C.B. v. Sonora Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 28 October 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:09–cv–00285–OWW–SMS.,1:09–cv–00285–OWW–SMS. |
| Parties | C.B., a minor, Plaintiff, v. SONORA SCHOOL DISTRICT; Karen Sinclair; City of Sonora; Chief of Police Mace McIntosh; Officer Hal Prock; Does 1–10, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
John F. Martin, Christine Ann Hopkins, Law Offices of John F. Martin, A Professional Corporation, Walnut Creek, CA, for Plaintiff.
Cornelius John Callahan, Borton Petrini, LLP, Modesto, CA, Joy C. Rosenquist, Goyette & Associates, Inc., Gold River, CA, for Defendants.
Before the court are Defendants City of Sonora, Chief Mace McIntosh and Officer Hal Prock's (collectively, “Defendants”), (1) Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (Defs. Mot. JMOL, ECF No. 177) and (2) Motion for New Trial and Remittitur (Defs. Mot. NT, ECF No. 178). Plaintiff C.B., a minor, (“Plaintiff”) opposes both motions. (Pl. Opp'n JMOL, ECF No. 186; Pl. Opp'n NT, ECF No. 188.)
This civil rights action arises from Officers McIntosh and Prock's (together, “Defendant Officers”) September 29, 2008 arrest of Plaintiff, then an eleven year old student, at Sonora Elementary School. Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Compl., ECF No. 2) and an Amended Complaint (Am. Compl., ECF No. 54) alleging: (1) violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act; (2) false imprisonment; (3) battery; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (5) violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; (6) violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act; and (7) civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff settled his claims against Defendants Sonora School District (“School District”) and Karen Sinclair on November 6, 2009. (Pet. Approval of Compr., ECF No. 48.)
The case was tried before a jury beginning on August 23, 2011. On August 31, 2011, the jury reached a verdict, which the court determined was inconsistent. An error in instructions on answering a question on the jury verdict form was discovered and corrected. The court answered the jury's questions and gave supplemental instructions and explanations.
On September 1, 2011, the jury reached the following verdicts: (1) Defendants violated Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right not to have excessive force used against him, and this violation caused harm or damage to Plaintiff; (2) Defendants violated Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights by taking him into temporary custody and removing him from school, and this violation caused harm or damage to Plaintiff; (3) the City of Sonora has a long standing practice or custom that caused its police officers to use excessive force against juveniles; (4) Defendant Officers intentionally caused Plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress, and this caused harm or damage to Plaintiff; (5) Defendant Officers did not have a legal right to take Plaintiff into temporary custody and to use reasonable force to effectuate and continue that custody; (6) Defendant Officers wrongfully took Plaintiff into temporary custody and/or wrongfully retained him in custody, and this caused harm or damage to Plaintiff; (7) Defendant Officers did not have probable cause to take Plaintiff into temporary custody and/or continue to hold him in temporary custody; and (8) Defendant Officers acted with malice, oppression, or reckless disregard of Plaintiffs' rights. (Verdict, ECF No. 174.) The jury awarded Plaintiff the following damages against Defendants:
Defendants move for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 on all of Plaintiff's causes of actions and Defendants' affirmative defenses. Plaintiff contends that Defendants' motion fails because the “overwhelming weight of the evidence supports the jury verdicts against Defendants ....” (Pl. Opp'n JMOL 6, ECF No. 186.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 governs motions for judgment as a matter of law in jury trials, and “allows the trial court to remove cases or issues from the jury's consideration ‘when the facts are sufficiently clear that the law requires a particular result.’ ” Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 447–48, 120 S.Ct. 1011, 145 L.Ed.2d 958 (2000) (quoting 9A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2521 (2d ed.1995)). Rule 50(a) provides in pertinent part:
If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue, the court may (A) resolve the issue against the party; and (B) grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the party on a claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be maintained or defeated only with a favorable finding on that issue.
“A district court may set aside a jury verdict and grant judgment as a matter of law ‘only if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict.’ ” Settlegoode v. Portland Pub. Schs., 362 F.3d 1118, 1122 (9th Cir.2004) (quoting Winarto v. Toshiba Am. Elecs. Components, Inc., 274 F.3d 1276, 1283 (9th Cir.2001)). “[T]he court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods. Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). “A judgment as a matter of law may be granted only if the evidence, viewed from the perspective most favorable to the nonmovant, is so one-sided that the movant is plainly entitled to judgment, for reasonable minds could not differ as to the outcome.” Gibson v. City of Cranston, 37 F.3d 731, 735 (1st Cir.1994).
Defendants move for judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff's unlawful seizure claim on the grounds of qualified immunity. Defendants contend that a reasonable officer in Defendant Officers' shoes during the incident would know that they were authorized to take Plaintiff into custody under Welfare and Institutions Code §§ 625 and 601 because Plaintiff was “beyond the control” of his guardian.
Qualified immunity shields government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The qualified immunity inquiry has two prongs: (1) “whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged ... or shown ... make out a violation of a constitutional right,” and (2) “whether the right at issue was clearly established' at the time of defendant's alleged misconduct.” Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 550 (9th Cir.2010) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815–816, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009)).
Defendants contend that the “special needs” standard applies to Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim for unlawful seizure. Traditional Fourth Amendment protections are lowered “when special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable.” Greene, v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1026, 1030 (9th Cir.2009), vacated in part on other grounds by Camreta v. Greene, –––U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2020, 179 L.Ed.2d 1118 (2011) (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987)). Defendants, however, do not specify what “special needs” are present in this case beyond the normal need for law enforcement to respond to a call for services from the school. Drawing all inferences in favor of Plaintiff, as required under this motion for judgment as a matter of law, there is insufficient evidence to satisfy Defendant's burden on the threshold question of the applicability of the “special needs” standard.
The Fourth Amendment protects students from unreasonable seizures at school. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985). A police officer's seizure of a student at a school is generally subject to traditional Fourth Amendment analysis when done for traditional law enforcement purposes. See Greene, 588 F.3d at 1026 (). To comply with the Fourth Amendment, a warrantless arrest must be supported by probable cause. Krainski v. Nev. ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., 616 F.3d 963, 969 (9th Cir.2010). “Probable cause to arrest exists when officers have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that an...
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