Byron v. Boston & M. R. R.

Decision Date07 December 1926
Citation136 A. 250
PartiesBYRON v. BOSTON & M. R. R.
CourtNew Hampshire Supreme Court

Transferred from Superior Court, Rockingham County; Burque, Judge.

Case for negligence in the maintenance of a station platform, brought by Laura Byron against the Boston & Maine Railroad. Verdict was returned for plaintiff. Transferred on defendant's exceptions to the denial of its motions for a nonsuit and for a directed verdict, and to plaintiff's argument. Verdict set aside. New trial.

William H. Sleeper, of Exeter, for plaintiff.

George T. Hughes and Stanley M. Burns, both of Dover, for defendant.

SNOW, J. The defendant's station at Exeter is upon the south side of two parallel main tracks, the southerly of which is known as the "east-bound," and the northerly as the west-bound." The main platform is between the station and the east-bound track, and is partially protected by a projecting roof in front of the station and by open awnings or roofs extending east and west therefrom. The middle platform separates the two tracks and is uncovered. Both platforms are of concrete construction, and are connected by four planked crossings, two of which are located in front of the station, the remaining two being situated one in either direction and some little distance therefrom. Otherwise the spaces between the rails are unfilled. Patrons of east bound trains are received from, and discharged upon, the main platform, while those traveling upon west-bound trains use the middle platform.

The plaintiffs evidence tended to show that she and her sister, who were intending passengers upon the west-bound noon train and already supplied with tickets, approached the station 'from a northerly direction by a path in common use, which entered through an opening in the fence of the railroad location at a point westerly of the platforms. Passing in front of the engine, which was at rest, they were proceeding easterly upon the middle platform, when, at a point some 6 feet easterly of the easterly end of the most westerly plank crossing, the plaintiff claims to have slipped upon a patch of ice and to have fallen upon the platform, receiving the injury complained of. The train consisted of an engine, baggage car, smoking car, and two coaches. The alleged point of the accident was opposite the middle or rear end of the baggage car. The plaintiff and her sister describe the patch of ice, from observations made after the accident, as about the size of a "chair bottom," of oval shape, higher in the center, and thinner at the edge, clear of sand and ashes.

The defendant concedes its duty to maintain station platforms in reasonably safe condition (P. L. c. 249, § 1; Haselton v. Railway, 71 N. H. 589, 591, 53 A. 1016), but contends that it was not responsible to the plaintiff for the condition of the platform at the place of the accident. This position seems to be based upon the claim that it owed no duty to intending passengers, approaching the train from other directions than the station, unless and until they had reached the line of travel which they would have taken if traveling directly from the station to the train. Manifestly the duty of the railroad to its patrons has no such narrow limitation. As the plaintiff held a monthly ticket, and the train was ready to receive passengers, she had no occasion to enter the station. She had been employ ed at Haverhill, and, when she had work, had been accustomed to travel daily by train to and from her place of employment. She had customarily used the path in passing between her home and the station. There was evidence that it was a "good path," and in use by the defendant's employees and others. If, however, it were conceded that the plaintiff was a wrongdoer until she reached the middle platform, such prior illegality of her conduct did not relieve the defendant of its duty to her after she had reached a place ostensibly prepared for passengers. There is no claim that the middle platform was not designed for the use of passengers to its full extent, or that it was not customarily so used, when the length of the train or other circumstances required. If the area to which the defendant's invitation to intending passengers extended was not coextensive with the boundaries of the concrete platform, no obvious limitation thereof is disclosed by the evidence. It cannot be said as a matter of law that the defendant's duty of maintenance as respects this plaintiff was limited to the direct course of travel from the station to her train.

Nor is the plaintiffs want of ordinary care conclusively established by the course of her approach. It is true that, when she crossed the track ahead of the engine, she might have continued across the east-bound track to the main platform, which had the protection of a sheltering awning, and thence proceeded by that platform and by one of the plank crossings to her train. It cannot be said, however, that no prudent person would have proceeded by the middle platform as she did.

Upon cross-examination the plaintiff admits that she did not notice, or look at, the platform before she fell; that, if she had looked, she could have seen the ice and would not have fallen. She, however, sets up as excusing circumstances that, upon crossing the northerly track, she had first stopped to reassure her sister, who was timid about crossing in front of the engine, and that just before she fell she had again stopped and turned, to make sure the sister was following her; that at this moment she was directed by a trainman, standing at the front end of the nearest passenger coach, to "come on," or "hurry up"; that, hastening in response to this admonition, she turned again to go forward, and had taken one, two, or three steps, when she encountered the icy surface and fell; that she was afraid they were going to miss the train, and was walking fast; that she was thinking about her sister, of what the trainman said, and whether the train would leave before they got there; that she supposed that the platform would be clean and sanded, and did not look at it, because she did not think it was necessary. The defendant's evidence tended to show that as a matter of practice the station platforms, particularly the middle platform, were kept sanded "whenever there was any ice, or any danger of slipping whatsoever." The last previous storm occurred six days before the accident, when 6.6 inches of snow fell. The temperature in the meantime had ranged between 46 degrees above zero and 27 degrees below.

It cannot be said that it conclusively appears upon the evidence that the ordinary person, under the exigencies of the situation in which the plaintiff was placed, would not have proceeded as she did in reliance upon the maintenance of the platform in the condition in which it was normally and usually kept. "It may be conceded that, if the plaintiff had looked, she would have refrained from stepping as she did, and still the defendants may...

To continue reading

Request your trial
11 cases
  • Wessman v. Boston & M, R. R.
    • United States
    • New Hampshire Supreme Court
    • 6 May 1930
    ...safe condition for the use of all its passengers including the plaintiff. Haselton v. Railway, 71 N. H. 589, 53 A. 1016; Byron v. Railroad, 82 N. H. 434, 136 A. 250. The agreement in question did not purport to relieve the defendant from its duty to exercise ordinary care with reference to ......
  • Fissette v. Boston & Maine R.R.
    • United States
    • New Hampshire Supreme Court
    • 7 April 1953
    ...that more precaution on decedent's part would have prevented the accident does not necessarily defeat a recovery. Byron v. Boston & M. Railroad, 82 N.H. 434, 437, 136 A. 250. Our law does not adopt particular circumstances as the measure of due care but rather holds the actor only to the st......
  • Charbonneau v. MacRury
    • United States
    • New Hampshire Supreme Court
    • 6 January 1931
    ...man" with whose conduct that of the actor is to be compared, namely, the average prudent person placed in his position. Byron v. Railroad, 82 N. H. 434, 438, 136 A. 250, and cases cited. While this standard is external (Garland v. Railroad, supra, page 564 of 76 N. H., 86 A. 141; Sevigny v.......
  • Lee v. Chamberlain
    • United States
    • New Hampshire Supreme Court
    • 3 December 1929
    ...law does not adopt particular circumstances as the measure of care, whatever may be the standard which is being applied. Byron v. Railroad, 82 N. H. 434, 438, 136 A. 250. While in this jurisdiction the doctrine of definitive degrees of negligence is not recognized as a part of our common la......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT