Byler v. Deluxe Corp.

• Decision Date: 19 August 2016
• Docket Number: Case No.: 16cv493 AJB (JLB)
• Citation: 222 F.Supp.3d 885
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of California
• Parties: Alexandra BYLER, Kay Catlin, Jennifer Graves, and Elizabeth O'Leary, Plaintiffs, v. DELUXE CORPORATION, d/b/a Deluxe Check Printers, Defendant.

222 F.Supp.3d 885

Alexandra BYLER, Kay Catlin, Jennifer Graves, and Elizabeth O'Leary, Plaintiffs,

v.DELUXE CORPORATION, d/b/a Deluxe Check Printers, Defendant.

Case No.: 16cv493 AJB (JLB)

United States District Court, S.D. California.

Filed August 18, 2016

Signed August 19, 2016

Anthony S. Bruning, Anthony S. Bruning, Jr., Ryan L. Bruning, The Bruning Law Firm, Saint Louis, MO, Francis J. Flynn, Jr., Los Angeles, CA, Richard Steven Cornfeld, Law Office of Richard S. Cornfeld, St. Louis, MO, for Plaintiffs.

Eileen M. Ahern, Paul Jen Loh, Willenken Wilson Loh & Delgado LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant.

ORDER:

(1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION;

(2) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM; AND

(2) DENYING MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE

Hon. Anthony J. Battaglia, United States District Judge

Presently before the Court is Defendant Deluxe Corporation, d/b/a Deluxe Check Printers' ("Defendant") motion to transfer venue, (Doc. No. 5), and motion to dismiss, (Doc. No. 22). Named Plaintiffs Alexandra Byler, Kay Catlin, Jennifer Graves, and Elizabeth O'Leary (referred to collectively as "Plaintiffs") oppose the motions. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART in part, its motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART , and its motion to transfer venue is DENIED .

I. Background

A. General Allegations

Defendant, under the brand name Deluxe, sells checks to account holders at various banks.¹ (Doc. No 19 at ¶ 16.) Customers can order checks from Defendant through their bank and have the checks printed and delivered to them, or customers can order new and replacement checks via the Defendant's website.² (Id. at ¶ 17–18.) Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated consumers, allege they were charged excessive, deceptive, unfair, and unethical fees for the delivery of new and replacement checks by Defendant. (Id. at ¶ 15.) The shipping costs at issue are for the following shipping options: (1) "Basic: Standard Delivery": $8.00; (2) "Better: Four–Day Express Delivery": $32.45; and (3) "Best: Checks Next Day": $49.60. (Id. at ¶ 23.)

Plaintiffs allege that these charges violated the California Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"), California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. ; the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750 et seq. ; the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act ("ICFA"), 815 ILCS505/1, et seq. ; the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act ("MMPA"), Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.010, et seq. ; the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 93A ("ch. 93A"); and similar consumer protection statutes of other states. (Id. at ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs' main contention is that the shipping and delivery charges are not reasonably related to the costs Defendant incurred in delivering or shipping the checks to consumers. (Id. ) Plaintiffs allege that Defendant maintains other websites under other brand names besides Deluxe, which use the same manufacturing facilities and provide the same delivery services as Defendant does for its Deluxe brand checks. Plaintiffs assert that Defendant charges significantly less for the same service through those alternative websites, which, according to Plaintiffs, establishes that the charges assessed on Deluxe's website do not represent the actual charges incurred in shipping and handling. (Id. at ¶ 29–33).³

B. Named Plaintiffs' Claims

Plaintiff Alexandra Byler has a checking account with U.S. Bank in San Diego, California. (Id. at ¶ 59.) On or about February 2013, Plaintiff Byler ordered checks using Defendant's website, and was charged thirty-four dollars and ninety-five cents ($34.95), of which eight dollars ($8.00) represented the delivery charge. (Id. )

Plaintiff Kay Catlin has a checking account with BMO Harris Bank in Chicago, Illinois. (Id. at ¶ 60.) On or about February 10, 2015, Plaintiff Catlin ordered checks using Defendant's website, and was subsequently charged thirty dollars and twenty-five cents ($30.25), of which eight dollars ($8.00) represented the delivery charge. (Id. )

Plaintiff Jennifer Graves has a checking account with Commerce Bank in Missouri. (Id. at ¶ 61.) On or about September 11, 2012, Plaintiff Graves entered Commerce Bank and ordered checks for personal, family, or household purposes. (Id. ) Plaintiff Graves received a bill for forty dollars ($40.00), of which an undisclosed portion was for delivery. (Id. ) On July 1, 2014, Plaintiff Graves again ordered checks for personal, family, or household purposes from Defendant through her bank; she was charged sixteen dollars and fifty cents ($16.50) for the checks and an additional seven dollars ($7.00) for Standard Delivery. (Id. at ¶ 62.)

