Bylling v. Edwards

• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: LILLIE; WOOD, P. J., and FOURT
• Citation: 14 Cal.Rptr. 760,193 Cal.App.2d 736
• Parties: Dora BYLLING, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Charles EDWARDS and Clara Edwards, Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 25286.
• Decision Date: 17 July 1961

Page 760

14 Cal.Rptr. 760 193 Cal.App.2d 736 Dora BYLLING, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Charles EDWARDS and Clara Edwards, Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 25286. District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1, California. July 17, 1961.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 4, 1961.
Hearing Denied Sept. 13, 1961.

Page 761

[193 Cal.App.2d 737] J. F. Goux and John M. Sink, Santa Barbara, for appellant.

Charles H. Lynch, Santa Barbara, for respondent.

[193 Cal.App.2d 738] LILLIE, Justice.

Plaintiff appeals from a judgment of non-suit entered in a personal injury action resulting from a fall in defendants' garage.

The following facts, taken from a settled statement, were offered on the issue of liability: Defendants Edwards celebrated their twenty-fifth wedding anniversary in their home at an afternoon reception for 150 people; they had no paid help, however, friends of Mrs. Edwards belonging to a social organization volunteered to assist; they came to defendants' home for the purpose of serving, did so and left. Plaintiff Dora Bylling and her husband, also friends of defendants, were invited to the reception and to remain for dinner; plaintiff neither helped serve in the afternoon nor was in any way connected with the social organization that did. The Byllings stayed on for dinner; six other persons were present--defendants, their daughter and her husband, and two others. Before they finished dinner, six after-dinner guests arrived. Defendants left the dinner table to greet and talk to them in the living room. Meanwhile, defendants' daughter, plaintiff and another woman cleared the table of dishes; they were neither asked to do this nor asked not to; they then began serving coffee and cookies using paper plates, carrying the same to the table from which defendants served their guests in the living room. Someone (unidentified) called from the kitchen that more paper plates were needed; defendants were standing in the dining area and Mrs. Edwards called to no one in particular, 'They are in the garage.' Plaintiff, who was in the kitchen but in the hearing of defendants, volunteered, 'I will get them.' Plaintiff walked through the door of the kitchen which opens into the garage. The garage is a one-car size, 9 1/2 feet high by 13 1/2 feet; a metal grease pan, 3 feet 10 inches long, 18 inches wide and one inch deep is kept on the floor at all times to catch oil from defendants' automobile; the car was not then in the garage but the grease pan was in its usual place; the bottom of the pan was entirely covered

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with grease of 1/16 to 1/4 inch; on the opposite side of the garage from the door was a wooden work bench on which the paper plates were stacked; the pan was so situated that a portion of it might or might not lie in the path of one walking from the kitchen door to the bench, depending upon to which end of the bench he walked. Defendants knew the pan was in its usual place; plaintiff had never before been in defendants' garage and did not know of the pan. The light in the garage was a strong 100 watt bulb on the wall about 15 inches to the [193 Cal.App.2d 739] left of the door as one entered, about 6 feet, 11 inches above the floor; the light was on. As plaintiff walked toward the bench she 'noticed some grease or a pool of grease' but did not see the pan; the grease she saw was generally in the area covered by the pan; plaintiff intended to step around the grease; while she was doing this she was looking in the direction of the bench; her foot shot out from under her and she suffered a fall. Plaintiff fell on her back and left side; she screamed and defendants hurried to the garage finding her lying close to the pan, beside it, not in it. They observed the grease pan and saw a long groove in the grease in the pan.

Appellant claims she was an invitee in defendants' home and that her fall resulted from their failure to use reasonable care to make the premises safe; but contends that in the event her status was only that of a licensee, defendants nevertheless had a duty to warn her of the grease pan; and further, that the same constituted a trap. She concedes she was a licensee on defendants' premises during the afternoon reception but submits that under the 'doctrine of changing status,' when she assisted defendants in serving their guests after dinner she became an invitee, relying on Cain v. Friend, 171 Cal.App.2d 806, 341 P.2d 753; and Edwards v. Hollwood Canteen, 27 Cal.2d 802, 167 P.2d 729.

Whether one is a licensee or an invitee is a question of fact (Laidlaw v. Perozzi, 130 Cal.App.2d 169, 278 P.2d 523); and the issue before us is whether, disregarding conflicting evidence and giving plaintiff's evidence all of the value to which it is legally entitled and indulging in every legitimate inference which may be drawn therefrom, there is evidence of sufficient substantiality to support a verdict for plaintiff (Blumberg v. M. & T. Inc., 34 Cal.2d 226, 209 P.2d 1; Sockett v. Gottlieb, 187 Cal.App.2d 760, 9 Cal.Rptr. 831). Viewing the evidence in the light of the foregoing rule, we conclude it would not support a finding that plaintiff was an invitee; the record clearly reveals plaintiff's status to be that of a social guest and as such, a licensee on defendants' premises, and that defendants had no duty to warn her of the grease pan.

'It is the purpose for which a person is upon the premises of another which renders him an invitee rather than a licensee.' Popejoy v. Hannon, 37 Cal.2d 159, 169, 231 P.2d 484, 490. 'As a general rule, if that purpose is one of common interest or mutual advantage the person is considered an invitee while a licensee is inferred where the object [193 Cal.App.2d 740] is the mere pleasure or benefit of the visitor. Aguilar v. Riverdale Cooperative Creamery Ass'n, 104 Cal.App. 263, 285 P. 889; Demmer v. City of Eureka, 78 Cal.App.2d 708, 178 P.2d 472.' Ashley v. Jones, 126 Cal.App.2d 328, 332, 271 P.2d 918, 920. The 'common interest or mutual advantage' required to make one an invitee is clearly found in those cases upon which appellant relies--in Laidlaw v. Perozzi, 130 Cal.App.2d 169, 278 P.2d 523, plaintiff was a co-hostess at a party which she and defendant were giving at the latter's home to which each had invited her friends and of which they shared the cost; plaintiff, a carpenter, in Cain v. Friend, 171 Cal.App.2d 806, 341 P.2d 753, while he visited defendant's home in their absence on invitation, went on the premises for the specific purpose of performing gratuitous construction work on a room defendants were building; and in Edwards v. Hollywood Canteen, 27 Cal.2d 802, 167 P.2d 729, the purpose of plaintiff, a vounteer hostess,

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in going on the defendant's premises was to further the latter's business of providing entertainment for members of the armed forces.

But the instant facts do not fall into the category of 'invitee' defined and discussed in the foregoing decisions; on the contrary, they appear to be similar to those found in the cases in which plaintiff's status as a licensee was inferred from her 'mere pleasure or benefit' of being on the premises. Free v. Furr, 140 Cal.App.2d 378, 295 P.2d 134; Ashley v. Jones, 126 Cal.App.2d 328, 271 P.2d 918. Mrs. Bylling's activities are similar to those of plaintiff in Ashley v. Jones, 126 Cal.App.2d 328, 271 P.2d 918. The Ashleys, friends of defendants Jones, went to their home to consult them about the disposal of church property; having finished their consultation, defendants invited them to remain until New Years to meet friends they had invited to their home for a social evening. On that day before the arrival of the guests, plaintiff had been in the kitchen with Mrs. Jones helping her prepare the refreshments; Mrs. Jones remarked...