Y.A. by Fleener v. Bayh, 49A05-9311-CV-421

Decision Date08 November 1995
Docket NumberNo. 49A05-9311-CV-421,49A05-9311-CV-421
Citation657 N.E.2d 410
PartiesY.A. by her next friend and Guardian Ad Litem, Michael FLEENER, on her own behalf and on behalf of those similarly situated, Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. Evan BAYH, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Indiana; Jeff Richardson, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Indiana Family and Social Services Administration; Robert Dyer, in his official capacity as Director of the Indiana Division of Mental Health; Indiana Division of Mental Health; State of Indiana, Appellees-Defendants.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court
OPINION

RUCKER, Judge.

In this class action lawsuit plaintiffs sought an order declaring the legal duty of defendants to provide plaintiffs with long-term psychiatric residential care. Plaintiffs also sought mandatory injunctive relief requiring defendants to provide safe, appropriate, and therapeutic placements. Both sides filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants and plaintiffs now appeal raising the following two issues for review:

(1) Do the Indiana Constitution, Article 9, § 1, and laws passed pursuant to that provision, impose an affirmative obligation upon the defendants to develop and provide residential services for members of the class of emotionally disturbed children in this cause?

(2) Did the defendants violate their due process obligations to subclass A, consisting of emotionally disturbed youth in need of residential placement who are in State custody, to safeguard these youth from harm and to provide them with minimally adequate treatment?

BACKGROUND 1

At the time this lawsuit was filed over 43,000 Indiana youth under age eighteen, were classified as "seriously emotionally disturbed." 2 Of that figure, over 7,000 youth required treatment in some form of residential placement, either inpatient acute psychiatric care, residential treatment facilities, group homes, or therapeutic foster homes. Inpatient acute psychiatric care is short-term inpatient care in public or private facilities. It is the most restrictive residential placement, but is essential to enable seriously ill youth to have crisis stabilization, acute care, short-term treatment, and comprehensive evaluation. Residential treatment facilities include twenty-four-hour-per-day treatment programs for children and adolescents with emotional, psychological, behavioral or social adjustment problems which are so severe they cannot be addressed by less restrictive means. Residential treatment includes specialized clinical services required for diagnosis, counseling and consultation in providing for adolescents with mental health needs, behavioral disorders, or emotional problems. Group homes are generally single dwelling residences with a family-like atmosphere. They typically serve between four to ten youths and emphasize independence, often including work and school programs. Therapeutic foster homes are also referred to as alternative families for children. These are essentially private foster homes where the foster parents have been specially trained to handle the needs of the youth placed in their care.

For the 7,000-plus youths in need of some form of residential care, the state of Indiana provides publicly funded placements for only about 400 youths. There are approximately 2,000 beds available in various private facilities licensed by the state for persons who have the ability to pay, have private insurance, or who are eligible for Medicaid. However a significant number of youth and their families do not have insurance, nor do they have the financial ability to pay for private facilities. As for those who are Medicaid eligible, their problems are still not solved. Medicaid will pay for acute inpatient care only for a brief period of time. And the 7,000-plus youths classified as seriously emotionally disturbed require long-term care.

Also, at the time this lawsuit was filed many of the emotionally disturbed children who could benefit from residential placements were already in the custody of the state or its subdivisions through Child in Need of Services (CHINS) proceedings, commitment proceedings, or other means, such as delinquency matters. Some of these youths are placed out of state while awaiting placement. However, many are placed into inappropriate foster homes, temporary shelter facilities, or in acute hospital settings. In sum, it is undisputed that there are many more seriously emotionally disturbed youths who need residential placements than there are residential placements available. As a result these youths may not be placed anywhere at all, may be placed into inappropriate placements, or may spend an inappropriate length of time in what was originally an appropriate facility.

FACTS

The facts in this case are not in dispute. The named plaintiffs are children under the age of eighteen who suffer a variety of emotional and psychiatric problems with varying degrees of severity. This action began October 16, 1990, when Y.A., by her next friend and guardian ad litem, Michael Fleener, filed a class action complaint against Evan Bayh, in his official capacity as governor of the state of Indiana, Joseph Reum, in his official capacity as commissioner of the Indiana Department of Mental Health, the Indiana Department of Mental Health and the state of Indiana. 3 The complaint sought declaratory as well as injunctive relief. Y.A. alleged that she was a ward of the Marion County Department of Public Welfare and that she had numerous emotional and psychological problems. A recommendation had been made that Y.A. be placed in a long-term residential psychiatric facility. However, the Marion County Welfare Department could not place her because no placements were available. Y.A. alleged that defendants were required to develop placements for her and all other persons similarly situated.

Thereafter the complaint was amended to include additional plaintiffs, namely: K.A. by her legal guardians; B.B. by his mother; A.C. by his legal guardian; J.T. by his mother; and M.P. by his mother. In addition the trial court granted motions permitting the following youths to intervene as named plaintiffs and class representatives: S.E.M. by his parents; J.T. by her father and stepmother; D.W. by his mother; N.C. by his mother; and G.M.B by her mother. All the named plaintiffs and intervenors were youths under the age of eighteen who alleged they were emotionally or psychologically disturbed and were in need of residential placements, but none were available. At the time the lawsuit was filed many of the named plaintiffs were in the custody of the state pursuant to Child in Need of Services (CHINS) proceedings or through other means.

On September 24, 1991 the trial court certified this matter as a class action. The class is defined as:

All persons under the age of 18 in the State of Indiana who have been identified or diagnosed by a qualified mental health professional as being in need of treatment for emotional disturbances in residential services, and who are not placed in the residential services prescribed or identified as appropriate because of the lack of such services, or because of their inability to afford such services.

Record at 293. In addition, the trial court certified subclass A which is defined as:

All persons under the age of 18 in the State of Indiana who are currently in the custody of the State or its subdivisions, and who have been identified or diagnosed by a qualified mental health professional as being in need of treatment for emotional disturbances in residential services, and who are not placed in the residential services prescribed or identified as appropriate because of the lack of such services, or because of their inability to afford such services.

Record at 293. On December 24, 1991, defendants filed their motion for summary judgment and on November 25, 1992, plaintiffs filed their cross-motion for summary judgment. Thereafter a hearing was conducted on the motions. On July 13, 1993, the trial court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants and against plaintiffs. In so doing the trial court entered detailed and extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law. Among other things the trial court determined that the long-term and short-term harm caused to children by inadequate or inappropriate placements is irreparable. The trial court also determined that "[t]he defendants are aware of the severe shortages in placements and the harm engendered thereby." Record at 292. Even so, the trial court concluded that the defendants did not breach any constitutional or statutory obligations imposed on them and as a matter of law were not liable to class plaintiffs. As for the subclass, those youth who are already in the legal custody of the state, the trial court observed that throughout the pendency of this action certain named individual members of the subclass had petitioned the court for injunctive relief to secure long-term residential placements and the relief had been granted. Thus concluded the trial court the defendants have not deprived any member of the subclass of any rights created by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This appeal ensued in due course.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing the propriety of a ruling on a motion for summary judgment, this court applies the same standard...

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