Byers v. Voisine (In re Interest of Voisine)

Citation888 N.W.2d 781
Decision Date30 December 2016
Docket NumberNo. 20160061,20160061
Parties In the INTEREST OF Raymond VOISINE Jonathan Byers, Special Assistant State's Attorney, Petitioner and Appellee v. Raymond J. Voisine, Respondent and Appellant
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of North Dakota

Jonathan R. Byers, Special Assistant State's Attorney, Office of the Attorney General, Bismarck, ND, petitioner and appellee.

Kent M. Morrow, Bismarck, ND, for respondent and appellant.

VandeWalle, Chief Justice.

[¶ 1] Raymond Voisine appealed a district court order finding he remains a sexually dangerous individual and denying his petition for discharge from the North Dakota State Hospital. We affirm.

I.

[¶ 2] Stemming from his conviction of gross sexual imposition in 2008, the State petitioned to commit Voisine to the state hospital as a sexually dangerous individual under N.D.C.C. ch. 25–03.3.

[¶ 3] Voisine's actions, leading to his civil commitment as a sexually dangerous individual, have resulted in six previous appeals to this Court. See Voisine v. State , 2008 ND 91, 748 N.W.2d 429 (reversing and vacating revocation of probation in postconviction proceeding); Matter of Voisine , 2010 ND 17, 777 N.W.2d 908 (reversing commitment as sexually dangerous individual and remanding for further proceedings); Interest of Voisine , 2010 ND 241, 795 N.W.2d 38 (summarily affirming commitment as sexually dangerous individual); Interest of Voisine , 2012 ND 250, 823 N.W.2d 786 (summarily affirming denial of request for discharge from commitment as sexually dangerous individual); Voisine v. State , 2014 ND 98, 859 N.W.2d 930 (summarily affirming denial of petition for postconviction relief); In re Voisine , 2014 ND 178, 859 N.W.2d 930 (summarily affirming denial of request for discharge from commitment as sexually dangerous individual).

[¶ 4] In December of 2014, Voisine again petitioned for discharge. The district court held a hearing in January of 2016. At the hearing, the State called one witness, Dr. Jennifer Krance, a psychologist at the state hospital. Dr. Krance testified Voisine remained a sexually dangerous individual because Voisine suffered from a congenital or acquired condition that is manifested by a sexual disorder, personality disorder, or mental disorder or dysfunction, he was likely to reoffend, and has serious difficulty in controlling his behavior. Dr. Stacey Benson, a clinical psychologist, testified for Voisine. Dr. Benson disagreed with Dr. Krance's findings and testified she did not believe Voisine remained a sexually dangerous individual. In February 2016, the district court issued an order finding Voisine remained a sexually dangerous individual and continued his commitment.

II.

[¶ 5] At a discharge hearing, the burden is on the State to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the committed individual remains sexually dangerous. In re J.T.N. , 2011 ND 231, ¶ 4, 807 N.W.2d 570. For the State to meet its burden, it "must prove three statutory elements and establish an additional constitutional requirement that is not a fourth element, but ‘is a part of the definition of a "sexually dangerous individual." " Id. (quoting Matter of Midgett , 2010 ND 98, ¶ 7, 783 N.W.2d 27 ). Under N.D.C.C. § 25–03.3–01(8), "sexually dangerous individual" is defined as:

an individual [1] who is shown to have engaged in sexually predatory conduct and [2] who has a congenital or acquired condition that is manifested by a sexual disorder, a personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction [3] that makes that individual likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct which constitute a danger to the physical or mental health or safety of others.

The State must also prove an additional constitutional requirement which requires the finding that the committed individual has serious difficulty controlling his or her behavior. J.T.N. , 2011 ND 231, ¶ 5, 807 N.W.2d 570 ; Kansas v. Crane , 534 U.S. 407, 413, 122 S.Ct. 867, 151 L.Ed.2d 856 (2002).

[¶ 6] Civil commitments of sexually dangerous individuals are reviewed under a modified clearly erroneous standard of review. Midgett , 2010 ND 98, ¶ 6, 783 N.W.2d 27. This Court explained:

We will affirm a trial court's order denying a petition for discharge unless it is induced by an erroneous view of the law or we are firmly convinced it is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. In reviewing the trial court's order, we give great deference to the court's credibility determinations of expert witnesses and weight to be given their testimony. The trial court is the best credibility evaluator in cases of conflicting testimony and we will not second-guess the court's credibility determinations.

Matter of Wolff , 2011 ND 76, ¶ 5, 796 N.W.2d 644 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

III.

[¶ 7] Voisine does not contest he meets the first factor of a sexually dangerous individual, that he has engaged in sexually predatory conduct. Rather, Voisine argues the district court erred when it determined that there was clear and convincing evidence that he (1) suffered from a congenital or acquired condition that is manifested by a sexual disorder, a personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction; (2) is likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct; and (3) has serious difficulty controlling his behavior.

A.

