Henry v. Heilman, 114 Pa. 499; Winchester v. Bennett, 54 Pa. 510; Wilde v. Trainor, 59 Pa. 439; Com. v. McDowell, 86 Pa. 377.

The action of the president judge, in directing judgment for plaintiff non obstante veredicto, was error:

First. Because, when he submitted the facts of testamentary capacity and undue influence to the jury, his judicial function was exhausted. "But there was error in submitting the fact of readiness to the jury in language that clearly embraced it; and, after the fact was found, in entering judgment for the defendant on the ground that the evidence was insufficient:" Oil Co. v. Forsyth Bros. & Co., 48 Pa. 291; Patton v. R.R., 96 Pa. 169.

Second. Because no question of law had been distinctly stated, and properly reserved: Henry v. Heilman Bros., 114 Pa. 501; Wilson v. Steamboat Tuscarora, 25 Pa. 317; Irwin v. Wickersham, 25 Pa. 316; Buckley v. Duff, 111 Pa. 223; Printing & Publishing Co. v. Rice, 106 Pa. 623.

Third. Because the attempted judgment had no verdict to support it: Robinson v. Myers, 67 Pa. 9; Morris v. Ziegler, 71 Pa. 450; Glading v. Frick, 88 Pa. 461.

Fourth. Because the court's proper and only remedy, if the verdict was unsatisfactory, was in granting a new trial. After the verdict, appellant obtained from Judge METZGER a rule to show cause why a new trial should not be granted, but this rule was entirely overlooked by the learned judge while sparring for position: Oil Co. v. Forsyth Bros. & Co., 48 Pa. 291.

Fifth. Because the verdict is supported by the evidence of the defendant's witnesses, if believed; and the learned judge should have found the weight of the testimony in favor of the defendants.

The associate judges have co-ordinate power with the president judge: Van Vliet v. Conrad, 95 Pa. 494; Com. v. Kryder, 1 Penny. 143; Reiber v. Bofs, 110 Pa. 594; Leister's Ap., 20 W.N. 224; Hamlin v. Peck, 135 Pa. 493; Const. of 1790, art. 5, § 5; act of April 14, 1834, §§ 20, 43, P.L. 344; Const. of 1838, art. 5, § 3; Const. of 1874, art. 5, §§ 4, 5; Richardson v. Stewart, 2 S. & R. 85; Smith v. Com., 54 Pa. 211; O'Mara v. Com., 75 Pa. 424; Lewistown Road, 84 Pa. 410; Lieb v. Com., 9 Watts, 218; Com. v. Dumbauld, 97 Pa. 295.

We deny that Judge FURST sat as a chancellor; the three judges sat as a court of chancery. The present constitution expressly vests chancery powers in the court of common pleas. Had he been sitting in the absence of his associates, it would have been otherwise, but a full court sat, both at the trial and at the argument on the rule for new trial, and for judgment non obstante veredicto. The two associates, sitting as judges, had the constitutional power to act as judges.

The same law that places these associates on the bench of the common pleas, places them in the orphans' court and clothes them with powers equal to those of the president: Buckalew, Const. 148; O'Mara v. Com., 75 Pa. 424.

The associates have the undoubted right to file an additional decree if deemed necessary by them to more fully illustrate their position: Leister's Ap., 20 W.N. 224.

Before STERRETT, C.J., GREEN, WILLIAMS, McCOLLUM, MITCHELL, DEAN and FELL, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE DEAN:

These appeals were argued from one paper-book. They are so woven together in the proceedings in the court below, that the questions in dispute will be disposed of in one opinion.

Personal imputations on the motives of a judge, who has rendered an adverse judgment, alleged to be erroneous, add nothing to the force of counsel's argument; they often tend to render obscure meritorious objections, and afford us no help in passing on the real contention. Our judgments must be founded on something of more substance than suspected motives.

A brief statement of the material facts, as gathered from this record, will largely aid in an intelligent judgment.

On February 20, 1890, Ruth B. Armor, the testatrix, being then about ninety years of age, made her will. She was possessed of a very considerable estate, which she divided among her five children, one of whom, a daughter, Eliza, was married to David M. Butts. The shares of all, except Mrs. Butts, were bequeathed to David M. Butts as trustee; he was also appointed sole executor. In less than a year after the execution of the will, the testatrix died. The legatees, except Mrs. Butts, contested the will, on the ground that the testatrix was of unsound mind at the date of its execution, and that she had been induced to make it by the undue influence of her son-in-law, D. M. Butts. Much testimony was taken, and, after due consideration, the orphans' court directed an issue to be tried in the common pleas, to determine whether the testatrix was possessed of sufficient mental capacity to execute the will, but refused an issue to determine whether it had been procured by undue influence. From so much of the decree as refused an issue on the question of undue influence, the contestants appealed to this court [Armor's Estate, 154 Pa. 517]. We, being of opinion that the court erred in refusing an issue on the second question, directed that an issue be awarded as to both, which was accordingly done, and the case came on for trial in the common pleas September 4, 1893. The judges on the bench were president judge A. O. FURST, and his associates, Thomas F. Riley and C. A. Faulkner. Many witnesses testified as to the mental capacity of testatrix, and to facts bearing on the averment of undue influence. The trial lasted four days. The evidence on both questions was submitted to the jury, who were instructed, if they found for defendants, to specify in their verdict whether the testatrix was not of sound mind, or whether the will was made when she was under undue influence. The jury found a verdict for defendants, and further found that Mrs. Ruth B. Armor was not of sound mind.

At the close of the testimony, the court made the following reservation: "Whether there is any evidence upon which defendants are entitled to recover." The verdict was recorded September 4, 1893, and on the 11th, on motion of plaintiff's counsel, a rule for a new trial was awarded, reasons to be filed within ten days; same day, on motion of same counsel, rule was awarded upon defendants to show cause why judgment should not be entered on verdict for plaintiffs, non obstante veredicto, on point reserved. On September 16th following, reasons for a new trial were filed. On October 13, 1893, in vacation, without consultation with his associates, Judge FURST, in an opinion filed, entered judgment on the point reserved for the plaintiff. On October 19, 1893, Judges Riley and Faulkner, without consultation with Judge FURST, filed an opinion overruling the judgment on the reserved point entered by him, and directed judgment to be entered thereon for defendants, and further directed the prothonotary to certify this judgment to the orphans' court. Then, on October 30, 1893, Judge FURST filed a supplementary opinion, in which he makes the following decree: "We hold the rule as matter of law, that the evidence in the cause on part of contestants is wholly insufficient in law to submit to the jury upon either issue, and we further hold, upon all the evidence in the cause, that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a verdict against the will of Ruth B. Armor, deceased. And we therefore, in accordance therewith, modify our former judgment entered on the 13th of October instant, and in lieu thereof, and as a substitute therefor, we set aside the verdict, and we further direct that the clerk of the court enter this judgment and decree of record, vacating decree heretofore made by said court for a feigned issue to determine the validity of the will of Ruth B. Armor, deceased."

This decree the prothonotary of the common pleas was directed to certify to the orphans' court, which, on being done Judge FURST, as president judge of that cou...