Bynoe v. Baca

• Decision Date: 24 July 2020
• Docket Number: No. 17-17012,17-17012
• Citation: 966 F.3d 972
• Parties: Michael B. BYNOE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Isidro BACA, Warden; Attorney General for the State of Nevada, Respondents-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

966 F.3d 972

Michael B. BYNOE, Petitioner-Appellant,

v.Isidro BACA, Warden; Attorney General for the State of Nevada, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 17-17012

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted July 17, 2019 San Francisco, California

Filed July 24, 2020

OPINION

PAEZ, Circuit Judge:

In 1995, the Nevada State Legislature replaced the insanity defense with a "guilty but mentally ill" plea. See 1995 Nev. Stat. 2248–49. Pleading not guilty by reason of insanity instead of guilty but mentally ill had important practical consequences.

Defendants who were found not guilty by reason of insanity were entirely acquitted of the crimes with which they were charged, while defendants who pleaded guilty but mentally ill were subject to the same panoply of punishment as defendants who pleaded guilty or were found guilty after trial.

Six years later, the Nevada Supreme Court reinstated the insanity defense. See Finger v. State of Nevada , 117 Nev. 548, 27 P.3d 66, 68 (2001) (en banc). The court concluded that the principle of legal insanity is so "well-established" and "fundamental" that its abolishment violated the due process clauses of the Nevada and United States constitutions.¹ Id. at 84. The Legislature responded by restoring the insanity defense and abolishing the guilty-but-mentally-ill plea. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 174.035(4) (2003).

Michael Bynoe was one of the defendants who pleaded guilty but mentally ill during the short-lived period in which the plea was available in Nevada. After the insanity plea was reinstated, he sought to invalidate his guilty plea by filing a habeas petition in federal district court. At the time he filed his petition, he had failed to first exhaust any of his claims in state court. The court denied Bynoe's request for a stay and dismissed the petition, interpreting our caselaw at the time to require the dismissal of habeas petitions consisting only of unexhausted claims. See Bynoe v. Helling (Bynoe I ), No. 3:07-cv-0009, 2009 WL 3060372, at *2 (D. Nev. Sept. 23, 2009). In an unrelated case, we later clarified that district courts can indeed stay and abey entirely unexhausted habeas petitions. See Mena v. Long , 813 F.3d 907 (9th Cir. 2016).

Following this change in law, Bynoe moved to reopen his habeas proceeding under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) so the district court could reconsider his request for a stay while he presented his claims in state court. The court denied his motion to reopen, concluding that Bynoe's claim was not timely and he had failed to present extraordinary circumstances justifying relief. See Bynoe v. Helling (Bynoe II ), No. 3:07-cv-0009, 2017 WL 4079263, at *5 (D. Nev. Sept. 6, 2017) ; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), (c)(1). We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I.

A.

Three years after Nevada eliminated the insanity defense, Bynoe was charged with one count of sexual assault on a child and one count of lewdness with a child under the age of fourteen. The court initially determined Bynoe was not competent to stand trial and ordered him transferred to a psychiatric facility for evaluation and treatment. After his competency was restored, he pleaded guilty but mentally ill to a lesser offense of lewdness with a child under the age of fourteen in exchange for the state's agreement not to pursue the original sexual assault charge.

At his sentencing hearing, the court found Bynoe was mentally ill at the time of the offense and at the time of sentencing, accepted his plea, and sentenced him to life imprisonment with eligibility for parole after he served a minimum of ten years.

B.

Bynoe's lengthy procedural journey through the Nevada and federal courts began a few months after he was sentenced. He began filing motions in state and federal court, challenging the propriety of his sentence and conviction. While his initial objections were pending, the Nevada Supreme Court held that the legislature's abolition of the insanity defense violated defendants’ due process rights under the United States and Nevada Constitutions. See Finger , 27 P.3d at 86.

In 2007, Bynoe filed a pro se habeas petition in federal district court. He alleged that his federal due process rights were violated when he was barred from pleading not guilty by reason of insanity. The court appointed him counsel, and he filed an amended petition. Three out of the four grounds for relief in the amended petition turned on Nevada's unconstitutional decision to abolish the insanity defense. After reviewing the petition, the court ordered Bynoe to show cause why the petition should not be dismissed for lack of exhaustion.

