Byrd v. Board of Educ. of Mercer County

• Decision Date: 13 December 1995
• Docket Number: No. 22962,22962
• Citation: 196 W.Va. 1,467 S.E.2d 142
• Parties: , 107 Ed. Law Rep. 316 Joan BYRD, et al., Petitioners Below, Appellees, v. "The BOARD OF EDUCATION OF MERCER COUNTY" aka School Board of Mercer County, Respondent Below, Appellant.
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

Page 142

467 S.E.2d 142

196 W.Va. 1, 107 Ed. Law Rep. 316

Joan BYRD, et al., Petitioners Below, Appellees, v. "The BOARD OF EDUCATION OF MERCER COUNTY" aka School Board

of Mercer County, Respondent Below, Appellant.

No. 22962.

Supreme Court of Appeals of

West Virginia.

Submitted Sept. 12, 1995.

Decided Dec. 13, 1995.

Syllabus by the Court

1. "The true interpretation of the language of a special levy proposal is the meaning given to it by the voters of the county, who, by their approval of the special levy, consent to be taxed more heavily to provide the necessary funds." Syl.Pt. 1, Thomas v. Board of Educ., 164 W.Va. 84, 261 S.E.2d 66 (1979).

2. "Funds derived from a special levy may be expended only for the purpose for which they are approved. W.Va.Code §§ 11-8-25[, 11-8]-26." Syl.Pt. 2, Thomas v. Board of Educ., 164 W.Va. 84, 261 S.E.2d 66 (1979).

3. "Generally the words of a statute are to be given their ordinary and familiar significance and meaning, and regard is to be had for their general and proper use." Syl.Pt. 4, State v. General Daniel Morgan Post No. 548, V.F.W., 144 W.Va. 137, 107 S.E.2d 353 (1959).

4. Because the requirement of West Virginia Code § 11-8-16 (1995) that a purpose be set forth in an election order for the levy of additional taxes is couched in very general language, a general statement of purpose meets the statutory requirement. However, once specific purposes are enunciated, corresponding amounts for each purpose must be stated.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Mercer County; Robert A. Burnside, Jr., Circuit Judge.

Kimber Ratcliffe Warner, Princeton, for Appellees.

Kathryn R. Bayless, Bayless, McFadden & Cyrus, Princeton, for Mercer County Board of Education.

Howard E. Seufer, Jr., Bowles Rice McDavid Graff & Love, Parkersburg, for amici curiae.

WORKMAN, Justice:

The Mercer County Board of Education ("Board") appeals from the June 15, 1995, order of the Circuit Court of Mercer County finding a special levy approved by Mercer County voters to be invalid. Appellees, a group of Mercer County residents, challenged the levy through a writ of supersedeas for failure to delineate specific dollar amounts for each stated purpose on the levy ballot. After due consideration of this issue, we conclude that the circuit court's ruling was incorrect.

On August 23, 1994, the Board approved a levy call for continuance of the excess school levy for the period of July 1, 1995, through June 30, 2000. The ballot containing the excess levy proposal was approved by the Mercer County voters on November 8, 1994. The election results--6,711 voters in favor and 5,008 opposed--were certified on November 30, 1994, by the county commission sitting as a board of canvassers. See W.Va.Code § 11-8-17 (1995); Park v. Landfried, 135 W.Va. 361, 63 S.E.2d 586 (1951) (stating that votes cast in special election called by local board of education should be canvassed by county commission).

A copy of the board of canvassers' certificate of votes cast was forwarded by the Board to the West Virginia Department of Tax and Revenue ("Tax Department"). On March 22, 1995, the Board proposed the levy rates and recorded the details of the proposed levy rates for fiscal year 1995-96 in its minutes. Pursuant to statutory requirements, the levy rates were then published in the Bluefield Daily Telegraph. See W.Va.Code § 11-8-12 (1995). By letter dated April 5, 1995, the Tax Department notified the Board that the state tax commissioner ("Commissioner") had approved the Board's schedule of proposed levy rates for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1995. ¹ The Commissioner concluded that "any levy rates to be imposed in excess of those prescribed by the West Virginia Constitution were legally authorized by a vote of the people."

On April 18, 1995, the Board laid the levy and entered the levy order reflecting the adoption of the rates previously proposed and published in its records. As required by West Virginia Code § 11-8-13 (1995), the levy order was forwarded to the Commissioner and the Mercer County Superintendent of Schools. Absent the intervening ruling by the circuit court, the levy rates approved by the voters would have taken effect on July 1, 1995.

