C.C. Dillon Com. v. City Of Eureka, MO.

Decision Date07 March 2000
Citation12 S.W.3d 322
Parties(Mo.banc 2000) . C.C. Dillon Company, Appellant, v. City of Eureka, Missouri, et al., Respondents. Case Number: SC81586 Supreme Court of Missouri Handdown Date: 0
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

12 S.W.3d 322 (Mo.banc 2000)
This slip opinion is subject to revision and may not reflect the final opinion adopted by the Court.
C.C. Dillon Company, Appellant,
v.
City of Eureka, Missouri, et al., Respondents.
Case Number: SC81586
Supreme Court of Missouri
Handdown Date: 03/07/2000

Appeal From: Circuit Court of St. Louis County, Hon. Kenneth M. Romines

Counsel for Appellant: Warren W. Friedman and Scott D. Mosier

Counsel for Respondent: Katherine L. Butler and Patrick S. Butler

Opinion Summary:

The city of Eureka based its billboard ordinance on section 71.288, which allows cities and counties to more restrictively regulate billboards than provided in the Missouri Billboards Act. The city denied C.C. Dillon Company a permit. Dillon claims amendments to several bills establishing and amending section 71.288 violate the Missouri Constitution. The trial court granted the city summary judgment.

AFFIRMED.

Court en banc holds: (1) Dillon's challenge to House Bill 831, enacted in 1997, which created section 71.288 is moot. The bill was repealed the following year by the enactment of Senate Bill 883, creating a new section 71.288.

(2) Billboards have been inextricably linked to highway transportation by federal and state legislation. The introduction of billboard regulations into a bill relating to transportation does not change the bill's original purpose. Conference Committee Substitute for House Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 883 (CCS HCS SB 883) does not violate the Missouri Constitution article III, section 21.

(3) The analysis in determining that billboards are germane to transportation also supports the determination that billboards fairly relate to, or are naturally connected with, transportation. CCS HCS SB 883 does not violate the single subject requirement of the Missouri Constitution article III, section 23.

(4) CCS HCS SB 883 does not violate the clear title requirement of the Missouri Constitution article III, section 23. First, the clear title rule necessarily applies to the version of the bill that was passed, not the introduced version. Second, the title, "relating to transportation" includes rather than excludes the bill's provisions. Third, the title need not describe every detail in the bill.

(5) The bill does not substitute one phrase for another in any statutory section. Instead, it is merely the state's election to allow local governments to exercise more than the minimum regulatory control necessary to maintain the state's federal highway funds. It does not violate the Missouri Constitution article III, section 28.

Opinion Author: William Ray Price, Jr., Chief Justice

Opinion Vote: AFFIRMED. All concur.

Opinion:

This case involves the constitutionality of section 71.288, RSMo Supp. 1999, which allows cities and counties to more restrictively regulate billboards than provided in the Missouri Billboards Act, sections 226.500 to 226.600, RSMo 1994 & Supp. 1999 ("Billboards Act"). The City of Eureka ("City") based its billboard regulation ordinance on section 71.288 and denied C.C. Dillon Company's ("Dillon") billboard permit. Dillon claims that the legislative amendments to the several bills establishing and amending section 71.288 were enacted in violation of sections 21, 23, and 28 of article III of the Missouri Constitution. The trial court granted summary judgment for the City. We have exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to Missouri Constitution article V, section 3. We affirm.

I.

On May 13, 1997, the Missouri Department of Transportation ("MoDOT") granted Dillon a permit to erect a billboard along Interstate 44 Highway within the City. On June 2, 1997, Dillon applied to the City for a permit to erect the billboard. The City Administrator denied the permit application on September 11, 1997, because the billboard did not comply with the City's more restrictive regulations. Dillon subsequently sought a variance from the City's Board of Adjustment, which was also denied.

Dillon filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a ruling that the bills that created and amended section 71.288 authorizing the city's more restrictive regulations were constitutionally invalid.1 The bills at issue are 1997 House Bill 831, 1998 Senate Bill 883, and 1998 House Bills (combined) 1681 & 1342.

II.

A.

Dillon's challenge to House Bill 831, enacted in 1997, which created section 71.288, is moot. That bill was repealed the following year by the enactment of Senate Bill 883. Senate Bill 883 repealed "former" section 71.288 and enacted in lieu thereof a "new" section 71.288. "The repeal of a law means its complete abrogation by the enactment of a subsequent statute." State ex rel. Peebles v. Moore, 99 S.W.2d 17, 19 (Mo. banc 1936) (citation omitted).