In order to proceed with a federal habeas petition, petitioners must first exhaust their state-court remedies. See Anthony v. Cambra , 236 F.3d 568, 573–74 (9th Cir. 2000). In Rose v. Lundy , 455 U.S. 509, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982), the Supreme Court held that district courts were required to dismiss "mixed" habeas petitions—petitions that contain both unexhausted and exhausted claims—in their entirety. Id. at 510, 102 S.Ct. 1198.

Although dismissals of mixed petitions are technically without prejudice, the enactment of Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") made it difficult for petitioners to return to federal court with a timely petition. AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitations on the filing of a federal petition, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), and filing a federal petition does not toll the statute of limitations, See Duncan v. Walker , 533 U.S. 167, 181–82, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001). Thus, petitioners who filed mixed petitions late in the limitations period could fall outside the one-year window by the time they finished exhausting their state-court remedies and returned to federal court. Together, the one-year time limit and Lundy ’s complete-dismissal requirement heightened the risk that petitioners who filed a mixed petition toward the end of the limitations period would lose the chance for federal review of their claims. Dixon v. Baker , 847 F.3d 714, 719 (9th Cir. 2017).

Recognizing "the gravity of this problem and the difficulty it [ ] posed for petitioners and federal district courts alike," the Supreme Court introduced an exception to the complete-dismissal requirement in Rhines v. Weber , 544 U.S. 269, 277, 125 S.Ct. 1528, 161 L.Ed.2d 440 (2005). Under Rhines , a federal district court may stay the mixed petition and allow the petitioner to return to state court to litigate the unexhausted claims. See Jackson v. Roe , 425 F.3d 654, 660 (9th Cir. 2005). Stay-and-abeyance under Rhines is appropriate only where the court determines "there was good cause for the petitioner's failure to exhaust his claims first in state court."² Rhines , 544 U.S. at 277, 125 S.Ct. 1528.

In response to the district court's exhaustion concerns, Bynoe moved for a stay of his federal habeas proceeding under Rhines . The court denied Bynoe's stay motion because his petition contained only unexhausted claims. Bynoe requested a certificate of appealability, which the district court denied. He requested the same from this court, which we also denied. Bynoe then petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court, which was denied in 2011.

C.

Years after Bynoe's stay request was denied, we settled the law governing the applicability of a Rhines stay to an entirely unexhausted petition. In Mena , we held that district courts may grant a Rhines stay of a petition containing only unexhausted claims. 813 F.3d at 912. Reasoning that "the distinctions between mixed petitions and fully unexhausted petitions" are not "sufficiently meaningful to warrant different treatment," we determined that "[d]enying stays to all petitioners with fully unexhausted petitions ... creates a needlessly overbroad rule." Id. at 911.

About seven months after our decision in Mena , Bynoe filed a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), seeking to reopen his federal habeas proceeding so he could renew his request for a stay under Rhines and Mena . The district court denied Bynoe's motion to reopen, explaining that seven years had passed since the court had originally entered judgment and it was not "reasonable and warranted to reopen this case after so many years." Bynoe II , 2017 WL 4079263, at *3.

Bynoe timely appealed. We have jurisdiction to review Bynoe's appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. We review for abuse of discretion a district court's decision to deny a Rule 60(b)(6) motion, and review de novo any questions of law underlying that decision. See Lal v. California , 610 F.3d 518, 523 (9th Cir. 2010).

II.

Bynoe seeks relief under Rule 60(b), which permits litigants to request reconsideration of a final judgment, order, or proceeding entered against them. The Rule lists five circumstances that may justify reopening a final judgment—including, for example, newly discovered evidence, fraud by the opposing party, or a mistake committed by the court—and a sixth, catch-all category. The sixth ground for relief allows a court to reconsider a final judgment for "any other reason that justifies relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).

A party seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6) must satisfy three requirements. The motion cannot be premised on another ground delineated in the Rule, See Liljeberg v. Health Serv. Acquisition Corp. , 486 U.S. 847, 863 & n.11, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988) ; it must be filed "within a reasonable time," see Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1) ; and it must demonstrate "extraordinary circumstances" justifying reopening the judgment, See Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P'ship , 507 U.S. 380, 393, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993). Extraordinary circumstances occur where there are "other compelling reasons" for opening the judgment. Klapprott v. United States , 335 U.S. 601, 613, 69 S.Ct. 384, 93 L.Ed. 266 (1949). Bynoe's Rule 60(b)(6) motion satisfies all three.

A.

Bynoe's motion was...