Byard v. Verizon West Virginia, Inc.
| Decision Date | 30 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:11CV132 (Judge Keeley) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of West Virginia |
| Parties | CHARLES R. BYARD, DAVID M. BROSIUS, KIMBERLY A. RAY, STEPHANIE SNOW-MCKISIC, LISA M. THARP, and LYNET WHITE, Plaintiffs, v. VERIZON WEST VIRGINIA, INC., FRONTIER WEST VIRGINIA, INC., VERISON SERVICES CORP., VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS, INC., JODI DENNIS, MARY FREDERICK, CODY STEWART, BARBARA TERWILLINGER, BOB ANDERSON, TAMMY MASON, DAWN WATSON, MICHAEL HATHAWAY, and CORBY MILLER, Defendants. |
Before the Court are the defendants' motions to dismiss and the plaintiffs' motion to remand this case to the Circuit Court of Harrison County, West Virginia. For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES the plaintiffs' motion to remand (dkt. no. 26), GRANTS the defendant Verizon Communications, Inc.'s ("VCI") motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (dkt. no. 9), and GRANTS the remaining defendants' motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim (dkt. nos. 11, 12, 13, 17).
On July 22, 2011, the named plaintiffs, Charles R. Byard, David M. Brosius, Kimberly A. Ray, Stephanie Snow-McKisic, Lisa M. Tharp, and Lynet White (collectively "the plaintiffs"), filed thisputative class action in the Circuit Court of Harrison County, West Virginia. The complaint alleges that the defendants, Verizon West Virginia, Inc., Frontier West Virginia, Inc., Verizon Services Corp., Verizon Communications, Inc., Jodi Dennis, Mary Frederick, Cody Stewart, Corby Miller, Barbra Terwilliger, Bob Anderson, Tammy Mason, Dawn Watson, and Michael Hathaway (collectively "defendants"), failed to fully compensate the named plaintiffs and a class of current and former employees for their "time worked" at the Verizon call centers located in Charleston and Clarksburg, West Virginia. Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants, as their employers and supervisors, required them to engage in certain "preliminary and post-liminary" work activities without compensation.
The complaint contains two causes of action. Count One alleges that the defendants violated W. Va. Code § 21-5-4 by failing to pay the plaintiffs "for all hours worked" (dkt. no. 1-1 at 50 (emphasis in original)). Count Two alleges that the defendants violated W. Va. Code § 21-5-9 by "fail[ing] to keep accurate records of all hours worked by Call Center employees" (dkt. no. 1-1 at 52).
On August 15, 2011, the defendants timely removed this case under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446, invoking this Court's federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The defendantsargue that the Court has federal subject matter jurisdiction over this case because the plaintiffs' claims are completely preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). The plaintiffs moved to remand (dkt. no. 26), VCI moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (dkt. no. 9), and the remaining defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim (dkt. no. 11, 12, 13, and 17). The Court will address each of these motions in turn.
The threshold question is whether the Court has federal subject matter jurisdiction in this case.
Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Any state civil action which satisfies this requirement "may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The party seeking removal bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction, Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chemicals Co., Inc., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994), and all doubts about the propriety of removal should be resolved infavor of retaining state jurisdiction. Hartley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 187 F.3d 422, 425 (4th Cir. 1999).
Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, "federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Accordingly, federal question jurisdiction may not rest on the assertion of a federal defense, including the defense of preemption. Id. at 393. Rather, federal district courts have jurisdiction over "'only those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.'" Interstate Petroleum Corp. v. Morgan, 249 F.3d 215, 219 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Const. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27 (1983)).
A corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule is the "complete preemption doctrine." Under this doctrine, a complaint "can be recharacterized as one 'arising under' federal law if the law governing the complaint is exclusively federal." Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 50 (2009) (citing Beneficial Nat. Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003)). This doctrine will apply to a claim when "the pre-emptive force of a statute is so'extraordinary' that it 'converts an ordinary state commonlaw complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.'" Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393 (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987)). The completely preempted state claim will thus be considered, "from its inception, a federal claim," and consequently "arises under" federal law. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393 (citing Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 24).
In order to remove an action on complete preemption grounds, a defendant must show that "the plaintiff has a 'discernible federal [claim]' and that 'Congress intended [the federal claim] to be the exclusive remedy for the alleged wrong.'" Pinney v. Nokia, Inc., 402 F.3d 430, 449 (4th Cir. 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting King v. Marriott Int'l, 337 F.3d 421, 425 (4th Cir. 2003)). Here, the defendants argue that the plaintiffs' claims are completely preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185, a statute in which the Supreme Court has found a congressional intent to create an exclusively federal remedy. See Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 390 U.S. 557, 560 (1968).
Section 301 of the LMRA provides in pertinent part:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in anindustry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a). This statute creates "a body of federal common law" in order to secure uniform interpretation of labor contracts and "'promot[e] the peaceable, consistent resolution of labor-management disputes.'" McCormick v. AT&T Tech., Inc., 934 F.2d 531, 534, 537 (4th Cir. 1991) (quoting Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 404 (1988)).
Even though the preemptive effect of § 301 "is so powerful as to displace entirely any state cause of action for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization," Franchise Tax Bd. , 463 U.S. at 23, "the bare fact that a collective bargaining agreement will be consulted in the course of state-law litigation plainly does not require [preemption]." Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 124 (1994). Instead, a state law claim will be completely preempted by § 301 only if resolution of the claim "requires the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement," Lingle, 486 U.S. at 413, or if the claim is "inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract." Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213 (1985).
As discussed here, the "collective bargaining agreement" consists of both the express provisions of the agreement itself and the "'industrial common law,'" the industry and shop practices that provide the context for the written agreement. McCormick, 934 F.2d at 536 (quoting United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960)); see also Shiflet v. I.T.O. Corp. Of Baltimore, No. 99-1379, 2000 WL 14214, at *3 (4th Cir. Jan. 10, 2000). District courts must examine the prima facie elements of a state law cause of action in order to determine whether interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement is required in order to resolve the claim. Foy v. Pratt & Whitney Gr., 127 F.3d 229, 233 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Lingle, 486 U.S. at 407); see also Arnold v. Cabot Corp., No. 1:99-75, 2000 WL 1283078, at *7 .
In Count One, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants violated the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act, W. Va. Code § 21-5-4,1 when they did not pay the plaintiffs "for all hours worked." (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 50 (emphasis in original)).
The West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act ("WPCA"), W. Va. Code § 21-5-1 et. seq., "controls the manner in which employees in West Virginia are paid wages." Gress v. Petersburg Foods, LLC, 592 S.E.2d 811, 814 (W. Va. 2003). The statute is "remedial in nature" and is designed to "protect working people and assist them in the collection of compensation wrongly withheld." Meadows v. Wal-Mart Stores, 530 S.E.2d 676, 686 (W. Va. 1999) (citing Mullins v. Venable, 297 S.E.2d 866, 869 (1982)). Accordingly, although "an employer is free to set the terms and conditions of employment and compensation," Meadows, 530 S.E.2d at 689, the WPCA mandates that it "must pay earned wages to its employees." Szturm v. Huntington Blizzard Hockey Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 516 S.E.2d 267, 273 (W. Va. 1999); see also W. Va. Code § 21-5-10.
To achieve this objective, the WPCA prescribes certain time...
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