Butzgy v. Town of Glastonbury

• Decision Date: 07 April 1987
• Docket Number: No. 12821,12821
• Citation: 203 Conn. 109,523 A.2d 1258
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Arthur F. BUTZGY et al. v. TOWN OF GLASTONBURY.

Page 1258

523 A.2d 1258

203 Conn. 109

Arthur F. BUTZGY et al. v. TOWN OF GLASTONBURY.

No. 12821.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 11, 1986.

Decided April 7, 1987.

Charles C. Greenwald, Glastonbury, with whom, on the brief, was Thomas M Stephens, Hartford, for appellants (plaintiffs).

William S. Rogers, Hartford, with whom was Michael B. Dashjian, New Haven, for appellee (defendant).

Before ARTHUR H. HEALEY, SHEA, DANNEHY, SANTANIELLO and CALLAHAN, JJ.

DANNEHY, Associate Justice.

On appeal, the plaintiffs challenge the dismissal of their complaint in which they were seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The action arose out of the proposed construction of an extension of a road in Glastonbury. The trial court, in dismissing the complaint, ruled that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the claims should have been brought by way of an administrative appeal.

It appears from the record that all of the plaintiffs own real property on Eastbury Hill Road in Glastonbury. At the time this action was commenced, that road began at Manchester Road and ended in a cul-de-sac. In March, 1984, Hilltop Woods, Inc., a nonparty, applied to the Glastonbury town plan and zoning commission (commission) for approval to subdivide land adjacent to Eastbury Hill Road. In May, 1984, the commission approved the application for the subdivision on the condition that the applicant construct an extension to Eastbury Hill Road. The extension would connect the road to Thompson Street, thereby opening Eastbury Hill Road to through traffic. Some of the plaintiffs in this action, together with other Eastbury Hill Road residents, filed an administrative appeal from the commission's decision contesting only the extension of Eastbury Hill Road to Thompson Street. The commission, as well as Hilltop Woods, Inc., and its principal, Lloyd Moody, were joined as appellees in that appeal. The appellants alleged, inter alia, that the proposed extension violated town ordinances, would have an adverse effect on traffic, noise and the safety of Eastbury Hill Road, and would unreasonably impair the public trust in natural resources. The appeal was withdrawn on December 21, 1984, and on the same day, Hilltop Woods, Inc., and its principal withdrew an action they had filed against the residents. At no time during these proceedings did the residents of Eastbury Hill Road seek any temporary relief by way of a stay or a temporary injunction. Construction of the extension began on February 26, 1985.

The complaint which forms the basis of this appeal was filed in April, 1985. ¹ The plaintiffs generally alleged that the extension "would result in an illegal and hazardous road condition and create a dangerous nuisance to persons residing along Eastbury Hill Road." Specifically, they alleged that the road as extended would violate minimum road width requirements and would fail to preserve the integrity of the area. They further alleged that the original portion of the road is inadequately designed and constructed to meet the requirements for safely handling the increased volume and speed of traffic that would result from the extension. Based on these allegations, the plaintiffs requested a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.

Upon motion of the defendant, the trial court dismissed the action on jurisdictional grounds. The court based its decision on the rule that "when a party has a statutory right of appeal from the decision of an administrative agency, he may not, instead of appealing, bring an independent action to test the very issue which the appeal was designed to test." Carpenter v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 176 Conn. 581, 598, 409 A.2d 1029 (1979); see also Davis v. Yudkin, 3 Conn.App. 576, 578, 495 A.2d 714 (1985). Because the plaintiffs abandoned their appeal from the decision of the commission, the court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action.

Before addressing the issue of whether the motion to dismiss was properly granted, we must first consider whether this appeal is moot. On August 30, 1985, the extension of Eastbury Hill Road was completed and opened to traffic. At the time this appeal was argued, the parties were uncertain whether the extension had been officially accepted by the town of Glastonbury. The defendant pointed out, however, that such an acceptance does not involve the exercise of discretion on the part of town officials but is instead, a ministerial act. The extension having been completed, the defendant asked this court, prior to our hearing the appeal, to dismiss the appeal on mootness grounds. We denied the motion without prejudice to the defendant so that the mootness claim could be renewed at the argument on the merits.