A cause of action is moot when the question presented for decision seeks a judgment upon some matter which, if the judgment was rendered, would not have any practical effect upon any then existing controversy. When an event occurs which renders a decision unnecessary, the appeal will be dismissed. And where an enactment supersedes the statute on which the litigants rely to define their rights, the appeal no longer represents an actual controversy, and the case will be dismissed as moot.

Bank of Washington v. McAuliffe, 676 S.W.2d 483, 487 (Mo. banc 1984) (citations omitted). Once the General Assembly repealed "former" section 71.288, this Court's basis for deciding the constitutionality of that statute evaporated. No relief can be granted concerning the validity of that statute, now repealed.

B.

Senate Bill 883 was introduced on February 5, 1998, and was entitled "An Act to repeal section 226.040, RSMo Supp. 1997, relating to transportation, and to enact in lieu thereof two new sections relating to the same subject." While the bill was being taken up for the third reading, House Amendment No. 1 was adopted, which revised section 71.288 by stating: "Any city or county shall have the authority to adopt regulations with respect to outdoor advertising that are more restrictive than the height, size, lighting and spacing provisions of sections 226.500 to 226.600, RSMo." The amendment also limited business taxes that cities or counties could impose on billboards to two percent of the gross annual revenue produced by the advertising structure. Numerous other amendments were adopted concerning sections 21.795, 43.030, 226.005, 226.140 as well as sections on fiscal notes. The Senate refused to concur with these House amendments and the bill was sent to a conference committee.

The final version, Conference Committee Substitute for House Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 883 ("CCS HCS SB 883"), was entitled "An Act to repeal sections 43.030, 226.040 and 226.140, RSMo 1994, and sections 71.288 and 226.005, RSMo Supp. 1997, relating to transportation, and to enact in lieu thereof seven new sections relating to the same subject." Section 21.795 established the permanent Joint Committee on Transportation Oversight to help account for transportation project funds. Section 43.030 amendments deleted the requirement that highway patrol member salary increases be the same as state merit employees. Amendments to section 226.005 pertained to organizational and salary issues of the Missouri Department of Transportation. Amendments to section 226.040 pertained to the position of the chief executive officer position of the highways and transportation commission and amendments to section 226.140 pertained to audits of that commission. The governor signed CCS HCS SB 8832 into law on July 6, 1998, with an effective date of August 28, 1998. 1998 Mo. Laws 1574.

III.

Article III, section 21 provides, "no bill shall be so amended in its passage through either house as to change its original purpose." Article III, section 23 provides, "[n]o bill shall contain more than one subject which shall be clearly expressed in its title . . . ." The purpose of these two sections3 is "to keep individual members of the legislature and the public fairly apprised of the subject matter of pending laws and to insulate the governor from 'take-it-or-leave-it' choices when contemplating the use of the veto power." Stroh Brewery Co. v. State, 954 S.W.2d 323, 325-26 (Mo. banc 1997).

Article III, section 28 provides:

[n]o act shall be amended by providing that words be stricken out or inserted, but the words to be stricken out, or the words to be inserted, or the words to be stricken out and those inserted in lieu thereof, together with the act or section amended, shall be set forth in full as amended.

This section's purpose is to avoid the confusion, uncertainty, and inconvenience that comes from having fragmented statutory amendments. See generally State v. Chambers, 70 Mo. 625, 628 (1879) (discussing article IV, section 34 of the 1875 Constitution, which is the same as article III, section 28 of the 1945 Constitution). The desired result of provisions like section 28 "is to have in a section as amended a complete section so that no further search will be required to determine the provisions of such section as amended." Flanders v. Morris, 558 P.2d 769, 773 (Wash. 1977) (discussing a state constitutional provision similar to that of Missouri's section 28) (citation omitted). Additionally, section 28 seeks to ensure that legislators are aware of the content and effect of the amended law. 1A Sutherland, Statutory Construction, section 22.16.

"The use of these procedural limitations to attack the constitutionality of statutes is not favored. A statute has a presumption of constitutionality." Stroh, 954 S.W.2d at 326. We interpret "procedural limitations liberally and will uphold the constitutionality of a statute against such an attack unless the act clearly and undoubtedly violates the constitutional limitation." Hammerschmidt, 877 S.W.2d at 102 (emphasis added). "The burden of establishing [a statute's] unconstitutionality rests...

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