Byler v. Woods
| Docket Number | 3:22-cv-00208-RRB |
| Decision Date | 04 August 2023 |
| Parties | DARREN K. BYLER, Plaintiff, v. AARON WOODS, USCG, CGIS Agent; et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Alaska |
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
Before the Court at Docket 25 is Defendants United States Coast Guard (“USCG”), USCG Coast Guard Investigative Service (“CGIS”) Agents Aaron Woods and Timothy Jans, and Lieutenant Sara Lovette's Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint (the “Motion”).[1]Plaintiff Darren K. Byler opposes.[2]For the following reasons, the Motion at Docket 25 is GRANTED.
In 2014, Plaintiff owned a vessel called the Wild Alaskan, from which he operated a “floating entertainment” business in Kodiak.[3]In early 2015, Plaintiff was indicted in the District of Alaska on two charges: (1) unlawfully discharging and depositing raw sewage into Kodiak waters without a permit; and (2) knowingly making materially false statements pertaining to his disposal of raw sewage.[4] A trial was held later that year and a jury found Plaintiff guilty on both charges.[5]Plaintiff appealed from the judgment to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals which affirmed his convictions in 2018.[6]Plaintiff later filed an application for post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the district court denied;[7] Plaintiff lodged an appeal of this decision, which the Ninth Circuit also affirmed.[8]
Plaintiff brought this case in October 2022.[9] He amended his complaint the following month to allege various civil rights and tort claims against the USCG and Agent Woods, Agent Jans, and Lieutenant Lovette (collectively, the “Federal Agents”).[10] Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the Federal Agents acted unlawfully during the federal investigation that led to his indictment, Plaintiff's eventual arrest, and the subsequent trial, events which occurred between 2014 and 2015.[11]Plaintiff also alleges that several years later, in July 2021, unidentified CGIS agents from the Kodiak Air Station “conspired with City of Kodiak [o]fficials to illegally sink” the Wild Alaskan.[12]
Defendants moved to dismiss the First Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).[13]On May 10, 2023, Plaintiff filed a response opposing the Motion.[14]On May 24, 2023, Defendants filed a Reply.[15]On May 31, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Sur-Reply.[16]
Defendants filed the Motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(1) requires dismissal where a plaintiff fails to meet his burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction, meaning that the court lacks the power to hear the case.[17]“A Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack may be facial or factual.”[18]In a facial attack, “the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in the complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.”[19]In a factual attack, the challenger “attack[s] the substance of a complaint's jurisdictional allegations despite their formal sufficiency, and in so doing rel[ies] on affidavits or any other evidence properly before the court.”[20]When resolving a factual attack on jurisdiction, a court may “review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment” and “need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff's allegations.”[21]
Rule 12(b)(6) requires dismissal for failure to state a claim based solely upon the statements made in the pleadings.[22]To avoid dismissal, a complaint must (1) set forth “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”;[23]and (2) “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'”[24]A claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”[25]In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must “accept all factual allegations of the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.”[26]However, the court is not required to accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.”[27]
In the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the Federal Agents: (1) improperly collected evidence before and after his arrest on federal charges; (2) recorded a private conversation between him and his doctor following his arrest, and denied him use of ear protection while transporting him to his arraignment, which resulted in “permanent hearing loss”; (3) lied or made false statements in connection with his criminal case; (4) fraudulently “spoliated” or “tampered with” evidence in his criminal case; and (5) fraudulently “conspired with City of Kodiak [o]fficials to illegally sink his . . . vessel[,] the Wild Alaskan.”[28]The Court construes these allegations as asserting (1) a constitutional claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Narcotics Agents;[29](2) personal injury, negligence, and conspiracy claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”);[30]and (3) a claim under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”).[31]
Defendants argue that dismissing Plaintiff's claims is appropriate for three reasons. First, Defendants contend that Plaintiff's Bivens and FTCA claims are barred under Heck v. Humphrey, and that even if they were not, they would be time-barred.[32]Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claim asserted under HIPAA fails because HIPAA does not provide a private cause of action.[33]And, third, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's conspiracy claim fails because he has not exhausted his administrative remedies and because the claim is only supported by conclusory allegations.[34] The Court addresses each argument in turn.
Plaintiff brings a Bivens claim, alleging that Agent Woods, Agent Jans, and Lieutenant Lovette violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure when they obtained evidence used against Plaintiff in his 2015 trial.[35]Plaintiff also brings a FTCA claim for personal injury resulting from his transport to his arraignment in 2015 and negligence based on the Federal Agents' conduct during his 2014 criminal investigation and the subsequent trial in 2015.[36]Defendants argue that each of these claims is barred by the Supreme Court's decision in Heck v. Humphrey, and, in the alternative, that the claims are time-barred.[37] Plaintiff responds that Heck does not apply because he is no longer in custody, and that his claims are not time-barred.[38]
The Court finds that each of these claims is barred by Heck. In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a civil rights complaint brought against state actors under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot proceed when “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence[,] . . . unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.”[39]In other words, a plaintiff seeking damages for the “very fact or duration of his confinement” has no claim under § 1983 “unless and until the [plaintiff] obtains favorable termination of a state, or federal habeas corpus, challenge to his conviction or sentence.”[40]This rule also applies to Bivens and FTCA claims against federal actors.[41]Although there is a narrow exception to the Heck doctrine for civil rights plaintiffs who have been released from custody, that exception does not apply where-as here-the plaintiff's claims challenge the underlying conviction.[42] Therefore, under Heck, Plaintiff may not seek damages resulting from the injury of his conviction unless his conviction or sentence has been invalidated. Because Plaintiff has not shown such a finding in his favor or asserted an injury other than his conviction,[43]his Bivens and FTCA claims are barred.[44]
Even if Plaintiff's Bivens claims were not barred by Heck, they would be barred by Alaska's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims.[45]Alaska Statute § 09.10.070 provides that a plaintiff may only bring personal injury claims “within two years of the accrual of the cause of action.” A cause of action for a claim based on a Fourth Amendment violation accrues at the time of the allegedly unlawful arrest, search, or seizure.[46]As the conduct underlying Plaintiff's Bivens claims occurred in 2014 and 2015, the limitation periods for these claims began running during that time period. Because Plaintiff brought this action in 2022-well after two years-these claims would time-and deeply rooted feature of both the common law and our own jurisprudence-is not rendered inapplicable by the fortuity that a convicted criminal is no longer incarcerated.”). barred even if they had accrued under Bivens. Plaintiff cites Makin v. Pfizer, Inc.,[47] a products liability case where the court affirmed the finding that Alaska law barred the plaintiff from bringing his tort claims, but this case does not affect the Court's determination on this issue.
If Plaintiff's FTCA claims were not barred by Heck however, they would not necessarily be barred by the FTCA's statute of limitations. That statute of limitations requires a claimant to both present an administrative claim within two years of accrual of the cause of action and file a complaint in federal court within six months of the agency's denial of that administrative claim.[48]“An FTCA claim ‘accrues when the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable...
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