Bynum v. Fort Worth Independent School Dist.
| Decision Date | 06 April 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:98-CV-690-A.,4:98-CV-690-A. |
| Citation | 41 F.Supp.2d 641 |
| Parties | William C. BYNUM, Plaintiff, v. FORT WORTH INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Dennis Gerald Brewer, Sr., Attorney at Law, John Matthew Anthony, Attorney at Law, American Center for Law & Justice of Texas, Irving, TX, for William C. Bynum, plaintiff.
David F. Chappell, Attorney at Law, Chappell & McGartland, Fort Worth, TX, for Fort Worth Independent School District, defendant.
Came on for consideration the above-captioned action in which William C. Bynum ("Bynum") is plaintiff, and the Fort Worth Independent School District ("FWISD") is defendant. Now before the court is FWISD's motion for summary judgment, filed February 16, 1999. The court, having considered the motion, related filings, and the applicable authorities, concludes that such motion should be granted.
On September 28, 1998, Bynum filed his first amended complaint, his current live pleading. In it, Bynum alleges that:
Bynum is a Seventh Day Adventist whose religious tenets require that he not work from sunset on Friday until sunset on Saturday. On July 20, 1995, FWISD hired Bynum as a Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps ("JROTC") instructor. At the time of his employment, Bynum informed FWISD and his supervisor, Major Negal Williams, U.S.A. Retired, ("Major Williams") of his religious tenets. In response, Major Williams, an agent of FWISD, effectively waived FWISD's requirement that Bynum work at least one full weekend each month.
Before becoming employed by FWISD, Bynum had been certified by the United States Army as a JROTC instructor. Certification by the Army was a necessary credential to gaining and retaining employment as a JROTC instructor.
After approximately one year of employment, FWISD issued Bynum an unsatisfactory performance evaluation for the reason that he did not work between sunset on Fridays and sunset on Saturdays. FWISD also requested that Bynum resign because of his religious beliefs. Furthermore, Lieutenant Colonel Herman J. Vanbebber, U.S.A. Retired ("Lieutenant Colonel Vanbebber"), an employee of FWISD, informed Bynum that FWISD would actively seek to have Bynum decertified as a JROTC instructor by the U.S. Army unless he resigned. Finally, FWISD refused to accommodate Bynum's sincerely held religious beliefs.
Bynum refused to resign. FWISD then took action to cause Bynum to be decertified by the U.S. Army, as threatened in the unsatisfactory performance evaluation issued by Vanbebber. Bynum still refused to resign. On August 12, 1996, FWISD placed Bynum on "suspension with pay" status through mutual agreement between Bynum and FWISD.
The U.S. Army did, in fact, decertify Bynum on September 20, 1996. FWISD terminated Bynum's employment on October 23, 1996. Bynum was unable to obtain any position as a JROTC instructor due to the decertification. Although Bynum was placed on a "suspension with pay" status from August 12, 1996, to October 23, 1996, and reassigned to work at another high school in the district during part of that time, FWISD did not pay Bynum for that period of time. Finally, when FWISD terminated Bynum it violated an employment contract he had with FWISD for the 1996-1997 school year.
The counts alleged by Bynum in his amended complaint are as follows:
Count One: FWISD discriminated against Bynum with respect to the compensation, term, conditions, and privileges of his employment, and ultimately discharged him, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 ("Title VII").
Count Two: FWISD breached the employment contract between FWISD and Bynum when it terminated his employment on October 23, 1996. Additionally, FWISD failed to pay Bynum for the time he was suspended with pay, constituting a second breach of contract. Bynum suffered economic damages as a result of such breaches of contract.
Count Three: Bynum demands attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) and Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code § 38.001.
FWISD first argues that summary judgment is appropriate because Bynum was not discharged, or subjected to discipline, for failing to comply with an employment requirement that conflicted with a bona fide religious belief held by Bynum. According to FWISD, the summary judgment record reflects that Bynum's employment was terminated because he no longer was eligible to serve as a JROTC instructor by reason of the U.S. Army's withdrawal of his certification to serve as such an instructor. FWISD asserts that the U.S. Army is solely responsible for Bynum's certification as a JROTC instructor being withdrawn. Following the U.S. Army's withdrawal of Bynum's certification, Bynum was no longer authorized to instruct the JROTC program for FWISD. Accordingly, FWISD terminated Bynum's employment as required by Army regulations and federal law. And, FWISD maintains more generally that it took no adverse employment action against Bynum of a kind proscribed by Title VII.
Second, FWISD argues that it accommodated Bynum's religious beliefs to the extent required by law. FWISD argues that, for this reason alone, it is entitled to summary judgment on Bynum's claims under Title VII.
Addressing Bynum's claims for breach of contract, FWISD asserts that Bynum failed to exhaust the necessary administrative remedies before filing his breach of contract claims, and that, therefore, the court is without jurisdiction to hear such claims. Furthermore, it maintains that the undisputed summary judgment evidence demonstrates that Bynum was paid by FWISD in full for the duration of his suspension with pay. Therefore, such claim for breach of contract must fail as a matter of law.
A party is entitled to summary judgment on all or any part of a claim as to which there is no genuine issue of material fact and as to which the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The moving party has the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The movant may discharge this burden by pointing out the absence of evidence to support one or more essential elements of the non-moving party's claim "since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), the non-moving party must do more than merely show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The party opposing the motion may not rest on mere allegations or denials of pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505. To meet this burden, the nonmovant must "identify specific evidence in the record and articulate the `precise manner' in which that evidence support[s][its] claim[s]." Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871, 115 S.Ct. 195, 130 L.Ed.2d 127 (1994). An issue is material only if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Unsupported allegations, conclusory in nature, are insufficient to defeat a proper motion for summary judgment. Simmons v. Lyons, 746 F.2d 265, 269 (5th Cir.1984).
The standard for granting a summary judgment is the same as the standard for a directed verdict. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. If the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 597, 106 S.Ct. 1348.
Bynum, a retired noncommissioned officer of the United States Army, was certified by the Department of the Army in December 1994 to work as a JROTC instructor.1 The JROTC program is described in one of the exhibits as follows:
The Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps program originated as part of the National Defense Act of 1916, which authorized the Secretary of War to issue equipment to those secondary schools desiring military training programs. The concept of maintaining a national program of military training for high school students was revalidated and expanded during the Congressional hearings preceding the passage of the ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964, the statute that governs all ROTC programs. Under this statute, the Army sponsors training in public and private schools as an integral part of the school's curriculum. It is, however, provided by the Army; and the overall performance of the program is closely monitored by the Army.
Pl.'s App. at 000008.2 The students who enroll as cadets in the program are taught primarily by retired United States Army officers and noncommissioned officers, who are hired by the school system in which they function. The Department of the Army reimburses the hiring school system for a part of the salary paid by the school system to the JROTC instructors on the school system's payroll. 10 U.S.C. § 2031(d)(1). Such a retired member of the military is not, while employed as a JROTC instructor, considered to be on active duty or inactive duty training for any purpose. 10 U.S.C. § 2031(d)(2). However, each instructor's professional qualifications and subsequent performance as an instructor must be approved by the Department of the Army through ROTC Region Headquarters. The standards established by the ...
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