Byrd v. Sorrells
| Decision Date | 10 January 1957 |
| Docket Number | 4 Div. 828 |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
| Parties | T. B. BYRD et al., Members of Review Committee (of Geneva County), Production and Marketing Administration, United States Department of Agriculture, v. Buford G. SORRELLS. |
J. Stephen Doyle, Jr., Neil Brooks, Sp. Attys. Gen., Hartwell Davis, U. S. Atty., Ralph M. Daughtry, Asst. U. S. Atty., Montgomery, Linton B. West, Wm. J. Foster, Atlanta, Ga., and Donald A. Campbell, Attys., U. S. Dept. Agriculture, Washington, D. C., for appellants.
E. C. Boswell and Jas. W. Kelly, Geneva, for appellee.
This suit was instituted in the circuit court of Geneva County, in equity, pursuant to the provisions of §§ 361-368 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, sometimes referred to hereafter as the Act. 52 Stat. 62-64, 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 1361-1368.
Under the Act, supra, quotas in each county are allotted by a County Committee elected by the farmers in the county. For the year 1954 the Geneva County Committee fixed the peanut acreage allotment for the farm of Buford G. Sorrells at 9.3 acres. Sorrells being dissatisfied with the allotment sought and obtained a review by the appropriate Review Committee composed of farmers appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture. In accordance with the regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture, a hearing was held by the Review Committee, which thereafter made its findings of fact and affirmed the action of the County Committee. Sorrells thereupon commenced this action in the circuit court of Geneva County, in equity, against T. B. Byrd, R. R. Donaldson, and M. C. Wilks, Members of the Review Committee, as allowed by the Act, supra. 7 U.S.C.A. § 1365. In accordance with the provisions of the Act, a transcript of the record upon which the determination of the Review Committee was made--including its findings of fact--was duly certified by the Review Committee to the court in which the bill was filed.
In his bill as amended, Sorrells claimed that the 1954 peanut allotment for his farm should have been 20 acres rather than 9.3 acres as fixed by the County Committee and averred, in substance, that the deficiency resulted (1) because of the failure of the County Committee to take into consideration the tillable acreage of his farm and 'other factors as provided by the Agriculture [sic] Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended, * * *' and (2) the refusal of the Review Committee to permit him to introduce evidence going to show the tillable acreage available on the farm and the peanut allotment for the farm for the years 1947 through 1950, which evidence it was averred was material, relevant and essential to a correct determination of the peanut allotment for 1954. The bill as amended prayed in part that the equity court make and enter 'such orders, as it determines necessary, requiring said Review Committee to re-determine their findings upon this cause and directing said Review Committee to allow the introduction of and to consider evidence of your complainant relating to the tillable acreage available of said farm and the peanut allotment of said farm for the years, 1947 through 1953.'
The amended answer of the respondents to the bill as amended contains a denial of the averments of the amended bill, as well as allegations to the effect that the 1954 acreage allotment established by the County Committee and affirmed by the Review Committee was proper and correct.
The case was heard in the equity court on the pleadings and the transcript of the record as certified to that court by the Review Committee. The equity court decreed that the cause be transferred back to the Review Committee for the purpose of considering 'evidence relating to the tillable acreage available and the peanut allotment for said farm for the years 1947 through 1953, as material evidence to be considered in their re-determination of a correct peanut allotment for the year, 1954, for said farm.'
On motion of the respondents the trial court set aside and vacated the decree just referred to and granted the respondents a rehearing, with permission to file an amendment to their answer.
Thereafter, on September 7, 1954, the equity court rendered a decree which was entered on September 13, 1954, which decree will sometimes be referred to hereafter as the decree of September 13th, providing that the cause be remanded to the Review Committee 'for the purpose of considering additional evidence to be taken in this cause and for a re-determination of their findings in said cause' and in which decree the Review Committee was ordered to 'allow the introduction of evidence relating to tillable acreage available and peanut allotment for said farm for the year 1947 through 1953, as material evidence to be considered in their re-determination of a correct allotment for the year 1954, for said farm.'
The bond to secure the costs of the appeal to this court by the respondents was approved and filed by the register on February 12, 1955. The certificate of appeal was filed in the office of the clerk of this court on February 22, 1955, and the transcript was filed here on March 4, 1955. The respondents, to whom we will refer hereafter sometimes as the Review Committee and sometimes simply as the appellants, being uncertain as to whether an appeal would lie from the decree entered on September 13, 1954, filed in this court on March 31, 1955, a motion or petition for mandamus in the alternative. The appellee on May 9, 1955, filed here his motion to dismiss the appeal. Submission here on behalf of the appellants was on the appeal and on the petition for mandamus and on behalf of the appellee on his motion to dismiss the appeal.
Grounds of the motion to dismiss the appeal are to the effect that the decree sought to be reviewed is not appealable.
It is settled that this court is without jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a decree rendered in an equity proceeding unless such decree is either a final decree or is one of the certain interlocutory decrees from which an appeal is authorized by statute. McKleroy v. Gadsden Land & Improvement Co., 126 Ala. 184, 28 So. 660; Ex parte Jonas, 186 Ala. 567, 64 So. 960; Hayes v. Hayes, 192 Ala. 280, 68 So. 351; Graves v. Barganier, 223 Ala. 167, 134 So. 874. The same rule, of course, applies in regard to judgments entered on the law side of the circuit court. See Bentley v. Knox, 258 Ala. 377, 62 So.2d 921.
It is not insisted, and it could not be successfully done, that the decree presently under consideration is of the kind of interlocutory decree from which an appeal is authorized by statute.
However, the appellants do contend that the decree of September 13th resolved all of the legal issues before the...
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