Butz v. Economou, No. 76-709

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtWHITE
Citation438 U.S. 478,57 L.Ed.2d 895,98 S.Ct. 2894
PartiesEarl L. BUTZ et al., Petitioners, v. Arthur N. ECONOMOU et al
Docket NumberNo. 76-709
Decision Date29 June 1978

438 U.S. 478
98 S.Ct. 2894
57 L.Ed.2d 895
Earl L. BUTZ et al., Petitioners,

v.

Arthur N. ECONOMOU et al.

No. 76-709.
Argued Nov. 7, 1977.
Decided June 29, 1978.
Syllabus

After an unsuccessful Department of Agriculture proceeding to revoke or suspend the registration of respondent's commodity futures commission company, respondent filed an action for damages in District Court against petitioner officials (including the Secretary and Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, the Judicial Officer, the Chief Hearing Examiner who had recommended sustaining the administrative complaint, and the Department attorney who had prosecuted the enforcement proceeding), alleging, inter alia, that by instituting unauthorized proceedings against him they had violated various of his constitutional rights. The District Court dismissed the action on the ground that the individual defendants, as federal officials, were entitled to absolute immunity for all discretionary acts within the scope of their authority. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the defendants were entitled only to the qualified immunity available to their counterparts in state government. Held :

1. Neither Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 79 S.Ct. 1335, 3 L.Ed.2d 1434, nor Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 16 S.Ct. 631, 40 L.Ed. 780, supports petitioners' contention that all of the federal officials sued in this case are absolutely immune from any liability for damages even if in the course of enforcing the relevant statutes they infringed respondent's constitutional rights and even if the violation was knowing and deliberate. Nor did either of those cases purport to abolish the liability of federal officers for actions manifestly beyond their line of duty; if they are accountable when they stray beyond the plain limits of their statutory authority, it would be incongruous to hold that they may nevertheless willfully or knowingly violate constitutional rights without fear of liability. Pp. 485-496.

2. Without congressional directions to the contrary, it would be untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90, and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials, Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619. Federal officials should enjoy no greater zone of protection when they violate federal constitutional rules than do state officers. Pp. 496-504.

Page 479

3. In a suit for damages arising from unconstitutional action, federal executive officials exercising discretion are entitled only to the qualified immunity specified in Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra, subject to those exceptional situations where it is demonstrated that absolute immunity is essential for the conduct of the public business. While federal officials will not be liable for mere mistakes in judgment, whether the mistake is one of fact or one of law, there is no substantial basis for holding that executive officers generally may with impunity discharge their duties in a way that is known to them to violate the Constitution or n a manner that they should know transgresses a clearly established constitutional rule. Pp. 504-508.

4. Although a qualified immunity from damages liability should be the general rule for executive officials charged with constitutional violations, there are some officials whose special functions require a full exemption from liability. Pp. 508-517.

(a) In light of the safeguards provided in agency adjudication to assure that the hearing examiner or administrative law judge exercises his independent judgment on the evidence before him, free from pressures by the parties or other officials within the agency, the risk of an unconstitutional act by one presiding at the agency hearing is clearly outweighed by the importance of preserving such independent judgment. Therefore, persons subject to these restraints and performing adjudicatory functions within a federal agency are entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability for their judicial acts. Pp. 508-514.

(b) Agency officials who perform functions analogous to those of a prosecutor must make the decision to move forward with an administrative proceeding free from intimidation or harassment. Because the legal remedies already available to the defendant in such a proceeding provide sufficient checks on agency zeal, those officials who are responsible for the decision to initiate or continue a proceeding subject to agency adjudication are entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability for their parts in that decision. Pp. 515-516.

(c) There is no substantial difference between the function of an agency attorney in presenting evidence in an agency hearing and the function of the prosecutor who brings evidence before a court, and since administrative agencies can act in the public interest only if they can adjudicate on the basis of a complete record, an agency attorney who arranges for the presentation of evidence on the record in the course of an adjudication is absolutely immune from suits based on the introduction of such evidence. Pp. 516-517.

5. The case is remanded for application of the foregoing principles

Page 480

to the claims against the particular petitioner-defendants involved. P. 517.

