Butts v. the Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc'y
Decision Date | 08 August 2011 |
Docket Number | No. A11–290.,A11–290. |
Citation | 802 N.W.2d 839 |
Parties | Beverly BUTTS, by and through her Power of Attorney, Kathy IVERSON; et al., Respondents,v.The EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN GOOD SAMARITAN SOCIETY, individually and d/b/a Good Samaritan Society–Albert Lea, Appellant,Brianna Broitzman, et al., Co–Appellants. |
Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Syllabus by the Court
A district court abuses its discretion by granting a motion for voluntary dismissal of claims that have abated under Minnesota's survival statute, Minn.Stat. § 573.01 (2010), because dismissal without prejudice deprives the defendant of an otherwise available defense.
James P. Carey, Marcia K. Miller, Sieben, Grose, Von Holtum & Carey Ltd., Minneapolis, MN; and Mark R. Kosieradzki, Joel E. Smith, Kosieradzki Smith Law Firm LLC., Plymouth, MN, for respondents.William M. Hart, Barbara A. Zurek, Melissa Dosick Riethof, Meagher & Geer P.L.L.P., Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.Stephen O. Plunkett, Shanda K. Pearson, Steven P. Aggergaard, Bassford Remele, Minneapolis, MN, for co-appellants.Considered and decided by SCHELLHAS, Presiding Judge; MINGE, Judge; and WRIGHT, Judge.
Appellants challenge the district court's grant of motions to voluntarily dismiss personal-injury claims that, under Minn.Stat. § 573.01, abated upon the death of the victims, and appellants challenge denial of their motions for summary judgment under the same statute. Because the dismissals without prejudice deprived appellants of an otherwise available defense to the claims and because that defense entitles appellants to judgment as a matter of law, we reverse.
This action arises out of numerous instances of abuse of residents of a nursing home operated by appellant The Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society, individually and d/b/a Good Samaritan Society—Albert Lea (Good Samaritan). Good Samaritan's employees, appellants Brianna Broitzman, Ashton Larson, Alicia Heilmann, and Kaylee Nash, are alleged to have committed the abuse.
In January 2010, four abuse victims (plaintiffs), through respondents as their representatives, initiated this action against appellants in Minnesota state district court. In April 2010, the estates of four deceased victims initiated a similar action in federal court in South Dakota, asserting claims in diversity against Good Samaritan, which has its principal place of business in South Dakota. Apparently because the individual appellants were not subject to the federal court's personal jurisdiction, the South Dakota action does not include any claims against the individual appellants or vicarious-liability claims against Good Samaritan.
In the months following commencement of the two lawsuits, three of the four plaintiffs in the Minnesota action died. Following their deaths, the estates of each of these individuals commenced actions in South Dakota federal court against Good Samaritan. In the Minnesota action, appellants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the deceased plaintiffs' claims because they had abated under Minnesota's survival statute, Minn.Stat. § 573.01. Respondents moved to voluntarily dismiss the plaintiffs' claims without prejudice, so that they could pursue the claims in South Dakota federal court.
The district court denied appellants' summary-judgment motions for dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims and granted respondents' motions for voluntary dismissal, reasoning that respondents had sought the voluntary dismissals early in the litigation and that appellants would not be prejudiced merely by having to defend the same claims in South Dakota federal court.
Shortly after the Minnesota district court granted the third motion for voluntary dismissal, the South Dakota federal court denied Good Samaritan's motion for judgment on the pleadings, rejecting Good Samaritan's argument that the plaintiffs' claims were barred under Minnesota's survival statute. The federal court conducted a choice-of-law analysis with respect to the survival issue, applied the South Dakota survival statute, S.D. Codified Laws § 15–4–1 (2010), and denied Good Samaritan's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
In the Minnesota action, appellants obtained amended orders from the district court, certifying that there was “no just reason for delay” and directing the entry of partial judgment in accordance with Minn. R. Civ. P. 54.02.
This appeal follows.
I. Did the district court err by granting respondents' motions to voluntarily dismiss without prejudice claims that had abated under Minn.Stat. § 573.01?
II. Did the district court err by denying appellants' motions for summary judgment dismissing the abated claims with prejudice?
