Byrd v. State, 62545

• Decision Date: 14 November 1985
• Docket Number: No. 62545,62545
• Citation: 481 So.2d 468,10 Fla. L. Weekly 599
• Parties: 10 Fla. L. Weekly 599 Milford Wade BYRD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 468

481 So.2d 468

10 Fla. L. Weekly 599

Milford Wade BYRD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 62545.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Nov. 14, 1985.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 6, 1986.

James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, W.C. McLain, Asst. Public Defender, Chief, Capital Appeals, and Karla J. Staker, Asst. Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Theda R. James and Katherine V. Blanco, Asst. Attys. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant, Milford Wade Byrd, was convicted of first-degree murder. The trial judge imposed the death sentence in accordance with the jury's advisory sentence recommendation. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

For the reasons expressed, we affirm appellant's murder conviction and the imposition of the death penalty.

Appellant and his wife, Debra, managed a motel in Tampa. Debra's body was found on the floor of the motel office at approximately 7:00 a.m. on October 13, 1981. An autopsy revealed that Debra had suffered four non-fatal scalp lacerations, four non-fatal gunshot wounds, and scratches and bruises on the neck. The pathologist determined that the cause of death was strangulation and that death had occurred between 9:00 p.m. on October 12 and 3:00 a.m. on October 13.

During interrogation on the morning of October 13, appellant told police that, on the night of the murder, he had gone to a gym and then to two bars. He stated that he returned home to the motel around 6:45 a.m., found his wife's body and called the police. Later that morning appellant requested that a desk clerk at the motel contact a life insurance company with reference to an insurance policy on Debra's life. Appellant was the sole beneficiary of the $100,000 policy. Five days later, on October 19, appellant personally carried a copy of Debra's death certificate to the insurance company and twice inquired as to how long settlement of the policy claim would take.

Ronald Sullivan, a resident of the motel, was arrested for violation of parole on October 27 and was subsequently charged with Debra's murder. After interviewing Sullivan the police decided that they had probable cause to arrest appellant. At 2:30 a.m. on October 28, the police arrived at the appellant's residence at the motel where they awoke appellant and arrested him for the first-degree murder of his wife. Although the arresting officers had no arrest warrant when they went to appellant's residence, it is undisputed that they had probable cause to arrest appellant. One of the arresting officers knocked on appellant's door, identified himself to appellant through a window, and mentioned that he had previously spoken to him with regard to the death of appellant's wife. After a few seconds appellant opened the door and stepped back. The detective then took a step inside, placed appellant under arrest for the murder of his wife, and advised him of his rights. In the motel room with appellant was his girlfriend, who was asked by the officers to accompany them to the police station. The woman voluntarily accompanied the officers.

At the police station appellant was again advised of his rights. He signed a written waiver of his rights at 2:55 a.m. Appellant neither admitted nor denied involvement in the crime until approximately 4:40 a.m. when he told the police he would tell them the truth if he could speak privately with his girlfriend. The detectives allowed appellant to spend some time alone with his girlfriend and, when questioning resumed, appellant's girlfriend re-entered the interrogation room and appellant gave a confession.

Appellant testified at trial that, at the time of his arrest, the arresting detectives said they had an arrest warrant. He stated that he opened the door and backed up as the detective stepped forward and arrested him.

When questioned about the murder, appellant stated that he had fallen in love with his girlfriend and that his wife had denied his request for a divorce. He confessed that he had offered Sullivan and Endress, Sullivan's roommate at the motel, five thousand dollars apiece to murder his wife. He also stated that the murder was planned to look like a robbery. Appellant denied, however, that he was present when the murder occurred. After this initial confession, appellant requested permission to use the telephone in the homicide squad room to call his father. Three police officers overheard this conversation and testified that appellant informed his father that, although he had not committed the murder, he had had it done.

Shortly after the telephone call, appellant signed a consent-to-search form for the search of a motel storage room. During the search of the room, detectives found a hacksaw, drill, solder, and copper and brass filings. Evidence was submitted at trial which indicated that Sullivan and Endress had fashioned a silencer for the murder weapon in the storage room.

Appellant retracted his initial confession two days after having given it and moved to suppress both the confession and the consent to search. The trial court, finding that the confession was voluntarily given and that the consent was valid, denied the motions.

In exchange for a negotiated plea, Sullivan testified against appellant on behalf of the state. Sullivan, who was charged with first-degree murder, testified that the state had offered him a term of probation in exchange for his truthful testimony. Sullivan stated that appellant had approached Endress and himself about having Debra killed. He also testified that he, Endress, and appellant were present when Debra was murdered; that Endress shot Debra several times and hit her with the gun; and that the three, in turn, had choked her.

The defense produced testimony from three county jail inmates concerning inconsistent statements made by Sullivan while he was in jail. The inmates offered three different statements allegedly given by Sullivan which alternatively placed the blame for Debra's murder on himself, Endress, and unknown armed robbers. A defense motion for a mistrial, based on the state's method of impeaching one of the inmates, was denied.

Appellant testified on his own behalf and denied complicity in the crime. He stated that he had been at two bars the night of the murder. Appellant also testified that his initial confession was given only because of concern for his girlfriend. Attempts to expedite the insurance policy on Debra's life, he explained, were only to enable him to pay the funeral expenses.

At the conclusion of the guilt phase of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of first-degree murder.

During the sentencing phase of the trial, the defense presented two witnesses, appellant and his father. Appellant testified concerning his relationship with his girlfriend subsequent to his wife's death. His father testified as to appellant's non-violent nature and appellant's relationship with his wife. The jury returned an advisory recommendation of the death penalty.

After the jury had given its recommendation, the trial judge heard testimony from two experts in the field of psychiatry concerning appellant's mental state at the time of the crime. The witnesses stated that appellant was not under the influence of any extreme mental or emotional disturbance, was not acting under the substantial domination of any other person, was not acting under extreme duress, and was not suffering any mental illness.

The trial judge agreed with the jury's recommendation and imposed the death sentence. The judge found three aggravating circumstances and one mitigating circumstance. The judge specifically found that the crime was committed for pecuniary gain in that appellant murdered his wife so that he could collect the proceeds of the $100,000 life insurance policy; that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel; and that the acts of appellant exhibited the highest degree of calculation and premeditation. As a mitigating circumstance, the judge found that appellant had no significant history of criminal activity.

Guilt Phase

Appellant contends that his conviction should be vacated because: (1) his confession was erroneously admitted because it was not shown to have been voluntarily given and because it was the fruit of an unlawful, warrantless arrest at his residence without compliance with Florida's knock-and-announce statute, section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (1981); (2) evidence obtained from the warrantless search of a storeroom was improperly admitted since the consent to search was not voluntarily given; (3) the consideration promised to a key state witness was not fully disclosed to the jury; and (4) the trial court failed to grant a mistrial based on the prosecution's improper cross examination of a witness. We find that the evidence is clearly sufficient to sustain this conviction and that none of the asserted errors require reversal.

A determination of the validity of appellant's confession requires a discussion of the appellant's arrest as it relates to the United States Supreme Court decision in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). In Payton and its companion case, Riddick v. New York, law officers, after establishing sufficient probable cause to arrest the defendants, entered the residences of the individuals to arrest them without first obtaining warrants. In both instances, incriminating property was seized from the premises and, in Payton, the defendant was also arrested. The United States Supreme Court held that the language of the fourth amendment applied to both the seizure of persons and the seizure of property. The Court, citing United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976), recognized that a warrantless arrest in a public place was proper, but stated that, with regard to the home or residence, the "Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the...