Buzhardt v. Cromer
| Decision Date | 05 December 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 20827,20827 |
| Citation | 272 S.C. 159,249 S.E.2d 898 |
| Parties | Sue H. BUZHARDT, A/K/A Sue Hagood Hutto, Respondent, v. James A. CROMER, Appellant. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
J. Reese Daniel, Columbia, for appellant.
Edmund H. Monteith, Columbia, for respondent.
Appellant, a real estate developer, sold to respondent two lots of land in the Basking Hills Subdivision in Lexington County for the sum of $7,000.00. The lots were adjacent to each other and were designated on a plat of the subdivision as lots 8 and 10. The plat showed a fifty (50) foot road along the southern boundary of the lots. This plat was shown to respondent; but according to her testimony, when the lots were inspected, she noticed that the road, indicated on the plat as running along the boundary of the lots, actually extended only to lot 10 and left lot 8 without access to the road.
Upon noticing that the road did not extend to lot 8, respondent stated that she inquired of appellant whether the road was going to be completed. Whereupon appellant, pointing to the area, told respondent that the road would be completed. Respondent testified that she would not have purchased the property, without the assurance and representation that the road would be extended to lot 8. The description in the deed by appellant to respondent showed the southern boundary as a 50 foot county road along both lots.
After purchasing the property, respondent constructed a residence on lot 10, but has not been able to sell lot 8 because the promised extension of the road has never been completed. When appellant failed to complete the road, as promised, respondent brought this action to recover damages resulting from the alleged fraudulent misrepresentation by appellant that the road would be opened to lot 8. Appellant denied any misrepresentation and, in addition, relied upon an unrecorded agreement by him with the county that the county would maintain drainage facilities, including all rights-of-way and easements in the subdivision in question. Respondent denied any knowledge of the agreement with the county at the time of the sale.
The trial of the action resulted in a verdict for respondent in the amount of $7,500.00 actual damages.
The timely motions of appellant for a nonsuit, directed verdict, judgment N.O.V., new trial and new trial nisi were denied; and this appeal follows.
The exceptions present two basic questions for decision:
(1) Was there any evidence of actionable fraud on the part of appellant; and
(2) Was there any evidence to sustain the amount of the verdict?
Under settled principles, if there was any evidence to sustain the jury's finding as to liability and the amount of damages, the judgment must be sustained. It is equally well settled that, in determining these issues, the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the respondent.
We think that the testimony sustains the verdict. Respondent testified that she purchased the property upon the representation by appellant that he would complete the road as shown on the plat. Appellant's reliance upon the agreement of the county, to show a lack of knowledge of the falsity of his statement, is not conclusive. His agreement did not bind the county to build the roads in the subdivision, but only to maintain drainage facilities, including all rights-of-way and easements in the subdivision. Such agreement placed no responsibility upon the county to construct the road in question. It is also inferable that appellant never conveyed the drainage facilities, rights-of-way or easements to the county. There is, therefore, evidence to sustain the conclusion that appe...
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...within the range of damages testified to, the verdict cannot be disturbed on the ground of excessiveness." Buzhardt v. Cromer, 272 S.C. 159, 163, 249 S.E.2d 898, 900 (1978). The jury verdict of $375,000 is well within the range of the During their deliberations, the jurors sent a note to th......
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...and all reasonable inferences arising therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the respondent. Buzhardt v. Cromer, 272 S.C. 159, 249 S.E.2d 898 (1978); Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bruce, 284 S.C. 227; 325 S.E.2d 77 Jordan owns and operates a fleet of tract......
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...common law may be measured by the difference between the purchase price of the property and its fair market value. Buzhardt v. Cromer, 272 S.C. 159, 249 S.E.2d 898 (1978). Although the Act does not define the term "actual damages," we hold that the term means common law damages, or the diff......