[¶ 8] Voisine argues the district court "failed to provide any detailed analysis of why Dr. Krance's diagnoses was more credible" than Dr. Benson's diagnoses.

[¶ 9] "Claims that a district court improperly relied on the opinion of one expert instead of another challenge the weight the evidence was assigned, not the sufficiency of the evidence." J.T.N. , 2011 ND 231, ¶ 8, 807 N.W.2d 570. We have declined to reweigh expert testimony as "[e]valuation of credibility where evidence is conflicting is solely a trial court function." Alumni Ass'n of U. of N.D. v. Hart Agency, Inc. , 283 N.W.2d 119, 121 (N.D. 1979). Additionally, "[w]hen witnesses give conflicting testimony, we do not decide to believe a witness different from the one believed by the district court." Hill v. Weber , 1999 ND 74, ¶ 12, 592 N.W.2d 585. "[A] choice between two permissible views of the weight of the evidence is not clearly erroneous." Wolff , 2011 ND 76, ¶ 14, 796 N.W.2d 644.

[¶ 10] Here, two doctors testified about Voisine's mental disorders. Dr. Krance diagnosed Voisine with other specified paraphilic disorder and a personality disorder not otherwise specified with antisocial features. Dr. Benson disagreed with these diagnoses, testifying that Voisine was better categorized as having dysthemic disorder, alcohol dependence, and antisocial traits. Ultimately, the district court agreed with Dr. Krance's diagnoses.

[¶ 11] To support her diagnoses, Dr. Krance testified Voisine "had sexual interest or sexually offended against a prepubescent male victim, as well as there having been allegation of hebephilic tendencies of an individual between the age of 12 to 14.... There's also indications within the records of incestuous behaviors." When asked about the differences between her diagnosis of antisocial traits and Dr. Krance's diagnosis of a personality disorder not otherwise specified with antisocial features, Dr. Benson testified the psychology profession itself has difficulty drawing lines to distinguish between the diagnoses. Dr. Benson explained, "that unspecified personality disorder has no agreed upon criteria ... the scientific community doesn't agree ... what exactly it takes to have that disorder."

[¶ 12] In weighing the testimony, the district court looked at two factors. The first being that both doctors acknowledge that Voisine was not diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder

solely because there was insufficient information concerning his behavior prior to the age of 15. The second factor the district court looked at was Voisine's behavior and lack of reliability. The district court explained:

Voisine has not provided reliable self-reports and has continued in implausible denials of problematic behavior. For instance, although it has been established by overwhelming evidence that he has been involved in an incestuous relationship resulting in his daughter giving birth to his child, he continues to deny the incest. He was found naked in his room with his roommate present within the past several months, but denies he was naked, suggesting he was wearing tan clothing.

We construe this statement by the district court not to mean that Voisine has the burden to show he doesn't have a mental or sexual disorder, but rather that the State has already met its burden and Voisine has failed to provide anything to refute the State's evidence.

[¶ 13] In the end, Voisine is asking this Court to find that one expert's diagnoses was more correct than another. As stated, we do not reweigh expert testimony. Because the district court's findings were consistent with the evidence presented at the hearing, it was not clearly erroneous to find that Voisine has diagnoses of a sexual disorder and a personality disorder.

B.

[¶ 14] Next, Voisine argues the district court erroneously held he was likely to engage in further acts of predatory conduct which constitute a danger to the physical or mental health or safety of others. Voisine's argument is centered around two points: (1) to determine this factor, test scores from various actuarial evaluations must show a likelihood of engaging in further acts, and (2) the district court incorrectly relied upon Dr. Krance's testimony rather than Dr. Benson's.

[¶ 15] Courts are not restricted to actuarial tests in determining whether an individual is likely to engage in further acts of predatory conduct. In re Corman , 2014 ND 88, ¶ 17, 845 N.W.2d 335. Courts and experts may "use the fullness of their education, experience and resources available to them in order to determine if an individual poses a threat to society." Matter of Voisine , 2010 ND 17, ¶ 14, 777 N.W.2d 908 (quoting Interest of M.B.K. ,...

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2 cases
  • Erickson v. Voisine (In re Interest of Voisine), 20190155
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • December 18, 2019
    ...which were affirmed on appeal. See Interest of Voisine , 2018 ND 181, ¶ 1, 915 N.W.2d 647 ; Interest of Voisine , 2016 ND 254, ¶ 24, 888 N.W.2d 781 ; Interest of Voisine , 2014 ND 178, ¶ 2, 859 N.W.2d 930 ; Interest of Voisine , 2012 ND 250, ¶ 1, 823 N.W.2d 786. This Court also affirmed a d......
  • Byers v. Voisine (In re Voisine)
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • July 18, 2018
    ..., 2012 ND 250, ¶ 1, 823 N.W.2d 786 ; Interest of Voisine , 2014 ND 178, ¶ 2, 859 N.W.2d 930 ; Interest of Voisine , 2016 ND 254, ¶ 24, 888 N.W.2d 781. This Court also summarily affirmed a district court order denying another petition for post-conviction relief from the conviction. Voisine v......

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