Plaintiff Elizabeth O'Leary has a checking account with Lowell Five Cent Savings Bank in Dracut, Massachusetts. (Id. at ¶ 63.) On or about September 18, 2012, Plaintiff O'Leary ordered a box of Defendant's checks to be delivered to her home. (Id. ) Plaintiff O'Leary was charged thirty-two dollars ($32.00), of which seven dollars ($7.00) represented the delivery charge. (Id. )

C. Prior Procedural Background Relevant to This Proceeding

Two of the named plaintiffs in this case originally filed suit against Defendant in separate cases in the Eastern District of Missouri. (See Doc. No. 5–8 at 2; Doc. No. 5–10 at 2.) Plaintiffs Catlin and Graves (hereafter referred to as "Missouri Plaintiffs") filed their claims separately in the Eastern District of Missouri, but the claims were eventually consolidated with Graves' case designated as the lead case. (See Doc. No 5–8 at 5; Doc. No. 5–10 at 3.) Following extensive litigation, on February 2, 2016, Missouri Plaintiffs requested that Defendant consent to a dismissal of the Missouri proceedings without prejudice. (Id. ) At that time, the Missouri Plaintiffs expressed their intention to refile their claims in this District. (Id. ) Defendant declined to agree and informed the Missouri Plaintiffs that it would oppose dismissal. The Missouri Plaintiffs thereafter moved for voluntary dismissal without prejudice in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2). (Doc No. 5–1 at 6; Doc. No. 21 at 8.) Defendant did not oppose or otherwise challenge Missouri Plaintiffs' request for a dismissal. (Doc. No. 31 at 9.) Accordingly, on February 23, 2016, the court granted the motion and dismissed the cases without prejudice. (Id. )

On February 25, 2016, two days after the dismissal of the Missouri proceedings, Plaintiffs Catlin and Graves added California Plaintiff Byler and Massachusetts Plaintiff Elizabeth O'Leary to the suit, and refiled in this District. (Doc. No. 1; Doc. No. 5–1 at 6.) Defendant now moves to transfer venue back to the Easter District of Missouri. (Doc. No. 5.) Additionally, Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs' first amended class action complaint (FAC) pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).

II. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

Federal subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue that goes to the power of the Court to hear a case. Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. CA State Board of Equalization , 858 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1988). Rule 12(b)(1) permits a party to seek a dismissal of an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) may be either "facial" or "factual." Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer , 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). A facial attack on subject-matter jurisdiction is based on the premise that the allegations in the complaint, accepted as true, are insufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction. Id. at 1039. By contrast, in a factual attack, " ‘the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.’ " Pride v. Correa , 719 F.3d 1130, 1133 n.6 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Safe Air for Everyone , 373 F.3d at 1039 ).

Here, Defendant raises both a facial and factual challenge to the Court's subject matter jurisdiction. (See generally , Doc. No. 22–1 at 18–20.) Defendant's facial attack alleges that Plaintiffs' claimed injury is not facially plausible, and the factual attack alleges that Plaintiffs' allegations are too speculative. (Id. at 19–20.) Thus, the Court's inquiry is not limited to the pleadings in resolving Defendant's challenge to the Court's subject matter jurisdiction.

B. Article III Standing

To sue in federal court, a plaintiff must establish standing under the "case or controversy" requirement under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Med. Comm. for Human Rights , 404 U.S. 403, 407, 92 S.Ct. 577, 30 L.Ed.2d 560 (1972). Standing is an essential element of a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction. City of S. Lake Tahoe v. California Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency , 625 F.2d 231, 233 (9th Cir. 1980). Three elements must be satisfied for a plaintiff to have standing under Article III: "(1) he or she has suffered an injury in fact that is concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable court decision." Salmon Spawning & Recovery Alliance v. Gutierrez , 545 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560–61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) ). Because Article III standing is a threshold jurisdictional requirement that can be raised at any time during a suit, any jurisdictional issues must be settled prior to the court considering the merits of any case. Villegas v. United States , 963 F.Supp.2d 1145, 1153 (E.D. Wash. 2013).

C. Discussion

Defendant contends that Plai...