Bye v. District Court In and For Larimer County

Decision Date10 June 1985
Docket NumberNo. 83SA417,83SA417
Citation701 P.2d 56
PartiesDavid BYE and John P. Gascoyne, Petitioners, v. DISTRICT COURT In and For the COUNTY OF LARIMER, and the Honorable John-David Sullivan, one of the Judges thereof, Respondents.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

David Bye, John P. Gascoyne, Fort Collins, pro se.

Duane Woodard, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Howe, Deputy Atty. Gen., Richard H. Forman, Sol. Gen., Dolores S. Atencio, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for respondents.

NEIGHBORS, Justice.

Pursuant to C.A.R. 21, we issued a rule to show cause to the respondents and simultaneously granted certiorari to review the Colorado Court of Appeals' dismissal of the petitioners' appeal. 1 People v. Vargas, 679 P.2d 1088 (Colo.App.1983). We elected to proceed in this fashion so that we could clarify the procedures available to court-appointed attorneys who seek appellate review of adverse orders concerning their fees under the payment scheme presently in effect. We affirm the court of appeals' judgment and discharge the rule, but remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

I.

This dispute involves the amount of fees awarded to two court-appointed attorneys in a criminal proceeding. The defendant, Jorge Vargas, was charged with first-degree murder and the petitioners, David Bye and John Gascoyne, were appointed by the Larimer County District Court to represent him. See § 21-1-105, 8 C.R.S. (1978) (appointment of attorney other than public defender). 2 They accepted the appointment and represented the defendant at a preliminary hearing and at hearings on motions to dismiss and to suppress evidence. The petitioners filed briefs in support of their client's position concerning these matters in the trial court and in connection with the People's interlocutory appeal of the respondent judge's order suppressing evidence. The petitioners also assert that they conducted an extensive investigation and engaged in considerable pretrial preparation. 3

Approximately two weeks before the scheduled trial date the charge against Vargas was dismissed, apparently on the ground that evidence newly discovered by the People adversely affected the credibility of the People's primary witness.

Approximately five months before dismissal of the information, Bye and Gascoyne filed a motion in the respondent court for the "interim payment" of attorneys' fees. The motion alleged that, because of the defendant's inability to communicate in English, the passage of approximately one year between the date of the homicide and the defendant's arrest, the number of witnesses, and the lengthy hearings, it was "both desirable and financially necessary" for the petitioners to receive interim compensation. The respondent judge granted the motion and authorized the payment of $1,500, stating in his order that "[t]he Court does not approve or disapprove of the time spent in this case...." 4

Following the dismissal of the charge against Vargas, Bye and Gascoyne petitioned the respondents for an order authorizing payment of attorneys' fees in excess of the maximum allowed. A number of specific grounds calculated to show that the case was unusually complex and time consuming were alleged in the motion. The petitioners summarized these grounds generally:

This case is one of the most involved and complex cases brought in Larimer County in recent years involving, as it does, very stale facts, witnesses from two cultures and two languages, many very transient witnesses who needed to be located and secured, many questions about the physical evidence accumulated, questions about eyewitness testimony, and several complex legal questions regarding evidentiary matters and matters of police propriety.

The motion was accompanied by itemized billing sheets and proposed orders for the payment of attorneys' fees in the amount of $8,717.50 and costs of $789.76. 5

The respondent judge authorized the payment of $3,000 to Bye and $1,000 to Gascoyne, substantially less than the requested amounts. In his order the respondent noted that the guidelines promulgated by the Chief Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court provided that the maximum payment for a class 1 felony to a court-appointed attorney for representation through trial was $3,000 and $1,000 for disposition prior to trial. 6 See Chief Justice Directive No. 6 (1978). The respondent, while not disputing the amount of time allegedly spent on the case by the petitioners, did "differ with their belief that all of this was necessary or appropriate." The respondent stressed in his written ruling the "contractual arrangements made at the time of the appointment" regarding the maximum allowable fees, and noted his view that the submission of a bill for six times that maximum was "alarming."

