Byung Moo Soh v. TARGET MARKETING SYSTEMS
Decision Date | 30 September 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 1-03-2745.,1-03-2745. |
Citation | 817 N.E.2d 1105,353 Ill. App.3d 126,288 Ill.Dec. 455 |
Parties | BYUNG MOO SOH, Plaintiff and Counterdefendant-Appellant, v. TARGET MARKETING SYSTEMS, INC., Defendant and Counterplaintiff-Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee (Richard Koh, Defendant-Appellee; Buylateral.com PTE, Ltd., Defendant and Counterplaintiff-Third-Party Plaintiff v. Boraam Industries, LLC, Third-Party Defendant). |
Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
McGuire Woods LLP, Chicago (William D. Serritella, Donald C. Pasulka and Brian Marquez, of counsel), for Appellant.
Holland & Knight LLP, Chicago (Malcolm H. Brooks and Laura A. Derouin, of counsel), for Appellee.
The trial court granted the motion of defendants Target Marketing Systems, Inc. (TMS), and Richard Koh to dismiss. On appeal, the plaintiff, Byung Moo Soh, argues that the trial court erroneously interpreted an employee exemption found in section 2 of the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (820 ILCS 115/2 (West 2002)). For the reasons that follow, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand this matter.
On March 20, 2003, Soh filed his third amended complaint against TMS, Buylateral and Koh, who was the chief executive officer of TMS. In the complaint, Soh alleged that on November 27, 2000, he entered a written stock purchase agreement with defendant Buylateral.com PTE, LTD. (Buylateral), pursuant to which Soh sold and Buylateral bought all of the shares of common stock that he owned in TMS. Thereafter, on January 5, 2001, Soh and TMS entered into an amended and restated employment agreement (employment agreement) whereby Soh agreed to serve TMS in the capacity of president for a term of four years commencing on October 1, 2000. However, on February 5, 2002, Soh's employment with TMS was terminated.
On February 27, 2002, Soh filed his original complaint alleging causes of action for breach of employment agreement against TMS in count I, breach of stock purchase agreement against Buylateral in count II, and detinue against TMS in count III. Subsequently, the complaint was amended to add a claim under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (the Act) (820 ILCS 115/1 et seq. (West 2002)) against TMS and Richard Koh. Thereafter, Soh amended his complaint on two additional occasions in an effort to state a cause of action but failed.
On April 17, 2002, TMS and Buylateral filed a counterclaim against Soh. Thereafter, on January 10, 2003, TMS and Buylateral filed a third-party complaint against Boraam Industries, LLC.
On July 29, 2003, TMS and Koh subsequently filed a motion to dismiss count IV of Soh's third amended complaint pursuant to section 2-615 of the Illinois Code of Procedure (the Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2002)). Relying on Doherty v. Kahn, 289 Ill.App.3d 544, 224 Ill.Dec. 602, 682 N.E.2d 163 (1997), the defendants alleged that Soh did not fall within the class of employees protected by the Act because he served as president of TMS and had some degree of control over the performance of his work.
Specifically, count IV of Soh's third amended complaint alleged a failure on the part of TMS and Koh to pay Soh his agreed salary pursuant to the terms of the employment agreement. Count IV also alleged, inter alia, a failure to pay Soh other benefits to which he was entitled, a failure to reimburse Soh for business expenses incurred by him and that TMS terminated him without cause and without the required written notice.
On August 6, 2003, the trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss with prejudice. On September 5, 2003, Soh timely filed his notice appeal, wherein he requested that this court reverse the trial court's order of August 6, 2003.
The only claim at issue on appeal relates to the trial court's dismissal of count IV of Soh's third amended complaint.
A motion to dismiss brought pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code attacks the legal sufficiency of a complaint based on defects apparent on the face of the complaint. Vitro v. Mihelcic, 209 Ill.2d 76, 81, 282 Ill.Dec. 335, 806 N.E.2d 632 (2004). In ruling on a section 2-615 motion, a court must accept as true all well-pled facts in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the nonmoving party. Vitro, 209 Ill.2d at 81, 282 Ill.Dec. 335, 806 N.E.2d 632. The critical question on appeal is whether the allegations of the complaint, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. Borowiec v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 209 Ill.2d 376, 382, 283 Ill.Dec. 669, 808 N.E.2d 957 (2004). A cause of action should be dismissed pursuant to a section 2-615 motion only if it is clearly apparent that no set of facts can be proven which will entitle the plaintiff to recovery. Borowiec, 209 Ill.2d at 382-83, 283 Ill.Dec. 669, 808 N.E.2d 957. Our review of a dismissal pursuant to section 2-615 is de novo, and we may affirm upon any grounds for which a factual basis exists in the record. Colmar, Ltd. v. Fremantlemedia North America, Inc., 344 Ill.App.3d 977, 994, 280 Ill.Dec. 72, 801 N.E.2d 1017 (2003).
Doherty v. Kahn, 289 Ill.App.3d 544, 557-58, 224 Ill.Dec. 602, 682 N.E.2d 163 (1997).
The defendants contend that the trial court's decision to grant their motion to dismiss was proper. The defendants argue that Soh, as president of TMS, had some degree of control and direction over the performance of his work. The employment agreement, which governed the relationship that Soh had with TMS, defines his job title and duties as follows:
Consequently, the defendants maintain that the employment agreement does not provide any specifics as to how Soh is to perform his duties. As such, the defendants claim that Soh had "some control" and "some direction" over how his job was to be performed. Consequently, relying on Doherty, the defendants argue that Soh does not fall into the class of employees protected by the Act and, therefore, cannot state a claim for relief under the Act.
Soh contends that the trial court erred when it dismissed count IV of his third amended complaint. In particular, Soh argues that the trial court should not have relied on the decision reached in Doherty. Soh maintains that the Doherty court erroneously interpreted the meaning of "employee" as it is defined by section 2 of the Act.
In Doherty, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claim under the Act, on the basis that the plaintiff did not fall into the class of employees the Act seeks to protect. The ruling of the Doherty court follows:
Soh argues that Doherty was decided wrongly because, "pursuant to Illinois law on statutory construction, the clear and express language of the Act's `independent contractor' exclusion set forth in section 2 clearly requires that an individual meet all three factors in order to be excluded from the Act's protection."
Section 2 of the Act states the following:
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