Byers v. Snyder
| Decision Date | 20 August 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 101,382,101,382 |
| Parties | Jim Byers and Sue Byers, Appellants/Cross-appellees, v. Dennis C. Snyder and Snyder's Marina Corporation, Appellees/Cross-appellants, and State of Kansas, d |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Ryan M. Peck and Joshua J. Hofer, of Morris, Laing, Evans, Brock & Kennedy, Chartered, of Wichita, for appellants/cross-appellees.
Randall J. Price, of Wichita, for appellees/cross-appellants.
epartment of Wildlife and parks, Defendant.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
When the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment is appropriate. The trial court must resolve all facts and inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in favor of the adverse party opposing summary judgment. The adverse party must present evidence to establish a disputed material fact. To preclude summary judgment, the disputed fact must be material to the case's conclusive issues. On appeal, the same rules apply; summary judgment must be denied if reasonable minds could differ as to the conclusions drawn from the evidence.
In determining whether a particular person is an intended beneficiary of a contract, the courts apply the general rules for construction of contracts. The primary rule in interpreting written contracts is to ascertain the parties' intent. If the contract terms are clear, the parties' intent is determined from the contract language without applying rulesof construction. Contracts should not be interpreted by isolating one particular sentence or provision, but by construing and considering the entire instrument. Reasonable interpretations are favored, and results vitiating the purpose of the terms of the agreement to an absurdity should be avoided.
Regardless of a trial court's construction of a written contract, an appellate court may construe it and determine its legal effect.
Third-party beneficiaries of a contract are divided into intended beneficiaries and incidental beneficiaries, and only intended beneficiaries have standing to sue for damages resulting from a breach of the contract.
The burden of establishing standing to bring suit as a third-party beneficiary rests with the party asserting it.
Under a theory of promissory estoppel, a promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
Intentional private nuisance is a tort relating to the intentional and unlawful interference with a person's use or enjoyment of his or her land. It requires that the actor act with the purpose or intent of causing a nuisance or to know it is substantially certain to result from his or her conduct; it is not sufficient to make invasion intentional if theactor merely realizes or should realize that his or her conduct involves a serious risk or likelihood of causing an invasion.
Tortious interference with an existing contract requires the following: (1) a contract; (2) knowledge of the contract by the wrongdoer; (3) intentional procurement of a breach of contract; (4) absence of justification; and (5) damages resulting from the wrongful interference.
Tortious interference with a prospective business advantage or relationship requires the following: (1) the existence of a business relationship or expectancy with the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) knowledge of the relationship or expectancy by the defendant; (3) that, except for the conduct of the defendant, plaintiff was reasonably certain to have continued the relationship or realized the expectancy; (4) intentional misconduct by defendant; and (5) damages suffered by plaintiff as a direct or proximate cause of the defendant's misconduct.
The elements of a claim for false light invasion of privacy are as follows: (1) that publication of some kind must be made to a third party; (2) that the publication must falsely represent the person; and (3) that representation must be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
The elements of defamation are as follows: (1) false and defamatory words; (2) communication to a third person; and (3) harm to the reputation of the person defamed.
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; MARK A. VINING, judge. Opinion filed July August 20, 2010. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Before Standridge, P.J., Green and Hill, JJ.
Jim and Sue Byers appeal from a summary judgment granted in favor of Dennis Snyder and Snyders' Marina Corporation (Snyder) in their breach of contract claim. On appeal, the Byers contend that they are entitled to a boat slip for their houseboat under Snyder's concessionaire's agreement with the Kansas Department of Wildlife and Parks (Department). The concessionaire's agreement vested Snyder with the obligation to furnish boat slips to park patrons of the Cheney State Park Marina and Concession. On the Byers' contract law claim, the threshold question is whether the Byers have standing to enforce the contract that was entered into by Snyder and the Department. The Byers, not being a party to the contract, contend that they have standing as third-party beneficiaries.
We determine that because the Byers have previously paid mooring fees for the right to moor their houseboat at the marina, they ceased to be a member of the general public. Moreover, the Concession Agreement imposed an obligation on Snyder, arising from his possession, control, and ownership of the boat slips, to furnish sufficient boat slips to satisfy the demands of park patrons. We determine that the Concession Agreement conferred a benefit on park patrons who intended to moor their boats at the marina. As a result, the Byers can be classified as third-party beneficiaries of the Concession Agreement between Snyder and the Department. We further determine thatthe Byers have standing on their contract claim. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for trial.
Next, the Byers contend that the trial court wrongly concluded that it lacked authority to order reinstatement of the boat slip agreement between the Byers and Snyder. We agree. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for trial.
Turning next to Snyder's cross-appeal, we note that Snyder appeals from a summary judgment granted in favor of the Byers in Snyder's counterclaims for tortious interference with existing contractual relations and intentional private nuisance. Finding no error, we affirm. In addition, Snyder contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his counterclaim for invasion of privacy. We disagree. Accordingly, we affirm. Finally, Snyder asserts that the trial court erred in dismissing his counterclaim for defamation. We agree. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for trial.
On January 25, 1991, the Department entered into a Concession Agreement with Wynn Robert Bailey. Under the terms of the Concession Agreement, Bailey was to furnish concession services and facilities on Cheney Reservoir "to the general public" and "park patrons," beginning March 15, 1991, and ending on October 1, 2015. As concessionaire, Bailey was to provide, at a minimum, a floating dock and 141 boat slips with 68 of them covered. In exchange, Bailey was granted the exclusive right to provide concession services on the premises. He was also required to pay the Department an annual rental fee of $1,000 and 2% of all gross receipts.
On July 19, 1999, Bailey assigned the Concession Agreement to Damien Bailey and Dennis C. Snyder. Later, on August 19, 2005, the Concession Agreement was assigned completely to Snyder. Snyder operated the marina in the name of his company, Snyder Marina Corporation.
On August 24, 2007, the Byers sued Snyder for breach of contract and Snyder and the Department for promissory estoppel and declaratory judgment. They asked for a judgment requiring the defendants to allow the Byers to use their houseboat at the Cheney Reservoir Marina and to rent them a boat slip at the marina under the customary terms offered to other park patrons. Snyder answered and asserted several counterclaims, alleging defamation, invasion of privacy, tortious interference with existing contractual relations, and intentional private nuisance.
The Department moved to dismiss the Byers' claims against it for lack of jurisdiction and judgment on the pleadings. The trial court denied the Department's motion and gave the Byers leave to amend their petition to comply with the Kansas Act for Judicial Review and Enforcement of Agency Actions. See K.S.A. 77-601 et seq. After the Byers filed their first amended petition, the Department moved to transfer venue and bifurcate and stay proceedings, which the trial court granted. The court transferred all claims against the Department to Shawnee County District Court.
The Byers moved for partial summary judgment on their claims for a declaratory judgment and for an order requiring Snyder to allow the Byers to moor their houseboat at the Cheney Reservoir Marina. Moreover, the Byers moved for summary judgment on all of Snyder's counterclaims. Snyder also moved for summary judgment on the Byers' claim that Snyder breached his Concession Agreement with the Department.
The trial court granted the Byers' motion for summary judgment as to Snyder's counterclaims for tortious interference with contractual relations and nuisance. The trial court found no facts showing a breach of contract by the Department. Moreover, the court found no facts indicating that the Byers intended to create a nuisance or to harm Snyder. The trial court denied the Byers' motion for summary judgment as to Snyder's counterclaims for defamation and false light invasion of privacy, finding genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment.
As to the Byers' claim for declaratory judgment, the trial court determined...
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