Butts v. Martin
| Decision Date | 30 March 2015 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:12cv114 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
| Parties | PAUL BUTTS v. MARCUS MARTIN, ET AL. |
Plaintiff Paul Butts, a federal prisoner, brings this lawsuit against Marcus Martin, Derric Wilson, Cheryl Cranmer-Sutton, Ricardo Martinez, Christopher Banks, Michael Harris, Garod Garrison, Theodosia Debricassart, Geraldo Maldonado, and Harrell Watts.
On December 19, 2010, when plaintiff went to the inmate chow hall for dinner, he states he was wearing a gray sweat shirt, gray sweat pants, and a gray knitted cap which he claims he purchased at the commissary. Plaintiff states that as he entered the chow hall, he removed the gray knitted cap and put on his yarmulka. When plaintiff was at the front of the line to pick up his tray, he claims defendant Martinez called him out of the line, pointed to his yarmulka, and asked: "What's that?" Plaintiff states he told defendant Martinez it was his yarmulka, and Martinez responded that "it was not BOP issued." When plaintiff attempted to explain that inmates must supply their own, plaintiff claims he was not allowed to explain and he became frustrated with defendant Martinez. Plaintiff states Martinez asked him for his identification card and told plaintiff that if he was lying about the yarmulka he would spend the night in the SHU. Plaintiff claims hetold defendant Martinez he would rather leave, and he left the chow hall instead of removing his yarmulka.
At lunch the next day, plaintiff had not received his identification card back, so he approached the warden in an effort to explain what had happened. Plaintiff asserts that the warden referred him to the Acting Captain, defendant Cranmer, a Lieutenant. Plaintiff claims defendant Cranmer told him she would check on his identification card, but was not as apologetic as plaintiff would have liked.
Later in the day, Officer Jones came to plaintiff's cell and informed him he was wanted at the Lieutenant's office. Jones also asked plaintiff about a gray yarmulka and plaintiff told him he did not have a gray yarmulka. Jones then requested to search his cell and plaintiff agreed. Plaintiff claims that during the search of his cell only white and black yarmulkas, which are approved religious head wear colors, were found. Plaintiff claims his cell was searched a total of three times and no unauthorized item or contraband was found. Plaintiff claims he was also strip-searched twice. Plaintiff claims the searches were unreasonable and occurred only to cover up defendant Martinez's violations of plaintiff's constitutional rights.
Plaintiff claims he went to the Captain's office and defendant Cranmer was on the phone with the door open. Plaintiff claims defendant Martinez came out of another door and asked him: "Where's the gray yarmulka?" Plaintiff replied that he did not have a gray yarmulka and Martinez asked him: "Where's the yarmulka you had on last night?" Plaintiff claims he replied: "This is the one I had on last night."
After the Chaplain came to the Lieutenant's office, plaintiff claims he was taken to the SHU for lying to staff. Plaintiff claims the move was authorized by defendant Martinez and was witnessed by defendant Cranmer. Plaintiff claims he was placed in the SHU for no other reason than his religious beliefs and because he exercised one of his constitutional rights.
A copy of the incident report was delivered to plaintiff the next day at which time plaintiff claims he gave a simple statement and requested three witnesses. Plaintiff claims, however, that the officer later stated defendant Martinez would not enter the information.
On December 22, 2010, plaintiff appeared before Unit Disciplinary Committee members, defendants Mr. Garrison and Ms. Debricassart. Plaintiff claims he asked about his witnesses and was told he did not request any witnesses. Plaintiff also told them he had made a statement to defendant Banks. Plaintiff claims the committee, however, made no attempt to verify his request for witnesses before finding him guilty of lying or providing a false statement to a staff member. Plaintiff claims the only punishment he received was a loss of commissary privileges for thirty (30) days. Plaintiff contends he remained in the SHU for an additional nine days before being released.
Plaintiff alleges that he appealed the Unit Disciplinary Committee's decision on January 10, 2011. Plaintiff claims his appeal of the disciplinary conviction was denied by defendant Martin on January 26, 2011. Plaintiff then appealed to the Regional Office. In response to his appeal to the Regional Office, plaintiff asserts defendants Maldonado stated: Plaintiff claims the Unit Team decided not to have the rehearing, but "squashed it."
Despite the fact that his disciplinary conviction had been overturned, plaintiff appealed again to the Regional Office. After not receiving a timely response, plaintiff appealed to the Central Office, defendant Watts, in Washington, D.C. Plaintiff claims Watts responded late and supported the staff with no actual facts. Plaintiff claims defendants Maldonado and Watts are both in violation of the Due Process Clause and BOP policy.
Plaintiff states "[i]t is well known that he is a Jew, whose beliefs are of Hasidic Judaism, which has a custom and belief of always having the head covered." Plaintiff claims this was the only time he has been denied a meal because of his religious beliefs, and it is the only time he has ever been questioned about his yarmulka.
As a result of the constitutional violations alleged above, plaintiff claims he has suffered anxiety, anguish, humiliation, distress, defamation of character, and nights of sleeplessness. Plaintiff claims that even though the disciplinary conviction was expunged,
The defendants have filed a motion to dismiss, or alternatively, a motion for summary judgment. The defendants assert that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over defendant Watts. Additionally, the defendants assert the court may dismiss the claims against Maldonado and Watts, alternatively, for insufficient service of process. The defendants contend plaintiff's allegations concerning the alleged failure to respond to grievances fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The defendants assert that plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege personalinvolvement regarding defendants Harris, Martin, Maldonado, and Watts. Further, the defendants state that plaintiff's allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under the amendments asserted in his complaint. The defendants also claim plaintiff fails to state a claim under RLUIPA. The defendants contend plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies regarding his claims. Finally, the defendants claim they are entitled to judgment in their favor under the doctrine of qualified immunity. Accordingly, the defendants contend their motion should be granted.
A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if the factual allegations are not sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate when the plaintiff has failed to plead "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570). Plaintiffs must state enough facts to "nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570.
In considering whether to dismiss a complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, all factual allegations in the complaint must be taken as true and construed favorably to the plaintiff. Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Assoc., 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993). However, conclusory allegations will not suffice to prevent dismissal for failure to state a claim. Id.
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(a). A fact is material if it could affect the outcome of the case under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Instone Travel Tech Marine & Offshore v. International Shipping Partners, 334 F.3d 423, 427 (5th Cir. 2003). A dispute about a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Instone Travel Tech, 334 F.3d at 427.
The party seeking summary judgment carries the initial burden of demonstrating that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Hart v. Hairston, 343 F.3d 762, 764 (5th Cir. 2003). "Before the non-moving party is required to produce evidence in opposition to the motion, the moving party must first satisfy its obligation of demonstrating that there are no factual issues warranting trial." Commander v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 978 F.2d 924, 927 n.4 (5th Cir. 1992). After a proper motion for summary judgment is made, the non-movant must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio...
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