Byrum v. Horning

• Decision Date: 25 July 2000
• Docket Number: No. 150,150
• Parties: Barney L. BYRUM et ux. v. Rodney C. HORNING et al.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

756 A.2d 560

360 Md. 23

Barney L. BYRUM et ux. v. Rodney C. HORNING et al.

No. 150, Sept. Term, 1999.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

July 25, 2000.

Clifford E. Snyder, Jr., Frederick, for petitioners.

Daniel M. Press (Rodney C. and Barbara L. Horning, Stephen C. Wilkinson, on brief), Cumberland, for respondents.

Argued before BELL, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL and HARRELL, JJ.

RODOWSKY, Judge.

We granted certiorari in this matter in order to highlight the amendment to Rule 2-601, "Entry of judgment," that became effective October 1, 1997. 24 Md. Reg., Issue 9, Friday, Apr. 25, 1997, at 650. The amended rule reads as follows (brackets indicate deletions from prior rule; italics indicate additions to prior rule):

"(a) [When Entered] Prompt Entry—Separate Document

"Each judgment shall be set forth on a separate document. Upon a general verdict of a jury or upon a decision by the court allowing recovery only of costs or a specified amount of money or denying all relief, the clerk shall forthwith prepare, sign, and enter the judgment, unless the court orders otherwise. Upon a special verdict of a jury or upon a decision by the court granting other relief, the [clerk shall enter the judgment as directed by the court] court shall promptly review the form of the judgment presented and, if approved, sign it, and the clerk shall forthwith enter the judgment as approved and signed. A judgment is effective only when so set forth and when entered as provided in section (b) of this Rule. Unless the court orders otherwise, entry of the judgment shall not be delayed pending [a] determination of the amount of costs.

"(b) Method of Entry—Date of Judgment

"The clerk shall enter a judgment by making a record of it in writing on the file jacket, or on a docket within the file, or in a docket book, according to the practice of each court, and shall record the actual date of the entry. That date shall be the date of the judgment.

"(c) Recording and Indexing

"Promptly after entry, the clerk shall (1) record and index the judgment, except a judgment denying all relief without costs, in the judgment records of the court and (2) note on the docket the date the clerk sent copies of the judgment in accordance with Rule 1-324."

This amendment "addresses the need for clear, complete, and precise judgments." Reporter's Note to Proposed Rule 2-601, 23 Md. Reg., Issue 24, Friday, Nov. 22, 1996, at 1667. The history of the rule is set forth in the Reporter's Note, reading in relevant part:

"At the Court conference on the One Hundred Twenty-Seventh Report, there was considerable sentiment that the proposed amendment did not go far enough in the direction of Fed.R.Civ.P. 58 and that the Rules Committee should consider proposing an amendment to Rule 2-601 that would require each judgment of a circuit court to be set forth on a separate document.

"Accordingly, the proposed amendment to Rule 2-601(a) has been drafted, using language borrowed from Fed. R.Civ.P. 58, with style changes. The amendment provides that a judgment is not effective until it is set forth in writing in accordance with section (a) and is entered as provided in section (b). This comports with current federal practice and with pre-1984 equity practice in Maryland. See Eberly v. Eberly, 253 Md. 132, 251 A.2d 900 (1969)."

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 provides in pertinent part:

"Every judgment shall be set forth on a separate document. A judgment is effective only when so set forth and when entered as provided in Rule 79(a) [concerning civil dockets]."

The separate document requirement was added to Fed.R.Civ.P. 58 in 1963. The Advisory Committee note of that year explains the amendment as an effort to remedy the

"difficulty [which] has arisen, chiefly where the court has written an opinion or memorandum containing some apparently directive or dispositive words, e.g., `the plaintiff's motion [for summary judgment] is granted,' see United States v. F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co., 356 U.S. 227, 229, 78 S.Ct. 674, [676,] 2 L.Ed.2d 721[, 724] (1958). Clerks on occasion have viewed these opinions or memoranda as being in themselves a sufficient basis for entering judgment in the civil docket as provided by Rule 79(a). However, where the opinion or memorandum has not contained all the elements of a judgment, or where the judge has later signed a formal judgment, it has become a matter of doubt whether the purported entry of judgment was effective, starting the time running for postverdict motions and for the purpose of appeal.

"The amended rule eliminates these uncertainties by requiring that there be a judgment set out on a separate document—distinct from any opinion or memorandum—which provides the basis for the entry of judgment."