Approximately one week prior to the November 1994 special levy election, some of the Appellees voiced objection to the county commission and to prosecuting attorney, Charles R. Smith, regarding the form of the ballot. The specific objection concerned the fact that the levy order listed eleven separate purposes for which additional funds were needed, divided into two categories--"a." and "b."--with no corresponding dollar amounts designated for each purpose for which the funds were sought. The pertinent ballot language was as follows:

Special Election to authorize additional levies for the fiscal years beginning July 1, 1995; ... and the approximate amounts necessary for each purpose are set forth as follows, ...

A. (1) For continuing the upgrading and improving of the instructional program of the Mercer County School District by the employment and retention of qualified teachers and substitutes thereby keeping the Mercer County School District in a competitive position with other counties in West Virginia, and

(2) For continuing the maintenance of a fair and adequate salary schedule for all service and auxiliary personnel so as to retain and employ competent staff and substitutes for maintaining adequate services for the Mercer County School District, and

(3) For continuing the provision of fringe benefits such as dental and optical insurance coverage for all employees and/or their dependents, in the annual amount of approximately ........... $2,900,000.

B. (1) For providing free textbooks in grades kindergarten through 12, inclusive, and

(2) For providing necessary instructional supplies, materials and equipment to all schools, and

(3) For continuing support of public libraries, health services for students and employees, 4-H activities, and

(4) For continuing support of extracurricular activities for students including chorus, instrumental music, clubs, athletics, cheerleading, and classroom field trips, and

(5) For maintaining and renovating existing school facilities, school building construction and,

(6) For assisting in meeting fire marshal requirements, and

(7) For assisting in meeting utility and operational costs, including insurance, in all buildings and

(8) For assisting in meeting the cost of transporting students to and from school, in the annual amount of approximately $3,251,320.

That the annual total approximate amount necessary to carry out the above purposes, after making due allowances for exonerations and delinquencies, is approximately $6,151,320.

That the total approximate amount necessary to carry out the above purposes, during the term of the five (5) year levy, after making due allowances for exonerations and delinquencies, is approximately $30,756,600.

The prosecuting attorney communicated to the county commission his opinion that the form of the ballot conformed with the statutory requirements for an excess school levy. Based on the opinion rendered by the prosecuting attorney, the county commission approved the form of the ballot.

Appellees initiated the underlying action on May 18, 1995, ² seeking to have the special levy declared "null and void" through a writ of supersedeas. The parties submitted a joint stipulation of facts and briefs, but no testimonial evidence was proffered. In its memorandum of June 14, 1995, which is incorporated by reference in the court's order of same date, the circuit court concluded that the levy order and levy ballot "were not in the form and substance required by W.Va.Code 11-8-16 because the Order and Ballot failed to state the amount of levy proceeds to be applied to each identified purpose." The Board appeals the conclusion reached by the circuit court.

* * *

This case of first impression presents a question regarding what information is required to be stated in an order providing for a special election to increase levies pursuant to the language of West Virginia Code § 11-8-16 (1995) and subsequently, on the election ballot itself. ³ West Virginia Code § 11-8-16 provides, in pertinent part:

A local levying body may provide for an election to increase the levies, by entering on its record of proceedings an order setting forth:

(1) The purpose for which additional funds are needed;

(2) The amount for each purpose;

(3) The total amount needed;

(4) The separate and aggregate assessed valuation of each class of taxable property within its jurisdiction;

(5) The proposed additional rate of levy in cents on each class of property;

(6) The proposed number of years, not to exceed three, to which the additional levy applies, except that in the case of county boards of education the proposed number of years shall not exceed five;

(7) The fact that the local levying body will or will not issue bonds....

Id. (emphasis supplied).

The Board's position is that only two purposes are stated on the election order. Those purposes are separately designated by the denotation "a." and "b." According to the Board, "a." refers to personnel expenses and "b." to non-personnel expenses. ⁴ Because a corresponding total dollar figure was provided for each of the two purposes, the Board maintains that the requirements of West Virginia Code § 11-8-16 were met. Recognizing that "[t]he true interpretation of the language of a special levy proposal is the meaning given to it by the voters of the county, who, by their approval of the special levy, consent to be taxed more heavily to provide the necessary funds[,]" Syl.Pt. 1, Thomas v. Board of Educ., 164 W.Va. 84, 261 S.E.2d 66 (1979), the Board cites the taxpayers' approval of the levy as evidence that the voters understood the purposes of the levy and agreed to be taxed in excess of what is required by law in order to effectuate those purposes.

Appellee...