Byler v. Asher

Decision Date31 January 1868
Citation47 Ill. 101,1868 WL 4941
PartiesJOHN BYLER et al.v.JOHN ASHER.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Adams county; the Hon. JOSEPH SIBLEY, Judge, presiding.

The opinion states the case.

Mr. N. BUSHNELL and Mr. JACKSON GRIMSHAW, for the appellants.

Messrs. WHEAT & MARCY, for the appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE WALKER delivered the opinion of the Court:

This was an action on the case, brought by John Asher, against John Byler and Charles F. Talcott, in the Adams Circuit Court, as judges of election, for refusing to receive his vote, at an election held on the 6th of November, 1866. At the July term, 1867, a trial was had, and appellee recovered a judgment for five dollars damages, and costs of suit. To reverse that judgment the case is brought to this court, and various errors are assigned upon the record.

It appears that appellee is a white man, and had resided in the precinct for many years, and was personally and well known to both appellants, and had for many years been in the habit of voting at that precinct. But he was not registered as a voter at that election. When he made application to vote, the judges examined the register, and his name not appearing thereon, they refused to permit him to vote, assigning as a reason that he had left the State to avoid the draft, and was not, therefore, entitled to exercise the right of an elector. Appellee, thereupon, made an affidavit that he was “an inhabitant of the precinct, and was entitled to vote therein at said election,” and presented it, with his ballot, to the judges, and demanded the right, but they declined to receive it, for the same reason, but offered to permit him to vote if he would swear that he had not left to avoid the draft. This he declined to do. Appellee made no other proof than his own affidavit. He did not offer the affidavit of a “householder and registered voter,” as required by the seventh section of the act of 1865, p. 66, regulating the registry of voters and the manner of voting.

On the trial in the court below, appellants offered to prove that appellee was enrolled in the military service of the United States, in the military district in which he resided, and to avoid the draft, that he left home and went beyond the district; also, to read the president's proclamation, but the court refused to permit the evidence to be introduced, and likewise instructed the jury that they should not regard such evidence. It is urged, that while this evidence did not constitute a defense, still it was proper to show the animus of appellants in refusing to receive the vote. It is an answer to this position, that it does not appear to have been offered for such a purpose, and even if it were proper, to mitigate damages, it should have been offered for that purpose, and not as a defense. It is conceded to be no defense until a judicial determination was had, and a sentence should be passed depriving a party of his right of citizenship. The judges of election were not vested with such a power, even if Congress had the constitutional authority to enact such a law. But in any point of view, we see no error in excluding this evidence, or in giving the instruction. Even for purposes of mitigating damages, if it had been admissible, we do not see that it would have availed him, as the jury assessed the damages at but five dollars, which is but nominal.

The next question is, whether the court below erred in refusing to give the instructions asked by appellants. They are these:

1. “The court instructs the jury, that even if the jury believe from the evidence, that defendants refused to permit plaintiff to vote at the election mentioned in the declaration, and gave as a reason therefor some excuse that would not of itself be a legal reason, still they cannot find for plaintiff unless they further believe from the evidence that plaintiff himself had fully complied with all the requirements of the law, in order to show his right to vote.”

2. “If the jury believe from the evidence, that the plaintiff was not registered as a voter at the election referred to in the evidence in this case, and that the defendants, acting as judges of such election, refused to permit him to vote, that...

To continue reading

Request your trial
17 cases
  • Fitzmaurice v. Willis
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • June 3, 1910
    ... ... 51, 77 N.W. 446; Jones v ... State, 153 Ind. 440, 55 N.E. 229; Capen v ... Foster, 12 Pick. 485, 23 Am. Dec. 632; Byler v ... Asher, 47 Ill. 101; Edmonds v. Banbury, 28 Iowa ... 267, 4 Am. Rep. 177 ...          The ... provisions of a registration do ... ...
  • Miller v. Rokita
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • February 27, 1985
    ...incompetent to show negligence cannot be admitted on question of credibility of witnesses where not offered for that purpose; Byler v. Asher (1868), 47 Ill. 101: it is not error for a court to refuse to admit evidence which constituted no defense to an action, but which may have been proper......
  • Pope v. Bd. of Election Com'rs
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • December 20, 1938
    ...as reasonable limitations on the right of suffrage. People v. Hoffman, 116 Ill. 587, 5 N.E. 596,8 N.E. 788,56 Am.Rep. 793;Byler v. Asher, 47 Ill. 101. Appellant was entitled to be registered only if he met the applicable residence requirements. To constitute a residence, within the meaning ......
  • People v. Hoffman
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • March 27, 1886
    ...to be an inhabitant of the district,’ etc. The act of 1865 was decided to be valid, under the constitution of 1848, in the case of Byler v. Asher, 47 Ill. 101.It was there held that the judges of election properly refused to allow a party to vote whose name was not on the register, and who ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT