Byrd v. Little
| Decision Date | 18 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:21-cv-00001-DCN |
| Parties | RICHARD F. BYRD, Plaintiff, v. BRADLEY J. LITTLE and DAVE JEPPESEN., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Idaho |
Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. 28. While originally opposing the Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 33), Plaintiff Richard Byrd recently filed his own Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Procedure 41(a)(2). Dkt. 39.
Because Byrd has filed this Motion, the Court could simply dismiss the case without further analysis. It will dismiss the case to be sure, but does so against the backdrop of the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for two reasons.
First, Byrd filed his Motion to Dismiss asking the Court to dismiss his claims without prejudice. The Court will not do so because, as explained below, Byrd's claims are improper and cannot be saved by amendment.
Second and relatedly, Rule 41 explains that the Court may—upon a plaintiff's request—dismiss any action "on terms that the court considers proper." Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). Because the Court is dismissing Byrd's claims with prejudice, it takes this opportunity to explain why such a finding is proper.
Having reviewed the record and briefs, the Court finds that the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented. Accordingly, the Court finds that the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument, the Court will decide the motions without oral argument. Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1)(B). Based on the following, the Court finds good cause to GRANT Defendants' Motions to Dismiss and to GRANT Byrd's Motion to Dismiss.
On January 4, 2021, Byrd filed a complaint with the Court challenging Idaho's COVID-19 vaccination schedule.1 Dkt. 1. Byrd's first claim states that Governor Little and Idaho Department of Health and Welfare Director Dave Jeppesen ("Defendants") abused discretionary powers by enforcing the vaccination schedule, which prioritized vaccinating healthcare personnel in the first phase. Id. Byrd suggests this vaccination plan does not rely on "science or statistical facts," because healthcare workers are at a much lower risk of severe illness or death from COVID-19 than people 65 years old and older. Dkt. 1, at 5. Thus, in Byrd's estimation, the vaccination schedule should focus on vaccinating high-risk individuals before vaccinating healthcare personnel.
Byrd's second claim argues that Idaho's vaccination plan violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution by prioritizing elderly residents of long-term carefacilities over Idahoans of the same age, but not housed in such facilities. Id. at 6. In this claim, Byrd alleges there is no difference between those 65 and older living in a long-term care facility and those 65 and older "struggling along at home." Id. Byrd suggests that by only prioritizing elderly people living in long-term care facilities, but denying him and other individual over 65 and living at home, Defendants are violating the Equal Protection clause.
In January 8, 2021, Byrd filed a Motion to Expedite Life and Death Matter requesting an "ex parte injunction," which asked the Court to order the State of Idaho to vaccinate the "most vulnerable" first, i.e. Idahoans over age 65. Dkt. 2. On January 22, 2021, Defendants filed an opposition to Byrd's Motion to Expedite. Dkt. 14. Byrd replied on January 26, 2021. Dkt. 15.
On February 2, 2021, Defendants filed a Notice of Additional Information stating that, as of February 1, 2021, all Idahoans ages 65 and older could request a vaccination. Dkt. 18. Byrd responded that he and his wife had called multiple clinics but were unable to schedule an appointment for a vaccination. Dkt. 19. Byrd further stated that his prior Motions were still necessary, because "there is a big difference between being able to 'request' a vaccination and actually getting one." Id. at 2.
On February 5, 2021, Byrd filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the United States District Court for the District of Idaho had not taken any action is this "life or death matter," and failed to appreciate the seriousness of his case. Dkt. 21. On March 9, 2021, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Byrd's request, stating that he failed to demonstrate that his case warrantedintervention by that court. Dkt. 31.
On February 26, 2021, the Court denied Byrd's Motion for to Expedite Life and Death Matter, which the Court construed as a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. Dkt. 27. The Court explained that the Temporary Restraining Order was not appropriate because Byrd's claim was unlikely to succeed on the merits and failed to demonstrate immediate threatened injury. Id.
On March 1, 2021, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, alleging that Byrd's first claim has not sufficiently raised a federal question, that he does not have standing, and that he has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Dkt. 28. Defendant's argue further that Byrd's second claim, the Equal Protection Violation, is moot because as of February 1, 2021, Byrd has been treated the same as residents in long-term care facilities—eligible for the vaccination. Byrd was subsequently served on March 9, 2021. Dkt. 30. Byrd responded on March 17, 2021, and Defendants replied on March 31, 2021. Dkts. 33, 35.
On March 31, 2021, the Defendants file a Motion for Limited Jurisdictional Discovery, requesting that Byrd disclose whether he had received a COVID-19 vaccination (to assess the mootness of Byrd's claims). Dkt. 35. On April 19, 2021, Byrd responded to Defendants Motion, stating that he had "completed" his vaccination on March 12, 2021. Dkt. 37.
On May 3, 2021, Defendants filed a reply to their motion for jurisdictional discovery. Dkt. 38. In that brief submission, Defendants point out that because Byrd confirmed he has been fully vaccinated, he 1) does not have standing to bring this suit, and2) his claims are moot. Id.
Also on May 3, however, Byrd filed a Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. 39. In this Motion, Byrd reviews the posture of the case and laments that "at this time [] any further litigation would . . . have no beneficial effect on the substance of the Complaint." Dkt. 39, at 4. Accordingly, Byrd asks that the case be dismissed without prejudice. Defendants do not oppose the Motion. Dkt. 40.
As previously noted, while the Court "may" dismiss this case solely upon Byrd's Motion, it has elected to analyze the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in order to outline the "terms" of the dismissal and to explain why it is dismissing the case with prejudice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) ().
When subject matter jurisdiction is challenged pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion. Indus. Tectonics, Inc. v. Aero Alloy, 912 F.2d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936)). A party who brings a Rule 12(b)(1) challenge may do so by referring to the face of the pleadings or by presenting extrinsic evidence. See White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000) (). If the jurisdictional attack is facial, the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to establish federal jurisdiction. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). Whenconsidering this type of jurisdictional attack, a court must consider the allegations of the complaint to be true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1988).
By contrast, in a factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction. Meyer, 373 F.3d at 1039. In resolving a factual attack on jurisdiction, the court need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff's allegations, and may review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Id.
Rule 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a claim if the plaintiff has "fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on either a 'lack of a cognizable legal theory' or 'the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.'" Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Rule 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," in order to "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007). "This is not an onerous burden." Johnson, 534 F.3d at 1121. A complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations," but it must set forth "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The complaint must also contain sufficient factual matter to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must view the complaint in thelight most favorable to the claimant and "accept[] all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, as well as any reasonable inference drawn from them." Johnson, 534 F.3d at 1122.
Finally, in determining whether a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal should be granted, the Court may not look at matters outside the complaint. Schneider v. Calf. Dep't of Corrections, 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 1998). However, the Court...
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