535 F.2d 688, vacated and remanded.

Daniel M. Friedman, Washington, D. C., for petitioner.

David C. Buxbaum, New York City, for respondents.

Mr. Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case concerns the personal immunity of federal officials in the Executive Branch from claims for damages arising from their violations of citizens' constitutional rights. Respondent 1 filed suit against a number of officials in the Department of Agriculture claiming that they had instituted an investigation and an administrative proceeding against him in retaliation for his criticism of that agency. The District Court dismissed the action on the ground that the individual defendants, as federal officials, were entitled to absolute immunity for all discretionary acts within the scope of their authority. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the defendants were entitled only to the qualified immunity available to their counterparts in state government. Economou v. U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, 535 F.2d 688 (1976). Because of

Page 481

the importance of immunity doctrine to both the vindication of constitutional guarantees and the effective functioning of government, we granted certiorari. 429 U.S. 1089, 97 S.Ct. 1097, 51 L.Ed.2d 534.

I

Respondent controls Arthur N. Economou and Co., Inc., which was at one time registered with the Department of Agriculture as a commodity futures commission merchant. Most of respondent's factual allegat ons in this lawsuit focus on an earlier administrative proceeding in which the Department of Agriculture sought to revoke or suspend the company's registration. On February 19, 1970, following an audit, the Department of Agriculture issued an administrative complaint alleging that respondent, while a registered merchant, had willfully failed to maintain the minimum financial requirements prescribed by the Department. After another audit, an amended complaint was issued on June 22, 1970. A hearing was held before the Chief Hearing Examiner of the Department, who filed a recommendation sustaining the administrative complaint. The Judicial Officer of the Department, to whom the Secretary had delegated his decisional authority in enforcement proceedings, affirmed the Chief Hearing Examiner's decision. On respondent's petition for review, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the order of the Judicial Officer. It reasoned that "the essential finding of willfulness . . . was made in a proceeding instituted without the customary warning letter, which the Judicial Officer conceded might well have resulted in prompt correction of the claimed insufficiencies." Economou v. U. S. Department of Agriculture, 494 F.2d 519 (1974).

While the administrative complaint was pending before the Judicial Officer, respondent filed this lawsuit in Federal District Court. Respondent sought initially to enjoin the progress of the administrative proceeding, but he was unsuccessful in that regard. On March 31, 1975, respondent filed a second

Page 482

amended complaint seeking damages. Named as defendants were the individuals who had served as Secretary and Assistant Secretary of Agriculture during the relevant events; the Judicial Officer and Chief Hearing Examiner; several officials in the Commodity Exchange Authority; 2 the Agriculture Department attorney who had prosecuted the enforcement proceeding; and several of the auditors who had investigated respondent or were witnesses against respondent.3

The complaint stated that prior to the issuance of the administrative complaints respondent had been "sharply critical of the staff and operations of Defendants and carried on a vociferous campaign for the reform of Defendant Commodity Exchange Authority to obtain more effective regulation of commodity trading." App. 157-158. The complaint also stated that, some time prior to the issuance of the February 19 complaint, respondent and his company had ceased to engage in activities regulated by the defendants. The complaint charged that each of the administrative complaints had been issued without the notice or warning required by law; that the defendants had furnished the complaints "to interested persons and others without furnishing respondent's answers as well"; and that following the issuance of the amended complaint, the defendants had issued a "deceptive" press release that "falsely indicated to the public that [respondent's] financial resources had deteriorated, when Defendants knew that their statement was untrue and so acknowledge[d] previously that...