Absent agreement of all other parties, a plaintiff seeking to dismiss claims after an answer has been served must obtain leave of court. Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.01. Court-ordered voluntary dismissals under rule 41.01(b) are, unless otherwise stated, without prejudice. Id. This court “will not reverse a district court's decision on a rule 41 motion unless the district court abuses its discretion.” Altimus v. Hyundai Motor Co., 578 N.W.2d 409, 411 (Minn.App.1998).
Appellants assert that the district court lacked discretion to consider respondents' motions for voluntary dismissal but instead was compelled to grant appellants' pending motions for summary judgment. In support of this assertion, appellants cite the mandatory language of Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03, which provides that, when the requirements for summary judgment are met, “[j]udgment shall be rendered forthwith,” and they cite Lubbers v. Anderson, 539 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Minn.1995), in which the Minnesota Supreme Court held that “[a] defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law when the record reflects a complete lack of proof on an essential element of the plaintiff's claim.” But neither authority compels a district court to address pending summary-judgment motions before pending voluntary-dismissal motions. Cf. Mizell v. Passo, 147 Ill.2d 420, 168 Ill.Dec. 812, 590 N.E.2d 449, 451 (1992) ( ). Our caselaw holds that the pendency of a summary-judgment motion is a factor to be considered in determining whether to grant voluntary dismissal, but is not dispositive. Altimus, 578 N.W.2d at 411. We therefore reject appellants' assertion that the district court lacked discretion to consider respondents' motions for voluntary dismissal and address whether the district court abused its discretion by granting the motions for voluntary dismissal.
In Altimus, this court addressed the factors to be considered by the district court in determining whether to grant a motion for voluntary dismissal under Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.01(b). Id. Noting that the rule was amended in 1993 to conform to its federal counterpart, this court relied on federal caselaw addressing the federal rule to identify four relevant considerations: “(1) the defendant's effort and the expense of trial preparation; (2) the plaintiff's excessive delay and lack of diligence; (3) insufficient explanation of plaintiff's need for dismissal; and (4) whether defendant moved for summary judgment.” Id. at 410–11.
Appellants do not challenge the district court's analysis of the first two factors, but argue that the district court abused its discretion by granting voluntary dismissal because (1) respondents did not adequately explain their need for dismissal, and (2) appellants had moved for summary judgment. Regarding the adequacy of respondents' explanation of their need for dismissal, the district court stated: Accordingly, we reject appellants' argument that respondents did not explain their need for voluntary dismissal.
With respect to appellants' pending summary-judgment motions, this court has explained that, “[a]lthough courts may consider the existence of a pending summary judgment motion, this factor ‘is not by itself dispositive.’ ” Id. at 411 (quoting Metro. Fed. Bank of Iowa, F.S.B. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 999 F.2d 1257, 1262 (8th Cir.1993)). “And the mere prospect of a second lawsuit is not sufficiently prejudicial to justify denial of a [rule 41.01(b) ] motion to dismiss.” Id. (citing Phillips v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R., 874 F.2d 984, 987 (5th Cir.1989)). Nevertheless, “a voluntary dismissal that strips a defendant of a defense that would otherwise be available may be sufficiently prejudicial to justify denial.” Id. (citing Ikospentakis v. Thalassic S.S. Agency, 915 F.2d 176, 177 (5th Cir.1990); Phillips, 874 F.2d at 987).
In Altimus, this court applied these standards to hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion to voluntarily dismiss and granting summary judgment on product-defect claims that were barred by Minn.Stat. § 169.685 (1996), which at that time precluded the admission of evidence of “proof of the installation or failure of installation of seat belts.” Id. at 411–12. This court reasoned that the appellant had “no cause of action under current law,” and that “[d]ismissing this case without prejudice would deprive [respondents] of their existing defenses.” Id. at 412. We rejected appellant's argument that dismissal without prejudice was appropriate because the legislature had been considering a change to the law that would allow her claim, explaining that “the fact that the legislature may pass such legislation in the future is not sufficient grounds for overturning the district court's decision on appeal.” Id. at 411.1
Here, appellants argue that the district court abused its discretion by granting voluntary dismissal because it deprives them of a defense to the plaintiffs' claims. In addition to Altimus, appellants...
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