Buzzard v. United States
| Decision Date | 13 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:20-cv-00600 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
| Parties | DAVID DEAN BUZZARD, Jr., Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Respondent. |
Pending before the Court is David Dean Buzzard, Jr.'s Petition for a Writ of Mandamus (ECF No. 3). This matter is assigned to the Honorable Robert C. Chambers, United States District Judge and, by Standing Order, has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for the submission of proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Respondent's request that the action be dismissed, (ECF No. 10), be GRANTED; that Buzzard's Petition, (ECF No. 3), be DENIED; that Buzzard's Motion for an Emergency Hearing, (ECF No. 12), be DENIED as moot; and that this action be DISMISSED and REMOVED from the docket of the Court.
On August 5, 2013, this Court found that Buzzard violated the terms of his supervised release and ordered that he serve a total of 36 months in federal prison following his service of a separate sentence imposed on him by the State of West Virginia. (ECF No. 3 at 1). After being granted parole from his state sentence, on October 2, 2020, Buzzard was moved from the state prison at the Northern Correctional Facility ("NCF") into a separate on-site jail, the Northern Regional Jail ("NRJ"), to await transfer to a Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") facility. (ECF No. 12 at 1). A recent search of the Inmate Locator Tool on the BOP website showed that Buzzard has still not been processed into federal custody. See https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/.
Buzzard filed the instant petition for a writ of mandamus on September 11, 2020, prior to his transfer from the NCF to the NRJ. (ECF No. 3). He asks this court to issue an order compelling the United States Marshals Service to either transfer him to the Carter County Detention Center ("CCDC") in Grayson, Kentucky, or alternatively transfer him immediately to a BOP facility. (ECF No. 3 at 1, 3). According to Buzzard, detention in the NRJ presents a "substantial and unnecessary risk" that he could become infected with COVID-19, because "the [NRJ] accepts pre-trial detainees into the facility who have been recently arrested and potentially exposed to the virus." (Id. at 2). Buzzard asserts that the NRJ does not separate convicted state prisoners from convicted federal prisoners. Consequently, a new pretrial detainee, who has been exposed to the virus, could infect other pretrial detainees in his pod. If one of those infected inmates becomes convicted and is placed in Buzzard's pod, Buzzard will be exposed to the virus. (Id.). Buzzard reasons that the CCDC creates a safer environment for him because the "CCDC does not comingle their Federal inmates with State inmates." (Id.). Buzzard asks the Court to "recognize the exceptional circumstances" giving rise to his request and to acknowledge the United States Marshals Service's duty to "reasonably protect [him] from the risk of contracting this virus." (Id. at 4).
On September 16, 2020, the undersigned ordered Respondent to answer Buzzard's petition within 14 days, (ECF No. 5), and then later granted Respondent's motion to extend the deadline. (ECF No. 9). On October 8, 2020, Respondent filed its response, opposing Buzzard's petition and requesting that the Court deny it. (ECF No. 10 at 1). Respondent emphasizes the extraordinary nature of the writ of mandamus and asserts that the location of housing federal inmates is an inherently discretionary decision for which the writ would be inappropriate. (Id. at 2-3). Respondent also points out that the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently declined to order changes in an inmate's custody location in the context of a motion for compassionate release due to the "mere existence of COVID-19 in society and the possibility that it may spread to a particular prison," arguing that a similar logic applies here. (Id. at 3-4) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting United States v. Raia, 954 F.3d 594, 597 (3d Cir. 2020)).
On October 13, 2020, Buzzard filed a motion seeking an emergency hearing. (ECF No. 12). He contends that he did not receive Respondent's answer to his petition, informs the Court that he had been transferred into the NRJ, and requests an emergency hearing in which he must be physically present to address the risk. (Id. at 1-2). On October 19, 2020, Buzzard filed his reply to Respondent's opposition to his petition. (ECF No. 15). In his reply, Buzzard clarifies his position, maintaining that he does not seek a writ of mandamus to dictate the place of his confinement but rather to compel the Marshals Service to "take reasonable measures to minimize the risk of petitioner contracting COVID-19." (Id. at 1). He also questions the applicability of United States v. Raia to the facts of his case, as his request is not for compassionate release but for transfer to a safer environment. (Id. at 1-2). Buzzard further adduces that because he is in custody and is restrained to act on his own behalf, Respondent owes him a duty to take "reasonablemeasures to protect [him] from the risk of contracting COVID-19" by virtue of the "special relationship" created by his status as an incarcerated person. (Id. at 2). He again requests that this Court order the Marshals Service to transport him to a BOP facility, or to the CCDC, to await designation. (Id. at 2).
On October 29, 2020, Buzzard filed an affidavit in support of his earlier motion for an emergency hearing. (ECF No. 18). He alleges that the housing units at the NRJ, originally designed to accommodate only 16 inmates, are in fact housing about 40 inmates. (Id. at 1-2). He claims that maintaining distance between individuals to prevent the spread of COVID-19 is impossible with the overcrowding, and that the inmates are not given masks or other equipment to protect themselves from the virus. (Id. at 2). He further attests that all 40 inmates must share two telephones and two showers, and that disinfectants are not made available to inmates to sanitize these shared implements before use. (Id. at 2). He also claims that the majority of inmates in his unit at NRJ are recently arrested probation and parole violators, who are neither tested nor quarantined before being placed in the housing unit. (Id.). Emphasizing the insight he has gained through years of incarceration, he maintains that the NRJ is not reasonably safe while a facility like the CCDC or a federal prison would lessen his risk of exposure to COVID-19. (Id. at 2-3).
Respondent does not identify the standard under which it seeks dismissal of Buzzard's petition; however, courts generally review motions seeking to dismiss petitions for a writ of mandamus under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Bldg. & Const. Trades Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Solis, 600 F. Supp. 2d 25, 32 (D.D.C. 2009); Lugo v. I.N.S., 950 F. Supp. 743, 745 (E.D. Va. 1997). As Respondent filed its responseconcurrently with the request for dismissal, the response is most properly treated as a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Walker v. Kelly, 589 F.3d 127, 139 (4th Cir. 2009). A motion for judgment on the pleadings applies the same standard of review as a motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6).
When deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court must accept all well-pleaded allegations of the petition as true and "draw all reasonable factual inferences" in favor of the petitioner. See Massey v. Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 353 (4th Cir. 2014); Wolfe v. Johnson, 565 F.3d 140, 169 (4th Cir. 2009). Nonetheless, the court is "not obliged to accept allegations that 'represent unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments,' or that 'contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit.'" Massey, 759 F.3d at 353 (quoting Blankenship v. Manchin, 471 F.3d 523, 529 (4th Cir. 2006)). A court presented with a motion for judgment on the pleadings must consider "the face of the petition and any attached exhibits." Walker, 589 F.3d at 139 (quoting Wolfe, 565 F.3d at 169) (internal markings omitted). In addition, the court may consider "matters of public record," including documents from prior or pending court proceedings without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. (Id.)
This Court is required to construe pro se pleadings liberally, such as the one filed in this civil action. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pleading must state sufficient factual allegations to support a valid legal cause of action. The Court may not rewrite the pleading to include claims that were never presented, Parker v. Champion, 148 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir. 1998), develop the plaintiff's legal theories for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the Court. Beaudett v. Cityof Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Buzzard asks this Court to issue a writ of mandamus. A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary writ that exists for the sole purpose of aiding courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction and "in such cases as are already pending and wherein jurisdiction has been obtained on other grounds and by other process." Gurley v. Superior Court of Mecklenburg, 411 F.2d 586, 587 (4th Cir. 1969). Title 28 U.S.C. § 1361 provides that United States District Courts have original jurisdiction "of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." A federal court may only issue a writ of mandamus against an employee or official of the...
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