Bye and Gascoyne asked the respondent to reconsider or modify his order relating to attorneys' fees, but he denied their motion. The attorneys then appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals. As noted earlier, that court dismissed the appeal, holding that it had no jurisdiction to consider the issue raised.

The petitioners argue that, in the absence of some more appropriate means of review, the court of appeals should have considered the merits of the claim on appeal. 7 Although we agree that the court of appeals properly dismissed the appeal, we reach that conclusion for different reasons.

II.
A.

We first consider the propriety of exercising our original jurisdiction to review the award of attorneys' fees to court-appointed counsel, and conclude that the dispute in this case is more appropriately resolved in an original proceeding rather than on appeal. Our original jurisdiction is properly invoked "where a trial court has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion in exercising its functions, and appeal is not an appropriate remedy." Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co. of America v. District Court, 617 P.2d 556, 558 (Colo.1980). See also Colo. Const. art. VI, § 3; C.A.R. 21. "Our exercise of original jurisdiction is discretionary and is governed by the facts and circumstances of each case." People v. District Court, 664 P.2d 247, 251 (Colo.1983).

The nature of the order being reviewed in this case persuades us that we should exercise our discretion to review such disputes through original proceedings. First, under the present scheme providing for the payment of attorneys' fees to court-appointed counsel, trial court orders concerning such fees are largely administrative in nature. Second, orders for the payment of fees are collateral to the merits of the underlying action. Thus, neither the People nor the defendant, the named parties in the case, generally has any interest in the dispute over attorneys' fees. 8

The guidelines for the payment of fees to court-appointed counsel are contained in the Chief Justice Directives, which are policy statements promulgated pursuant to this court's general power to administer the Colorado judicial system. Article VI, § 5(2) of the Colorado Constitution provides that the chief justice is "the executive head of the judicial system," and article VI, § 2 provides that this court "shall have a general superintending control over all inferior courts...."

At the time the fees here were ordered, the pertinent directive provided:

If a judge orders a fee exceeding the maximum permitted by the schedule above, a justification signed by the judge setting forth the specific unusual facts and circumstances of the particular case justifying the excess fee shall accompany the fee order. Form orders of justification, conclusory statements, and mere recapitulation of time shown on the order for attorney fees form are not acceptable as justification for a fee in excess of the maximum and shall be returned for amplification or correction in accordance with this directive.

Chief Justice Directive No. 6 (1978). 9 The directive now in effect explicitly provides for review by the state court administrator's office of all orders for the payment of fees to determine that there has been compliance with all regulations and that the file is complete. Chief Justice Directive 85-24(5)(B) (1985).

The process by which these fees are paid and the determination by a trial court whether to authorize fees in excess of the specified maximums are essentially administrative functions. This court has the power to control the financial expenditures of public funds ordered by the judiciary so as to accomplish its overall aim of administering justice. See Pena v. District Court, 681 P.2d 953 (Colo.1984). We have "adopted the general rule that the judicial branch of government possesses the inherent power to determine and compel payment of those sums of money which are reasonable and necessary to carry out its mandated responsibilities." Id. at 956. We consider it a corollary to this principle that this court should oversee the administration of public funds earmarked for the payment of fees to court-appointed attorneys. This will entail, in cases such as that presented here, resolving disputes over the amount and payment of such fees, and, if necessary, compelling the lower courts to order appropriate payments to court-appointed attorneys. Cf. Luke v. County of Los Angeles, 269 Cal.App.2d 495, 74 Cal.Rptr. 771 (1969); State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966) (courts have inherent power to compensate court-appointed counsel for indigent defendants).

A secondary circumstance persuading us that this particular dispute is best adjudicated in an original proceeding is the collateral nature of the claim for attorneys' fees. Where, as here, the underlying criminal action has been dismissed and no appeal of any other issue has been pursued, neither the defendant nor the prosecutor has any continuing interest in the outcome of the dispute. As the court of appeals correctly pointed out, the parties to the controversy after dismissal of the criminal charges are the attorneys and the trial court, and the...

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