Buzzi v. Gomez

• Decision Date: 12 February 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98-0371-CIV.,No. 96-3492-CIV.,96-3492-CIV.,98-0371-CIV.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida
• Parties: Kenneth BUZZI, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Lieutenant Ricardo GOMEZ, individually, et al., Defendants.

Page 1344

62 F.Supp.2d 1344

Kenneth BUZZI, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Lieutenant Ricardo GOMEZ, individually, et al., Defendants.

No. 96-3492-CIV.

No. 98-0371-CIV.

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

February 12, 1999.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

David Alan Chonin, Sher & Navarrete, P.A., Coral Gables, FL, for plaintiffs.

Thomas A. Tucker Ronzetti, Assistant County Attorney, Miami, FL, for defendants.

ORDER GRANTING MIAMI-DADE COUNTY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE CLAIMS OF RICARDO GOMEZ

GOLD, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant Miami-Dade County's Motion for Summary Judgment on the Claims of Ricardo Gomez [D.E. # 41].¹ Plaintiff, Lieutenant Ricardo Gomez, has sued Miami-Dade County's violations of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

As all claims arise under federal law, this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Additionally, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) invokes the original jurisdiction of the Court over all claims predicated on violations of civil rights.

The County, sued for national origin discrimination and retaliation, has moved for summary judgment. The County asserts four bases which it claims support the propriety of summary judgment in its favor: (1) the allegations in Gomez's complaint exceed the scope of his Charge of Discrimination filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC"); (2) Gomez has not established a prima facie case of retaliation; (3) the County had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its employment decisions; and (4) because Gomez has not shown the existence of an illegal custom or policy, the § 1983 claim against the County should be dismissed.

After carefully considering the parties' arguments, the relevant case law, and the record as a whole, the Court concludes that the County has presented meritorious arguments on the dispositive issues. Based upon the County's compelling reasons, as well as additional principles governing employer and municipal liability under Title VII and § 1983, the Court concludes that Gomez's claims cannot survive summary judgment.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff Ricardo Gomez's claims arise out of his employment with the County as a police officer in the Miami-Dade Police Department ("MDPD"). This action was initiated by the filing of a Complaint on February 20, 1998, which was amended on March 9, 1998. Although the Amended Complaint does not set forth identifiable counts, it purports to allege claims of national origin discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII and § 1983. Gomez claims that, as a result of discrimination and retaliation perpetrated by the County, he was denied meritorious promotions and training opportunities.

Gomez's employment history reflects that he was hired as a police officer of the MDPD in 1981. Throughout his employment with the County, Gomez received several promotions. Ultimately, he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant in 1992. In January 1994, Gomez was appointed as the head of the General Investigations Unit (GUI) at the Airport District.

From the inception of his assignment to the Airport District, several officers perceived that Gomez based his employment decisions on unlawful criteria. These officers believed that Gomez was repeatedly harassing non-Cuban officers for the purpose of coercing or effectuating their transfers out of the GUI in order to create vacancies for Cuban officers. The harassing treatment reached such intolerable levels that, as a result of complaints submitted to Gomez's superiors, the MDPD's Professional Compliance Bureau ("PCB"), the division responsible for investigating improper conduct within the MDPD, commenced a formal investigation in June 1995. Gomez was reassigned to another unit during the pendency of the investigation.

The PCB investigation focused on seventeen allegations of discrimination and improprieties committed by Gomez against these officers, including ethnic slurs and blatant abuses of power. Upon its conclusion, the PCB issued written findings. The PCB Disposition Memorandum sustained several of the serious allegations, and found that Gomez had acted unprofessionally in carrying out his supervisory responsibilities. Although the PCB did not find sufficient evidence that discrimination motivated Gomez's actions, the PCB explicitly concluded that Gomez's failure to follow published procedures for personnel decisions, and the actual decisions made by Gomez, raised concerns about the bases for his decisions, "fostered the perception of discrimination," and "creat[ed] an environment ... that was hostile."²

In addition to instituting the MDPD internal investigation, several of the offended officers filed a federal civil rights action against the County, Gomez, and the Assistant Director of Police Services, Carlos Alvarez ("Alvarez"). Alvarez, now the Director of Police Services, was dismissed from that suit on the basis of qualified immunity. However, the County remains exposed to liability for, at least, Gomez's allegedly unlawful conduct.

Notwithstanding the seriousness of the discrimination charges and the PCB's suspicions regarding Gomez's supervisory abilities, Gomez believed his tenure and service in the MDPD entitled him to a promotion. He applied for and actively pursued the rank of Captain. Following the selection phases, Gomez placed sixth on the Captain's eligibility list. Accordingly, he could not be considered for promotion until the candidates who placed above him on the list received their promotions. However, when Gomez became the top candidate, after the five higher ranked officers were promoted, Gomez was passed over. Instead, promotions were extended to candidates who ranked below him on the eligibility list.

Prior to denying Gomez's promotion to Captain and training opportunities in 1997, Gomez filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC. This Charge, filed July 27, 1995, was based solely on allegations of national origin discrimination. Gomez charged that, as a Hispanic, he was harassed and transferred "upon the filing of a Charge of Discrimination against [Gomez]." Gomez further charged that others who had been accused of discrimination, had not received "disciplinary transfers" pending PCB investigations. Gomez did not include the national origins of these other officers.

Prior to filing his EEOC Charge, Gomez attempted conciliation through the County's grievance process. In his grievance form, dated June 29, 1995, Gomez alleged that his transfer violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement (the "Agreement") between the County and the Police Benevolent Association. Specifically, Gomez's grievance was based on Article 36 of the Agreement, which prohibits the use of transfers as a disciplinary measure. Gomez neither mentioned nor inferred that the transfer was based on his national origin.³

Several years passed between the time Gomez filed his EEOC Charge and the issuance of the EEOC's Right to Sue Notice on November 23, 1997. During this period, Gomez claims that he was subjected to several additional acts of discrimination. However, he never supplemented his EEOC Charge. Pursuant to the EEOC's Notice, Gomez filed his civil complaint.

II. Standard for Summary Judgment

Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court is authorized to grant a party's summary judgment where the pleadings and supporting materials demonstrate there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue of fact is "material" if it is a legal element of a claim under the applicable substantive law and one which might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id. A material fact is "genuine" if "the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Id.

In order to defeat a defendant's properly supported motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must make an affirmative presentation of specific facts showing a genuine issue, and may not merely rely on the general allegations of the pleadings. Id. A mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment:

[I]n every case, before the evidence is left to the jury, there is a preliminary question for the judge, not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.

Id. at 251, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. Courts reviewing a motion for summary judgment focus on "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir.1997) (quoting Anderson, supra).

The Supreme Court has established a two-prong framework of shifting burdens which must be employed by federal courts in determining whether there exists a genuine issue precluding summary judgment. This framework places the initial burden on the moving party to establish the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact. Allen, 121 F.3d at 646 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970)). The moving party may discharge this burden by "`showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In deciding whether the burden has been satisfied, the Court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Allen, 121 F.3d at 646.

Once the movant has satisfied its...