To continue reading

Request your trial
3501 practice notes
  • Part II
    • United States
    • Federal Register March 10, 2006
    • March 10, 2006
    ...their independence from the APA, which sets out their duties and imperatives in some detail. See 5 U.S.C. 554; see also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978). There has never been any question relating to the independence of ALJs or their authority to hear APA Second, the reference to ......
  • Civil procedures,
    • United States
    • Federal Register March 10, 2006
    • March 10, 2006
    ...their independence from the APA, which sets out their duties and imperatives in some detail. See 5 U.S.C. 554; see also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978). There has never been any question relating to the independence of ALJs or their authority to hear APA Second, the reference to ......
  • Williams v. Treen, No. 80-3792
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)
    • March 31, 1982
    ...us that "... it is not unfair to hold liable the official who knows or should know he is acting outside the law." Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2910, 57 L.Ed.2d 895, 916 Finally, as an added fillip to the jurisprudence of Procunier immunities, the Supreme Court has rec......
  • Rabin v. NASDAQ OMX PHLX LLC, CIVIL ACTION No. 15-551
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Pennsylvania)
    • April 21, 2016
    ...exchanges to the judicially created doctrine of SRO immunity. The rule has its roots in the Supreme Court's decision in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978), which began the process of extending the type of immunity previously limited to judicial officers to ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
3484 cases
  • Williams v. Treen, No. 80-3792
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)
    • March 31, 1982
    ...us that "... it is not unfair to hold liable the official who knows or should know he is acting outside the law." Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2910, 57 L.Ed.2d 895, 916 Finally, as an added fillip to the jurisprudence of Procunier immunities, the Supreme Court has rec......
  • Rabin v. NASDAQ OMX PHLX LLC, CIVIL ACTION No. 15-551
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Pennsylvania)
    • April 21, 2016
    ...exchanges to the judicially created doctrine of SRO immunity. The rule has its roots in the Supreme Court's decision in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978), which began the process of extending the type of immunity previously limited to judicial officers to ......
  • BEG Invs., LLC v. Alberti, Civil Action No.: 13–cv–0182 RC
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. United States District Court (Columbia)
    • March 24, 2015
    ...42 U.S.C. § 1983 for acts taken in her role as an advocate for the State. 424 U.S. at 424–31, 96 S.Ct. 984 ; see also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 515, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) (observing that “agency officials performing certain functions analogous to those of a prosecutor s......
  • Hernandez v. Pederio, Case No. 1:16-cv-00027-DAD-SKO (PC)
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. Eastern District of California
    • October 18, 2017
    ...immunity to other public officials who perform activities that are "functionally comparable" to those of judges. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513, 98 S.Ct. 2894 (1978); see also Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1303 (9th Cir.1981) ("If an official's role is functionally equivalent to......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
15 books & journal articles
  • Rights, Structure, and Remediation: The Collapse of Constitutional Remedies.
    • United States
    • Yale Law Journal Vol. 131 Nbr. 7, May 2022
    • May 1, 2022
    ...Civil War's aftermath"). (290.) Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). (291.) HUQ, supra note 2, at 123 (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978)). In fairness to the Court, we note that Butz concerned immunity from Bivens claims. In contrast, the Court has properly discla......
  • Qualified Immunity and Federalism
    • United States
    • Georgetown Law Journal Nbr. 109-2, December 2020
    • December 1, 2020
    ...expanding the Bivens remedy is now a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity.”); Fallon, Jr., supra note 14, at 951–54 (discussing pattern). 88. 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978) (“Accordingly, without congressional directions to the contrary, we deem it untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immuni......
  • RECALIBRATING QUALIFIED IMMUNITY: HOW TANZIN V. TANVIR, TAYLOR V. RIOJAS, AND MCCOY V. ALAMU SIGNAL THE SUPREME COURT'S DISCOMFORT WITH THE DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY.
    • United States
    • Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Vol. 112 Nbr. 1, January 2022
    • January 1, 2022
    ...(requiring that an "official himself must be acting sincerely and with a belief that he is doing right"). (120) See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 484 (1978); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 562 (1978); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577 (1975) ("[T]he relevant question for the......
  • THE BRANCH BEST QUALIFIED TO ABOLISH IMMUNITY.
    • United States
    • Notre Dame Law Review Vol. 93 Nbr. 5, May 2018
    • May 1, 2018
    ...of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time."). (16) 420 U.S. 308 (1975). (17) Id. at 318. (18) 438 U.S. 478 (19) Id. at 504. (20) 457 U.S. 800 (1982). (21) Id. at 815 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Wood, 420 U.S. at 322). (22) See i......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT