Byram v. City of Detroit

• Decision Date: 18 January 1883
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: BYRAM and another v. CITY OF DETROIT and others.

14 N.W. 698

50 Mich. 56

BYRAM and another v. CITY OF DETROIT and others.

Supreme Court of Michigan

January 18, 1883

In view of the delay of complainants in filing their bill; of the fact that they are presumptively benefited by the pavement for which they are taxed; of the fact that the legislature can still authorize a reassessment, and that if the tax is as claimed, void, they have a legal remedy,--the relief prayed for should not be granted, the decree below should be reversed, and the bill dismissed, with costs.

Appeal from superior court of Detroit.

Otto Kirchner, for complainants.

Henry M. Duffield, for defendants and appellants.

MARSTON, J.

We have no doubt whatever of the power of the legislature to authorize a reassessment under the circumstances and in the manner indicated in act No. 44, Local Laws 1882, p. 17, and without intimating any opinion as to whether this case comes within the provisions of that act, we think it may well be disposed of on other grounds.

That the contract under which the work was done was in good faith let in accordance with the then customary manner of advertising for bids is conceded; and that these complainants are benefited by the pavement, to the amount of the assessments made upon their property, is not denied or put in issue in this case.

The assessment sought to be set aside was made and approved by the common council in September, 1880, and the work done shortly thereafter, of which complainants had full notice. The bill in this case was filed in September 1881, long after the work was completed and accepted, and complainants had the benefit thereof. They have not paid or offered to pay any part of this tax, but seek to avoid payment of the whole thereof. The fact that others may have more promptly filed a bill for relief would not be sufficient excuse for the delay of complainants in this case. Had they acted promptly, the city might have applied to the legislature and obtained ample authority to make a reassessment, and thus have collected the amount thereof before now. In view, therefore, of the delay; of the fact that complainants are presumptively benefited by the pavement, and should therefore pay their equitable proportion of the tax; of the fact that the legislature can still authorize a reassessment, and that if the tax is, as claimed void, they have a legal remedy,--we are of opinion that the relief prayed for should not be granted. ...