Fed.R.Civ.P. 58 (1963 advisory committee note (citations omitted)).¹ The dispute in the case before us concerns the use of a right-of-way. The issue on this certiorari review, however, is procedural, so that it is unnecessary to state the facts bearing on the substantive merits. The case was instituted in the Circuit Court for Allegany County in March 1994 by the petitioners, Barney L. and Elizabeth Byrum (the Byrums), against Rodney C. and Barbara L. Horning (the Hornings) and Jack W. Harvey (Harvey). The Byrums acted pro se in instituting this action, and more often than not they have proceeded pro se through the tangle of this litigation. In April 1994 the Byrums' claim for injunctive relief was denied, and their claim for money damages was deferred for determination at a trial on the merits. The subject action, Civil No. 94-10601, was consolidated with another action, Civil No. 93-10121, which was brought in 1993 and in which the Hornings, as plaintiffs, sought to enjoin the Byrums from blocking the disputed right-of-way.²

After eight continuances and an unsuccessful appeal by the Byrums, who claimed denial of a right to a jury trial, the consolidated cases went to a bench trial on July 15, 1999. The Byrums did not appear at trial. The court ruled that day, finding in favor of the respondents. That same day the clerk generated entries into the computer-maintained docket of the circuit court. In relevant part the entries read:

"Judgment entered in favor of the Counter Defendant, Jack Harvey, and against the plaintiffs, the Byrums in the amount of one dollar ($1.00).

....

"Hornings' motion for judgment is granted."

No separate document setting forth the judgment or judgments signed by the clerk (or by the judge) was filed in the court file on that date.

Thereafter, the court signed an undated, separate document in No. 94-10601, titled, "JUDGMENT," and reading in its entirety as follows:

"The Court having reviewed the file of this case and the matter having been brought to trial on the 15 th day of July, 1999, the Court on that date granted judgment to Defendant Jack W. Harvey on motion made by him, the Plaintiffs having produced no evidence to support their allegations. Further, the Court on that date entered judgment in favor of Counter-Plaintiff Jack W. Harvey against Counter-Defendants Barney L. Byrum and Elizabeth Byrum on Count I of the Counter-Complaint in the amount of One Dollar ($1.00)."

This separate document was filed by the clerk on August 6, 1999, and entered into the computerized docket on August 9, 1999. The docket entry reads, "Judgment. Copies to the Byrums and counsel for the defendants." Thus, per Rule 2-601(a) judgment was entered in Harvey's favor on the Byrums' claim against him, and, under Rule 2-601(b), the date of that judgment was August 9, 1999. There was, however, no final judgment in action No. 94-10601 at that time, because no judgment had been entered on the claim of the Byrums against the Hornings. See Rule 2-602(a).

Also after July 15, 1999, the court signed an undated separate document in No. 94-10601, titled, "JUDGEMENT," and reading in relevant part as follows:

"THE COURT having reviewed the file of this case and the matter having been brought to trial on the 15th day of July, 1999, the Court on that date granted judgement to Defendants Rodney C. and Barbara L. Horning, the Plaintiffs having produced no evidence to support their allegations."

This separate document was filed in the court file on August 13, 1999, and entered into the computerized docket on August 16, 1999. Insofar as relevant to No. 94-10601 the docket entry reads, "Judgment is entered in favor of Rodney and Barbara Horning.... Copies mailed to Mr. and Mrs. Bryum [sic]...."

All claims in No. 94-10601 having been adjudicated, the judgment entered on August 16, 1999, constituted final judgment in that action. No post-judgment motions were filed. Consequently, the thirty day period within which to appeal to the Court of Special Appeals is calculated from August 16, 1999.³ The Byrums noted their appeal to the Court of Special Appeals in No. 94-10601 on August 26, 1999. Hence, the notice of appeal was timely filed.

Nevertheless, the Byrums' appeal was met by motions to dismiss, respectively filed by Harvey and by the Hornings on September 10 and September 17, 1999. They argued that the Byrums' notice of appeal was filed too late. Both motions submitted that final judgment had been entered on July 15, and neither motion cited Rule 2-601(a).

The Byrums did not respond to the motions to dismiss. Accordingly, on October 13, 1999, the Court of Special Appeals dismissed the appeal by an order signed only by the Chief Judge.⁴

The Byrums, now acting through counsel, timely filed a motion to reconsider the dismissal of their appeal. The motion to reconsider did not cite to Rule 2-601(a), but it did attach copies of the docket entries and copies of the separate documents embodying the judgments entered on August 9 and August 16. Further, the motion, in part, made the following argument:

"7. It has been assumed here that the orders of court signed by [the trial judge] and sent to the Byrums by the clerk in August 1999

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