Byrd v. Pierce Cnty.
| Decision Date | 05 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 50513-4-II,50513-4-II |
| Citation | 425 P.3d 948 |
| Parties | Brian BYRD and Nicole Byrd, husband and wife, Appellants, v. PIERCE COUNTY, a Washington municipal corporation, Respondent. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Martin Burns, Burns Law, PLLC, 524 Tacoma Ave. S, Tacoma, WA, 98402-5416 for Appellant
Michelle Luna-Green, Pierce County Prosecuting Attorney, 955 Tacoma Ave. S Ste. 301, Tacoma, WA, 98402-2160 for Respondent
PUBLISHED OPINION
¶ 1 Brian and Nicole Byrd appeal the superior court’s grant of Pierce County’s CR 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the Byrds’ complaint. The Byrds argue that their complaint stated claims for equitable estoppel and quiet title upon which relief can be granted and that they were not required to exhaust administrative remedies under the Land Use Petition Act (LUPA), ch. 36.70C RCW. We hold that (1) as a matter of law, equitable estoppel may not be alleged offensively as a cause of action by plaintiffs, so the Byrds’ complaint failed to state an equitable estoppel claim, (2) the Byrds failed to state a quiet title claim, and (3) because the Byrds failed to state claims upon which relief can be granted, we do not consider the exhaustion of remedies issue. We affirm.
FACTS
¶ 2 The Byrds filed a complaint in superior court entitled "Complaint for Equitable Estoppel and Request for Perm[a]n[e]nt Inju[n]ctive Relief." In a section with the heading "Causes of Action: Quiet Title/Declaratory Relief," the Byrds incorporated their factual allegations by reference and then provided the following statement describing their action:
Plaintiffs have spent 5 years and thousands of dollars moving through the permitting process to build the new recycling center. The County has been aware of, and has verbally approved, Plaintiffs’ plans since 2012. The County has approved construction/renovation so as to create an office. The County has requested and recommended approval of Plaintiffs’ submitted engineering designs. Plaintiffs consulted with the County prior to purchasing the property. Plaintiffs reasonably relied on the County’s assertions, permits and approvals to use the Subject Property for commercial use. The County has now changed its approval to a denial. Plaintiffs have been damaged by the County’s denial. Such conduct by the County satisfies the doctrine of equitable estoppel as a party cannot act in a manner allowing another to rely on such action only to then contradict or repudiate such action to the detriment of the relying party.
Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 5 (emphasis added).
¶ 3 The only time the Byrds used the phrase "quiet title" was in the heading of the section discussing their equitable estoppel claim. The complaint’s request for relief asked for "an order estopping the County from denying Plaintiffs’ minor right of way driveway deviation" and a "permanent injunction against the enforcement of a covenant on title restricting residential access only to the Subject commercial Property." CP at 6. The complaint did not assert that there was a dispute regarding competing property rights or the parties’ respective rights under the deed language. The complaint did not allege that the Byrds were entitled to commercial access to the property under the deed. The complaint also did not ask the court to interpret the deed language.
¶ 4 In 1967, Disman and Beverly Peecher owned the "Subject Property" in Puyallup, which was directly adjacent to State Route (SR) 512 and Canyon Road. SR 512 was under construction, and the State used eminent domain to purchase the portion of the Peechers’ property that directly abutted SR 512. The Peechers deeded a portion of their property to the State and relinquished rights to access SR 512 from the Subject Property. The deed included a 14-foot residential driveway exclusion that stated, in relevant part, that the Peechers granted to the State "all rights of ingress and egress ... to, from and between" SR 512 and the Subject Property except right of way access "for the sole purpose of serving a single family residence." CP at 103.
¶ 5 In 1979, when the State completed construction of SR 512, the State quit claimed to the County "all right, title and interest in the property" that the State had obtained from the Peechers under the 1967 deed. CP at 2. The deed stated that the County would "maintain the control of ingress and egress to, from and between the lands herein conveyed and the lands adjacent thereto," including the Subject Property. CP at 15.
CP at 32. At the time the Byrds purchased the Subject Property, they had a partially legible copy of the 1967 warranty deed.
¶ 7 The Byrds communicated with the County numerous times between 2012 and 2016 to seek information and submit applications regarding the Subject Property’s development. In April 2013, the County issued permits for the Byrds to convert a detached garage on the Subject Property into office space. In August 2014, the County approved the Byrds’ plans for the proposed commercial recycling center. In March 2015, the Byrds received approval to clear the Subject Property, which was required before the Byrds could obtain building permits for the recycling center.
¶ 8 In October, the County informed the Byrds that in order to use the Subject Property for commercial purposes, the Byrds needed to obtain an engineering deviation to widen the driveway to comply with commercial driveway regulations. In December, the Byrds submitted a deviation request to widen the driveway. In January 2016, a county engineer "recommended" approval for the Byrds’ deviation request if the Byrds constructed the road, lighting, and curbing into and out of the Subject Property consistent with the conditions specified in the memo.
¶ 9 In February 2017, the State sent an e-mail to the County saying that the State had an "understanding" that "a commercial recycling facility has been proposed" on the Subject Property. CP at 76. The State’s e-mail said that the driveway on the County’s property "is currently only allowed as a Type A Residential Use driveway." CP at 76. The State expressed concern to the County that the Byrds’ proposed development could have negative impacts on traffic patterns and said, "[Washington State Department of Transportation] will not support allowing the driveway’s usage to be changed from its current residential use only." CP at 76. The State asked the County to enforce the limited access restrictions in the 1967 deed that allowed only single-family residential access to the Subject Property from SR 512.
¶ 10 In March 2017, the County denied the deviation request "due to title notification that the subject parcel is only allowed a residential driveway approach not to exceed 14 feet wide." CP at 81. The denial stated that the Byrds’ deed for the Subject Property contained a reference to the 1967 warranty deed and the residential access restriction it contained.
¶ 11 The Byrds filed a "Complaint for Equitable Estoppel and Request for Perm[a]n[e]nt Inju[n]ctive Relief" in superior court.
¶ 12 In May, the County filed a CR 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the Byrds’ action, arguing that the Byrds had failed to comply with the LUPA requirement that they exhaust administrative remedies regarding the deviation permit denial before appealing to superior court. In addition, the County asserted that there was no legal theory under which the Byrds could succeed on their equitable estoppel claim because the superior court cannot prohibit enforcement of the deed or state law. The County asserted that the deed language clearly prohibited commercial access to the Subject Property, and RCW 47.52.080 allowed access to, from, and between limited access highways and abutting properties only to the extent authorized in a deed. As such, according to the State, the deed allowing only single-family residential access between the highway and the Subject Property was a limitation on access to the Subject Property provided under state law, and this access limitation could not be modified by the County even if the County wanted to grant such access.
¶ 13 The Byrds asserted for the first time in reply to the County’s response that the language in the deed, allegedly imposing a limited residential access restriction to the Subject Property, was unclear. They argued that the court, as a threshold matter, needed to address whether the deed limited all commercial access to the Subject Property, and if so whether the County was equitably estopped from enforcing the deed. As such, the Byrds asserted that their complaint addresses "the scope of a deed provision" and "the application of equitable estoppel," both of which the Byrds claimed are issues outside the authority of the hearing examiner and properly brought as original actions in the superior court. CP at 122.
¶ 14 The superior court granted the County’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the Byrds had failed to state a claim upon which relief...
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