Byce v. Pruco Life Ins.
| Decision Date | 21 January 2011 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO.1:09-CV-1912-RWS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
| Parties | PATRICIA BYCE, Plaintiff, v. PRUCO LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. |
This case comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [51-1] and Request for an Oral Hearing [51-30], Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [56], Plaintiff's Motion for Oral Argument on her Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [57], Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [66], and Plaintiff's Motion Requesting Consideration of Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [68]. After a review of the record, the Court enters the following Order.
Plaintiff Patricia Byce was the beneficiary and owner of a policy of life insurance that was underwritten by the Defendant, Pruco Life Insurance Company ("Pruco"). Def.'s SMF, Dkt. No. [51-28] at ¶ 1. The policy lapsed in March 2005 due to non-payment but was subsequently reinstated on May 11, 2007. Def.'s SMF, Dkt. No. [51-28] at ¶ 2; Pl.'s Opp. SMF, Dkt. No. [55-17] at ¶ 2.
On July 31, 2008, Mr. Mills M. Byce, Jr., Plaintiff's husband and insured under the policy, committed suicide. Def.'s SMF, Dkt. No. [51-28] at ¶ 7. As a result, Plaintiff filed her claim paperwork for the aforementioned policy on August 22, 2008. Id. at ¶ 8. After various communications and a meeting between Plaintiff and Defendant, the Plaintiff sent a letter on October 28, 2008 which stated in relevant part that she requested "immediate payment under the 2 policies purchased through Prudential." Dkt. No. [51] at Ex. O. As well, on December 2, 2008, Plaintiff's counsel sent a letter to the Defendant which quoted O.C.G.A. § 33-4-6 and alleged that the Defendant was engaging in a "delay tactic." Dkt. No. [51] at Ex. X. The letter also stated that Plaintiff did not "waive her right to sue Prudential at any time for its bad faith refusal to payher." Id Approximately three months later, on March 12, 2009, Defendant paid Plaintiff the $500,000 face amount under the policy, plus $31,638.83 in interest. Def.'s SMF, Dkt. No. [51-28] at ¶ 26.
On May 20, 2009, Plaintiff originally filed this action in the Superior Court of DeKalb County. See Dkt. No. [1-2] at 12. Defendant removed the action to federal court and has since moved for summary judgment on all counts. In response, Plaintiff has cross-moved for partial summary judgment. However, Defendant moves to strike this cross-motion for violating the filing deadline, and Plaintiff seeks leave to file it. As well, both parties have requested oral argument on these issues. The Court will consider each motion in turn.
Initially, both parties have requested oral argument on their respective summary judgment motions. As the Court finds the briefings sufficient on these issues, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Oral Argument [57] and Defendant's Request for an Oral Hearing [51-30].
Additionally, Defendant moves to strike, and Plaintiff seeks leave to file, Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Plaintiff filed her Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [56] on September 29, 2010, or thirty-four days after the Scheduling Order's summary judgment deadline. See Joint Prelim. Rep., Dkt. No. [7] (setting the summary judgment motion deadline as within 20 days after the close of discovery); Sch. Ord., Dkt. No. [9] (accepting the parties' Joint Preliminary Report as the Order of the Court); Ord., Dkt. No. [43] (extending discovery until 30 days after the July 7, 2010 Order, or August 6, 2010). When a filing deadline is missed, "the court may, for good cause, extend the time...on a motion made after the time has expired if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 6(b)(1)(B).
Here, Plaintiff argues that she acted with excusable neglect because, prior to Defendant's summary judgment filing, Defendant had taken the position that Plaintiff had made a demand under O.C.G.A. § 33-4-6. Specifically, Plaintiff points to Defendant's initial disclosure wherein the Defendant stated "[o]n or about October 28, 2008, Plaintiff sent a letter demanding immediate payment under both policies." Dkt. No. [6] at 13 (emphasis added). Additionally, Defendant's disclosure stated "[s]ome of [Plaintiff's counsel's] letters contained threats to sue Pruco and references to O.C.G.A. § 33-4-6." Id at 14.
In response, Defendant argues that it challenged Plaintiff's demand allegation in its answers to both complaints in this matter. See Ans., Dkt. No. [2] at ¶¶ 31, 42; Ans. to Am. Compl., Dkt. No. [25] at ¶¶ 32, 51, 60. As well, Defendant challenges Plaintiff's excusable neglect rationale as her cross-motion for partial summary judgment extends beyond the demand issue into a separate and distinct burden of proof issue.
The Court finds that Plaintiff acted with excusable neglect insofar as the demand issue is concerned, but agrees with Defendant as to the standard of proof issue. Defendant's answers did not clearly put the demand letter in issue. See, e.g. Ans. to Am. Compl., Dkt. No. [25] at ¶ 51 ). However, the Defendant affirmatively stated that Plaintiff had "demand[ed] payment" in Initial Disclosure Attachment F, which addressed the "detailed factual basis for the defense or defenses and any counterclaims or crossclaims asserted by defendant in the responsive pleading."
Dkt. No. [6] at 2. This statement is inconsistent with a lack of demand defense, especially in light of the fact that Defendant now challenges whether the Plaintiff's word choice even demanded payment. See, Def.'s MSJ, Dkt. No. [51-1] at 14 ().
Moreover, Defendant is not prejudiced. Defendant responded in opposition to Plaintiff's Cross Motion and was even given additional time to make its response. See Dkt. No. [63] (granting the Defendant more time to file a response to Plaintiff's Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment).
However, the Court does not find the same excusable neglect for Plaintiff's burden of proof section. Plaintiff first raised this issue in her Cross-Motion and fails to offer a justification for her delay as to this issue. Therefore, Plaintiff's Motion Requesting Consideration [68] is GRANTED, in part and DENIED, in part. The Motion is granted as to the demand issue, but denied as to the burden issue. As a result, Defendant's Motion to Strike [66] is GRANTED, in part and DENIED, in part. This motion is granted as to the burden issue, but denied as to the demand issue.
Plaintiff and Defendant have cross-moved for summary judgment on whether Plaintiff's contacts with Defendant ever constituted a demand under O.C.G.A. § 33-4-6. Additionally, Defendant moves this Court to find, as a matter of law, that its actions were not "frivolous or unfounded."
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires that summary judgment be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "The moving party bears 'the initial responsibility of informing the... court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.'" Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotations omitted)). Where the moving party makes such a showing, the burden shifts to the non-movant, who must go beyond the pleadings and present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact does exist. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986).
The applicable substantive law identifies which facts are material. Id at 248. A fact is not material if a dispute over that fact will not affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id. An issue is genuine when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id at 249-50.
In resolving a motion for summary judgment, the court must view all evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Patton v. Triad Guar. Ins. Corp., 277 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2002). But, the court is bound only to draw those inferences which are reasonable. "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (internal citations omitted); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 ().
Finally, the filing of cross-motions for summary judgment does not give rise to any presumption that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Rather, "[c]ross-motions must be considered separately, as each movant bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Shaw Constructors v. ICF Kaiser Eng'rs, Inc., 395 F.3d 533, 538-39 (5th...
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