It is beyond dispute that "the existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the determination of which no practical relief can follow." Reynolds v. Vroom, 130 Conn. 512, 515, 36 A.2d 22 (1944); see also Shays v. Local Grievance Committee, 197 Conn. 566, 571, 499 A.2d 1158 (1985). " 'In the absence of an actual and existing controversy for us to adjudicate in any sense of the term, the courts of this state may not be used as a vehicle to obtain judicial opinions upon points of law ... and where the question presented is purely academic, we must refuse to entertain the appeal....' Connecticut Foundry Co. v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, 177 Conn. 17, 19, 411 A.2d 1 (1979)." Shays v. Local Grievance Committee, supra, 197 Conn. at 571-72, 499 A.2d 1158.

The defendant contends that we can no longer grant any of the relief sought by the plaintiffs and that their appeal is therefore moot. We do not agree. In the second request for relief, the plaintiffs seek an injunction prohibiting the town of Glastonbury and/or the commission "from requiring and/or permitting that Eastbury Hill Road be connected to Thompson Street" until the road is upgraded to meet adequate safety standards and is in conformance with town zoning regulations. The third prayer for relief contains language similar to that quoted from the second request. The defendant asserts that an injunction prohibiting the construction of the extension can no longer be granted because the extension is completed. This argument, however, overlooks the language of the second and third prayers for relief. The plaintiffs do not seek an injunction against the "construction" of the extension, but instead wish to prevent Eastbury Hill Road from being "connected" with Thompson Street. Although the extension has been completed, we see no reason, assuming arguendo that the plaintiffs are successful on the merits of their appeal, why a court could not grant the relief requested by ordering that temporary barricades be erected at the ends of the extension. These barricades would effectively prevent the connection of Eastbury Hill Road to Thompson Street until the alleged illegalities and safety problems are eliminated. Having determined that a court could still afford the plaintiffs relief under their second and third prayers for relief, we need not consider whether the requests for relief made in the first and fourth prayers are also efficacious.

We turn to the main issue raised in this appeal, namely, whether the trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff's action. Under the rule set forth in Carpenter v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, a party who has a statutory right of appeal from the decision of an administrative agency may not, instead of appealing, institute an independent action to litigate the very issue which the appeal is designed to test. See also Davis v. Yudkin, supra. This doctrine is, in essence, a restatement of the rule that "when an adequate administrative remedy is provided by law, it should be exhausted." Connecticut Life & Health Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Jackson, 173 Conn. 352, 357, 377 A.2d 1099 (1977). Relying on the Carpenter doctrine, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' action ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case because the plaintiffs had not pursued their statutory right of appeal. See General Statutes § 8-28. We find no error in the trial court's dismissal of the present action.

The plaintiffs acknowledge the holding of Carpenter, but assert that an appeal from the action of the commission here could not resolve the issues raised in their complaint, specifically, their claim of private nuisance. Although paragraph 8 of the plaintiffs' complaint alleges that the extension of Eastbury Hill Road would "create a dangerous nuisance to persons residing along Eastbury Hill Road, including the plaintiffs," an examination of the specific allegations made in support of this "nuisance" claim reveals that the plaintiffs are actually seeking to resolve the questions of whether the commission acted in accordance with town ordinances and whether the road as extended is a safety hazard to drivers and pedestrians. These issues are of a sort that must have been considered by the commission at the time it ordered the extension and that would have been reviewable by a court in an administrative appeal from the commission's decision.

Subparagraphs 8(a), (b) and (c) of the plaintiffs' complaint allege respectively that Eastbury Hill Road, as extended, "would violate the minimum road width requirements of Section 9.0 et seq." of the Glastonbury subdivision and resubdivision regulations, would fail "to preserve the integrity of the area as required by Section 9.2.5(a)" of those regulations, and would "result in an upgrading of the classification of said road under [town regulations] to a 'collector street' " despite the fact the road is inadequately constructed to meet minimum requirements for such a classification. ² Under General Statutes § 8-25, a ...